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9Abstract
The aim of the study is to explain how paradise beliefs are born from the viewpoint of 
mental functions of the human mind. The focus is on the observation that paradise beliefs 
across the world are mutually more similar than dissimilar. By using recent theories 
and results from the cognitive and evolutionary study of religion as well as from studies 
of environmental preferences, I suggest that this is because pan-human unconscious 
motivations, the architecture of mind, and the way the human mind processes information 
constrain the possible repertoire of paradise beliefs.
The study is divided into two parts, theoretical and empirical. The arguments in the 
theoretical part are tested with data in the empirical part with two data sets. The first data 
set was collected using an Internet survey. The second data set was derived from literary 
sources. The first data test the assumption that intuitive conceptions of an “environment 
of dreams” generally follow the outlines set by evolved environmental preferences, but that 
they can be tweaked by modifying the presence of desirable elements. The second data test 
the assumption that familiarity is a dominant factor determining the content of paradise 
beliefs.
The results of the study show that in addition to the widely studied belief in supernatural 
agents, belief in supernatural environments wells from the natural functioning of the 
human mind attesting the view that religious thinking and ideas are natural for human 
species and are produced by the same mental mechanisms as other cultural information. 
The results also help us to understand that the mental structures behind the belief in the 
supernatural have a wider scope than has been previously acknowledged.
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1 Introduction
Paradise beliefs exist in virtually every religious tradition. The religions of the Near 
East, Chinese Taoism, the religion of the Aztecs of Central America, of African tribes, 
Aboriginals of Australia, or of the Saamzi of Northern Scandinavia all have their own views 
about paradisiacal circumstances. Many contemporary traditions have also adopted the 
idea of a paradise. The Melanesian Cargo Cults and Western UFO religions, for example, 
hold their own unique beliefs about life in better realms.
Not only are paradises constituents of many religious traditions, many of them are 
also central to a tradition. Whole religious systems from ancient Egypt to Christianity 
have been built around the idea of resurrection in which the idea of a paradisiacal afterlife 
has been central. Moreover, a belief that there is a paradise reserved for the righteous as a 
reward for good acts in this life is typical of most religious traditions. 
Despite the apparent universality of such beliefs, the reasons behind their universality 
have not been widely studied. In fact, it is surprising how little interest scholars of religion 
have shown in this topic. It is recognized that belief in an ideal afterlife, or in the perfect 
original abodes of men are significant building blocks of religious traditions. Yet studies 
focused strictly on paradises are difficult to find and often their focus is not on the paradises 
themselves but, for example, on the language used to describe paradisiacal worlds.
To fill this gap, I aim in this work to study the reasons behind the emergence and 
persistence of paradise beliefs and to explain their recurrence in the world’s religious 
traditions. This work builds on an argument that typifies the cognitive science of religion; 
the observed invariance in religious representations across cultures is best explained by 
the regularities in mental functions. More specifically, I will present a hypothesis that 
the foundations of paradise beliefs are of mental origin and ultimately products of our 
intuitive information processing guided by evolutionary objectives. I also adopt the view 
of many scholars and scientists in the field of cognitive science of culture who argue that 
the human mind has predispositions that constrain the kinds of information that can be 
acquired and how this information is processed and transmitted. I will examine if, and to 
what extent, the universality of the nature of paradise beliefs can be explained along these 
lines.
Moreover, I adopt the view that the mind has evolved to respond to certain types 
of tasks and stimuli better than to others. In other words, the repertoire of cultural 
representations is best explained by understanding that the architecture of the mind is an 
evolved whole adapted to respond to problems primarily related to survival. My aim is to 
show, by theorizing and by examining empirical and historical materials, that the mind 
works in a similar manner and under similar constraints with regard to representations of 
supernatural environments as it works with regard to supernatural agents. In other words, 
the cognitive processing of the elements of paradise representations is in essence similar 
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to the more researched agent detection albeit it is more complex: The cognitive processing 
of paradise representations is based on finding and identifying objects in the environment 
and on responding to them in an appropriate manner.
This task has not been conceivable for long. Indeed, I am fortunate enough to have 
access to scientific knowledge that scholars of religion have not had the opportunity to 
utilize until very recently. The cognitive science of religion, a young and still maturing 
discipline that emerged during the 1990s, provides a theoretical framework that has 
helped to enhance our understanding of religion as a natural psychological phenomenon. 
Moreover, the theoretical framework of the cognitive science of religion connects the 
relevant research problems of comparative religion with other disciplines which study the 
human mind: The advancements of several disciplines, namely those of cognitive science, 
neurobiology, evolutionary biology, and environmental psychology constitute both the 
cognitive science of religion and my task here. Thus, some twenty years ago formulating 
the hypothesis I here present would not have been possible, or at least finding an answer 
would have been an unattainable task for an individual scholar in any reasonable period 
of time. That said, I feel that I am merely standing on the shoulders of giants and by doing 
so I, hopefully, will manage to add my tiny bit of information to the top of the pyramid of 
scientific knowledge.
To gain an understanding of the structural features of the mind affecting the making 
of paradise representations, we must examine how cognitive constraints shape paradise 
representations guided by the unconscious environmental preferences that make some 
type of representations in general more attractive than others. The correspondence 
between our basic needs and the features and traits of paradises must be analysed in order 
to understand the inner motivations that construct representations about paradises such as 
we know them. While paradises may seem very different from each other, the differences 
between them can be explained by the frames of reference set by the local settings and 
histories.
This work is divided into two parts, theoretical and empirical. In the theoretical part, I 
will first review the previous scholarly explanations for the invariance of myths in general 
and explain how the new findings can help us investigate this old problem from a new 
viewpoint. In chapter 3, I will review different paradises of world’s religions to show that 
the apparent variance between paradises is in fact largely superficial. Then, in chapter 4, 
I will present my hypothesis on how the invariance can be explained from the cognitive 
and evolutionary viewpoint.
The empirical part consists of two studies with two different types of research material. 
My aim is both to address the (in many cases justified) criticism of not testing evolutionary 
or cognitive theories with data and to test the main aspects of my hypothesis with material 
to see if, and to what extent, the arguments of the hypothesis are correct or if they should be 
revised. In addition to testing, I also try to use the data to facilitate a deeper understanding 
of my hypothesis.
The aim of the first study is to test what kind of environments are spontaneously 
considered ideal and how the typical properties of paradise representations are spontaneously 
preferred. The second study examines the role of surrounding environments in paradise 
imagery, that is, how much actual circumstances can predict the content of paradises. 
As the data of the second study is derived from literary sources, it should have passed 
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a “theological filter”. Therefore, they should be theologically correct images of paradise. 
Thus, in addition to testing the hypothesis, the studies also allow a comparison between 
intuitive and theologically correct ideas of paradisiacal circumstances.
The data of the first study was collected by an Internet questionnaire implemented in 
2007. The data of the second study is collected from literary sources of Christianity and 
from the writings of various UFO religions. The material is therefore ranging from the 
second millennium BCE to today.
Thus, two materials of a different kind are used to test the different aspects of the 
hypothesis. The purpose of these studies is to offer empirical evidence for those aspects not 
previously discussed in the context of the cognitive science of religion. Whilst especially 
the data derived from the Bible in the second study is probably familiar to most scholars 
of religion, my aim is, along with the primary purpose of the analysis, to offer new insights 
into the construction of biblical texts describing paradises.
The final chapter is dedicated to the summary and conclusions. In that chapter, I will 
summarize the findings of this work and discuss the perspectives the results and this type 
of approach in general may open up for future study.
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2  The study of recurrence of myths – a new approach          to an old problem
In theory, myths should exhibit infinite variation. In practice, however, myths across 
the world are strikingly similar. Mythical narratives from ancient Greece do not differ 
much from those of Native Americans. The creation myths of different religious traditions 
resemble each other closely. Myths about heroes follow a similar outline irrespective of 
time and space. The myth of the great flood described in the Bible, for instance, has been 
known in a practically similar form from New Zealand to the Americas well before a 
single European explorer with his holy book had set foot in those regions (see Feldman & 
Richardson 1972; Puhvel 1988; Stark 2007). Wherever one looks, one comes across similar 
myths, heroes, and mythical realms. It thus seems that unconnected peoples tend to build 
their mythical imagery in a very similar manner by following some unwritten rules. It 
does not really matter where people live; they seem to share very similar ideas of how the 
universe came into existence, how life was in the beginning, and how mythical events 
determine the present world order.
The invariance of myths and religious beliefs across the world has been recognized 
at least since the 17th century, when exploratory expeditions brought mythologies of 
different cultures to the awareness of European philosophers and writers. Several types of 
myths familiar to Europeans, such as the Oedipus tales or Orpheus myths, were repeated 
in almost identical form in the New World (Puhvel 1988: 3). It was soon realized that the 
invariance of myths could not be the result of cultural interaction, instead some kind of 
universal capacity to produce such myths must be involved (see Feldman & Richardson 
1972).
Since then, several attempts to explain the invariance scientifically have been made. In 
fact, the most notable achievements of early comparative religion were made in the area 
of mythology (Sharpe 1994: 47) and many of the early scholars of religion were interested 
in classifying and categorizing traits of religious traditions in order to find the essence 
of religion. Also, the evolutionary anthropology that flourished in Europe during the 
19th and early 20th century tried to construct evolutionary pathways that might explain 
the development and transformation of beliefs and traditions from the “lowest” to the 
“highest” form (see Sharpe 1994). Thus, myths and the problem of recurrence have been a 
subject of interest to scholars from the very beginning of comparative religion.
The first scholarly theories of myth as a human universal can be traced back to the 
time when evolutionism shaped the cultural sciences. Evolutionism, which was based on 
the idea of a progressive evolution of humankind, penetrated anthropology in the late 19th 
century. It was strongly influenced by the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin (1882; 
1897) and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1907 [1809]). Nevertheless, evolutionism was not truly 
evolutionary in modern terms. Evolutionary anthropologists simply combined Darwin’s 
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theory of natural selection with Lamarck’s theory of the heritability of acquired properties 
and added the then prevailing ideas of progressive cultural and mental development and 
the universality of elementary ideas presented by theorists such as Georg Hegel, Bernard 
Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Charles de Brosses, and Adolf Bastian (see Bolle 2005; Pyysiäinen 
2009; Waller 2005) into the mix.
While several evolutionist theories were about society and the development of 
humanity, the most notable theoretical insights of evolutionary anthropology regarding 
myths were those of Edward Tylor. He formulated one of the first theories (but see Bolle 
2005 for de Brosses) of the original form of religion called animism in which a soul was 
projected into inanimate objects. This, according to Tylor, was the most primitive form 
of religion from which all religions have progressively developed towards “higher” forms 
(Tylor 1970 [1871]). Tylor also argued that believing in myths was an expression of a level 
of thinking typical of “less developed men” or “savages”. As mental evolution progressed, 
belief in myths was gradually replaced by scientific thinking and knowledge characteristic 
of “civilized men”. Thus, for Tylor, myths were simply explanatory like science with regard 
to goals, that is, they explained the causalities of the world but were inferior to scientific 
explanations (Segal 1999: 10).
In Tylor’s theory, the universality of myths was therefore explained as a culturally 
universal step preceding “higher” forms of mental abilities. Myths were explanations of 
the world formulated by the “lowest savages” in contrast to modern Western men whose 
scientific knowledge represented the “highest” forms of knowledge and mental abilities. 
However, Tylor also argued that even the most advanced civilizations had passed through 
the mythical phase in the past. Thus, as all cultures followed a similar progressive pattern, 
the beliefs (or myths) were expected to be similar due to species-specific progressive mental 
evolution (see Tylor 1970 [1871]).
As myth provided an explanation of the world, there would always be, according to 
Tylor, some similarities between myths due to similarities in actual circumstances. Thus, 
Tylor recognized religion as a phenomenon that can be reduced to human psychological 
abilities although his arguments were otherwise clearly erroneous. In retrospect, even 
though Tylor may not have meant it, he actually recognized the importance of both 
psychological and environmental factors in shaping myths, albeit his theory of mental 
development was rejected with good reasons decades ago.
The weaknesses of evolutionism became apparent by the early 20th century when 
its incompatibility with Darwinian evolution was gradually revealed and the nature of 
social evolutionist theories in general were questioned by many scholars (for a review, see 
Kuper 1988). As Adam Kuper (1988) notes, both the dichotomy between primitive and 
developed and the idea of the progressive evolution of societies are based on a complete 
(and possibly intentional) misunderstanding of the theory of Darwin. Darwinian 
evolution is neither mechanistic nor progressive. Evolutionary processes always depend on 
actual circumstances and selective pressures that are dependent on time and space. As a 
consequence, the evolutionary process does not produce predictable outcomes irrespective 
of external variables. Furthermore, there are no “savages” or “modern” men as social 
evolutionists argued. Indeed, from the modern viewpoint, evolutionary anthropology 
comes close to racism.
The first theories of the invariance of myths were developed within evolutionary 
anthropology, which was not merely limited to the study of religion. The first large-scale 
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research programme solely concentrated on explaining the varieties and similarities of 
religious beliefs was the phenomenology of religion, generally understood as the general 
cross-cultural comparative study of religion, although the definition is not that settled. 
Instead of purely comparative research based on anthropological data, finding the alleged 
essence of religion was a goal of many phenomenologists. They were usually not as 
interested in comparative studies as they were in a subjective understanding of religion. 
On the other hand, many of the early scholars of religion did not consider themselves 
phenomenologists even though their work was primarily comparative by nature. Thus, 
although there were basically two types of phenomenological study, descriptive and 
hermeneutic-existential, this type of classification of early phenomenologists is created 
retrospectively. The boundaries of the field were not generally that well defined (Jensen 
2003: 28-30).
While the phenomenologists of different schools produced a number of comparative 
studies and thus data about religious traditions and beliefs, the theoretical foundations 
of the phenomenology of religion remained vague because metaphysical and theological 
interests often outweighed scientific analytical approaches and historical study (Sand 
1999). Due to the lack of theoretical formulations, it is also difficult to put forward testable 
hypotheses within the phenomenology or religion (Jensen 1993; 2003; Penner 1989: 41-66; 
Pyysiäinen 2004b). This is not to say that theoretical openings have been completely absent 
in the phenomenology of religion, however. Several attempts have been made, but as Jeppe 
Jensen (1993; 2003) points out, they all suffer from obscurity and subjectivity and fail to 
establish sound theoretical or methodological foundations.
Despite theoretical ambiguity and metaphysical interests, there are some examples of 
theoretical efforts. Mircea Eliade, for instance, formulated a simple yet complex theory 
of hierophanies, that is, manifestations of the holy. The fundamental argument is simple: 
according to Eliade (1983), all elements of myths can be categorized either as “sacred” or 
“profane”. The sacred, says Eliade, has several modalities and it is essential to all myths and 
religious beliefs alike. Thus, the essence of religion can be returned to the hierophanies 
that separate the sacred from the secular.
The complexity of this approach lies in the obscurity of the category of the sacred. For 
Eliade, the sacred can express itself in almost anything, like trees or stones, for example. 
However, by following Eliade’s definition we soon arrive at an impasse. The concepts 
themselves remain vague as basically anything can be labelled sacred without any precise 
criteria of sacredness. Eliade fails to create definitions and categories which could be 
systematically applied to religious beliefs. This is a recurrent problem in the phenomenology 
of religion; either theoretical formulations are subject to circular arguments or they are 
logically ambiguous (Jensen 2003: 66-71). Definitional problems are therefore a major 
reason for the failure of the phenomenology of religion to establish sound, scientifically 
plausible explanations for the apparent invariance of religious beliefs and myths. The 
attempt to find one essence has, ironically, led to dissolutions rather than convergence (see 
Jensen 1993; 2003; King 1984).
Another type of approach to explain the invariance of myths is the structural analysis 
formulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963: 206-231). Lévi-Strauss based his theory on the 
philological theories that have largely influenced structuralism in general, applying the 
theory to myths (see Lévi-Strauss 1963: 67-80). The fundamental argument of Lévi-Strauss 
is that the structures of cultural phenomena correspond with the structures of the mind 
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and these structures manifest themselves in human cultures. When this approach is 
applied to myths, the reason for the invariance of myths, for Lévi-Strauss, is essentially 
a logical one. In his theory, the actual elements of myths are not as important as the 
relationships between the individual elements of myths. Myths share structural traits that 
relate to each other in a similar manner irrespective of the actual content. For example, 
the actions of mythical heroes follow a similar underlying formula which can be revealed 
by deconstructing the relationships of actions into parts and comparing the relationships 
between the parts with each other.
Using this approach, Lévi-Strauss argues, it is possible not only to find the common 
pattern behind myths but also to argue that myths are not “primitive” compared to scientific 
thinking (contrary to what Tylor proposed); both “primitive” and scientific thinking are 
based on the similar logical and structural patterns typical to all humans (Lévi-Strauss 
1963: 230). In other words, Lévi-Strauss defends the standpoint that the invariance of myths 
is primarily due to unconscious universal mental structures, or “universal logic”. Even if 
myths are publicly communicated, transmitted, and distributed, the true explanation for 
their similarity is the inner human capacity and tendency to handle such information in a 
predictable way (see Lévi-Strauss 1963; Sharpe 1994: 217-218).
Like the phenomenology of religion, structuralism has definitional problems. As 
the interpretation of structures is always that of a scholar, almost any kind of structural 
comparison becomes possible if only the objects of comparison are defined loosely enough. 
The object of structural analysis is therefore a result of interpretation rather than observable 
data (Sperber 1996: 43-47). Moreover, as a theory, structuralism does not manage to 
explain how structures of a certain kind emerge. Even though structuralism claims to 
explain the invariance of cultural information as manifestations of the structural features 
of the mind, it does not clarify what the specific features could be. As a consequence, the 
assumptions structuralism makes are unverifiable (D’Andrade 1995: 248-249). In other 
words, structuralism does not really explain though, at best, it does help to clarify what 
should be explained. Ultimately, it does not manage to investigate the underlying features 
of the mind that are said to give rise to the cultural data structuralists compare (Sperber 
1996: 43-47).
Another attempt to understand the invariance of myths was made by Joseph Campbell 
(1968; 1973). As Lévi-Strauss, also Campbell considers the causes behind the invariance 
of myths to be mainly psychological. He proposes that the tendency to make myths is 
innate and only the content of the myths is determined by environmental factors. Thus, 
innateness explains the similarities between myths and differences in circumstances and 
“the imprints of experience” explain differences (Campbell 1973: 21-131). Furthermore, 
the ultimate meaning of myth is, according to Campbell, universally the same. The 
ultimate meaning can be revealed when myth is taken psychologically and symbolically. 
In other words, myths can tell the truth and reveal their essence but only when understood 
metaphysically.
Campbell also outlined the theory of the monomyth, that is, a basic pattern found 
in many mythical narratives throughout the world (Campbell 1968). Campbell argues, 
mostly following the theories of Carl Jung and to some extent of Sigmund Freud, that the 
monomyth is one of the archetypes of the human subconscious. Thus, the monomyth is 
the elementary form, or archetype in the Jungian terms used by Campbell, of all mythical 
narratives and is furthermore an eternal possession that cannot be superseded (for the 
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opposed view, see Tylor 1970 [1871]).
The issue with Campbell’s theories is that they are not really testable (Segal 1987; 1999). 
Many of Campbell’s arguments are contradictory: at one point he emphasizes the unity of 
myths, but elsewhere he talks about their various oppositions. Methodologically, Campbell 
takes several liberties and applies other theories when it suits his needs, and even then 
drops parts without applying a systematic approach. Considering the comparative nature 
of his quest, Campbell also uses ethnographic data sparingly (Segal 1987). Thus, despite the 
promising opening remarks of his theory of myths (see Campbell 1973), the theory itself 
remains scientifically vague. Campbell is enthusiastic about myths but his actual analyses 
remain ambivalent and contradictory (see Segal 1987: 136-140). On the other hand, he 
should be credited for taking into account the psychological dimension of myths.
Notably, neither Lévi-Strauss nor Campbell developed their theories from scratch; both 
were influenced by the theories of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, two psychologists who 
radically advanced the study of subconscious during the early 20th century. While both 
were physicians seeking to cure mental illness, both also contributed to the psychology 
of religion and in effect made the theories of Lévi-Strauss and Campbell possible. While 
Freud mostly concentrated on denigrating religion – for him religion was just a detrimental 
phenomenon of the human psyche – Jung made significant efforts to create a theoretical 
approach to the relation between myths and conscious thinking. As a result, Jung phrased 
a theory of archetypes, or patterns of symbols which belong to what he calls the collective 
subconscious, which, according to Jung, explains why and how mythical narratives arise 
from the subconscious (Sharpe 1994: 208). The collective unconscious refers to the mental 
reservoir of the experiences typical of our species and thus shared by everyone. In other 
words, according to the Jungian view, myths are invariant and share a universal structure 
and pattern because they are manifestations of the collective unconscious (Jung & Kerényi 
1951, cited in Sharpe 1994: 208).
There are several important insights in the aforementioned theories and views and 
they sum up the kind of efforts that have made to understand the invariance of myths. 
Early on Tylor noted the significance of mental processes, although his views of mental 
levels and progression are hardly in line with today’s knowledge. Lévi-Strauss’s attempt 
is notable mainly because of his effort to return invariance to the structures and natural 
functioning of the human mind. Campbell noted that environmental factors cannot be 
omitted even though pan-human psychological properties affect the boundaries of myths. 
Jung’s idea that myths are survivals independent of all tradition due to structural elements 
present in everyone’s mind was one of the first serious attempts to explain the psychological 
background of cultural universals. Lastly, even though Freud disliked religion and saw it as 
neurotic wish-fulfilment or delusion (e.g., Freud 1959), he was one of the first to seriously 
locate the religious impulse below the level of the conscious mind (Sharpe 1994: 202).
This discussion shows that myths have been both a subject of interest and also 
recognized as a part of the human mind long before the most recent research and 
psychological methods. The shortcoming of the approaches discussed is that they lack an 
independent theory and data about the mind and mental functions. They simply postulate 
the mind as a source of myths and state that all humans share a similar architecture when 
it comes to mental functions. While this is also the starting point for many contemporary 
scholars, the previous theories do not explain how the mind actually processes information 
so that output recurrently results in myths of a certain kind that are predictable and typical 
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of the human species. In other words, all the theories discussed bypass the “manufacturing 
process” of myths. Moreover, the distribution of myths or other narrative material is largely 
omitted. Thus, neither the emergence nor persistence of myths can really be explained 
along any of the proposed lines.
The naturalistic approach to the recurrence of cultural ideas
 The earlier theorists indeed managed to pin the source of the invariance down to the 
mind but at the same time their results remained superficial. That is to say, they were not 
able to explain what kind of processes of the mind were responsible for the output they 
studied. Of course, this was for the most part simply impossible, because the modern tools 
of analysis were not available. Until recently, knowledge about the brain and the mind has 
been insufficient for making scientifically plausible analyses about the actual functioning 
of the mind.
The architecture of the mind began to be uncovered only a few decades ago and the 
exact nature of the mind is still in many ways an open issue. However, recent major leaps 
in the sciences of the mind have opened up completely new possibilities for the study 
and understanding of cultural phenomena in general, as well as religious beliefs from the 
standpoint of the functioning of the mind.
While the debate on whether human behavioural traits result from our biological 
nature or are a reflection of culture is several millennia old (Geary & Huffman 2002), the 
most recent and most influential quest for the exploration of the functioning of the mind 
and cognition did not start until the 1950s. Prior to that, even the most advanced science 
of the mind was fragmented into incommensurable disciplines, such as neurology and 
behaviourist psychology (e.g., Varela & al. 1993).
The first theory to point out that the behaviourist stimulus-response model of the mind 
was implausible was that of linguist Noam Chomsky (1957). In his theory, language was 
derived from logic that instantiated itself in the brain. Thus, Chomsky’s main argument 
was that environmental responses cannot explain the acquisition of language. Instead, 
there must be a set of innate predispositions that make learning possible.
Chomsky extended his argument by formulating a theory of domain-specific cognition, 
which refers to the idea that the human mind is equipped with a number of innate 
subsystems specialized in different types of information-processing tasks (Chomsky 1980). 
The idea has since been developed and refined by many authors (e.g., Fodor 1983; Pinker 
1994; Sperber 1985; 1994). In addition to language, many other mechanisms of the mind 
have been studied from the viewpoint of modularity. It has been suggested, for instance, 
that basic emotions (Damasio 1999; Ekman 1992), risk evaluation (see Chase & al. 1998; 
Rode & al. 1999), tool use (Pinker 1997), and predator-prey interactions (Barrett 2005) are 
innate rather than learned and are based on the modular architecture of the mind.
The modular model proposes that cognition is context-sensitive, and thereby 
functionally limited by its own architecture. Different modules, while very effective 
in their own sphere, are ineffective problem-solvers when it comes to information of a 
type they are not specialized in. Thus, modularity limits the type of information that 
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is effortlessly processed. For instance, abstractions are difficult for humans because they 
cannot be connected to any meaningful context the mind is adapted to process (e.g., 
Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Sperber & al. 1995; Ward 1994).
Some authors (e.g., Burgess & MacDonald 2005; Elman & al. 1996; Uttal 2001) are 
sceptical about domain-specificity, instead advocating a more versatile domain-general 
model of cognition in which information processing is less specialized and therefore 
more capable of processing various types of information. In the domain-general model 
of cognition, modularity itself is not denied. Instead, the defenders of domain-generality 
argue that modules cannot be located in specific regions of the brain and that they are not 
isolated from each other. Thus, the information-processing capabilities of the mind should 
be more flexible due to interaction between different parts of the mind. According to the 
domain-general model, this would make cognition more adaptive to different situations 
and more free from contextual boundaries.
In addition to formulating theories about the structures of thinking, several attempts 
to physically locate the supposed modules in the brain have been made (for a review, see 
Geary & Huffman 2002). It is evident that at least some tasks, such as navigational skills 
(Maguire & al. 2000), processing agency (McNamara 2001), and aspects of social cognition 
(Lieberman & al. 2002) can be located in the hippocampus, the frontal lobes, and the 
neocortex respectively, indicating a possible physical location of respective modules. In 
many cases, however, it is not possible to locate mental processes in well-defined parts 
of the brain. For example, language activates so many areas in the left hemisphere of the 
brain that it is exaggerated to speak of a specific region that would in turn indicate the 
presence of the single language module (Binder & al. 1997; see also Gazzaniga 1995). 
Moreover, different regions of the brain are generally able to handle tasks of several kinds 
and evidence has shown that postnatal learning leads to changes in the brain structure 
suggesting that the brain is prone to dynamic change over time (Geary & Huffman 2002). 
Furthermore, while many skills can be connected with certain parts of the brain, it is 
evident that many of its resources are shared by several cognitive processes (see Gazzaniga 
1995). Thus, these findings suggest that at least the strictest modular models of cognition 
may need reconsideration at the physical level although this does not eliminate context-
sensitive modularity from information processing itself.
Taking all these findings into account, it is evident that the answer lies in neither 
extreme proposed, that is, the mind does not consist either of hard-wired physically 
identifiable modules or of equipotential general processors. Instead, it looks as if the 
mind has a modular basis from the contextual point of view; while information of a 
certain kind is evidently processed more easily than another, the actual processing may 
involve the cooperation of several mental mechanisms or physical parts of the brain (see 
Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Geary & Huffman 2002; Pyysiäinen 2009). In other words, the 
predispositions of the mind determine how efficiently and effortlessly given information 
can be processed. The modules are neither physically nor contextually as strictly 
encapsulated as some theorists suggest, however. Generally, there is room for flexibility 
and communication between modular structures and some structures are able to perform 
several tasks of different kinds. In fact, this is what makes the human mind so special: 
it is flexible and capable of processing and transmitting information across domains (cf. 
Mithen 1996; Boyer 1994; 2001; Sperber 1996).
While the debate on the relative roles of domain-specificity and domain-generality 
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is far from being settled, there is little denial of the fact that not all information is 
equal. The mind processes certain types of information better than some other and the 
acquisition of information is guided by several types of functional wholes in the mind. 
In other words, humans do not acquire information freely but under constraints that 
also set phenomenological boundaries on cultures. Information compatible with the 
predispositions of the mind has a better chance to become a part of cultural information 
than information that requires delicate cognitive efforts to be processed (Sperber & Wilson 
1995). 
The impact of these considerations on the study of culture has been enormous, though 
not as enormous as it could be. Nevertheless, unlike only a couple of decades ago, all 
serious theorists agree today that there are gene-driven constraints on brain development 
although experience indeed affects the development of both the brain and the mind (Geary 
& Huffman 2002). The naturalistic view of the mind as an entity equipped with innate 
predispositions has gradually replaced the old tabula rasa idea of the mind as a blank 
slate filled with information only after birth. While the modular model of the mind is still 
disputed by some scholars, the accumulating empirical evidence has indeed strengthened 
the view of cognition as a specialized, context-sensitive information processor. This has 
also made possible the study of religious beliefs from the cognitive point of view. The idea 
of inequality of information along with the growing understanding of the functioning of 
the mind and brain provide new perspectives on religious beliefs. For trying to understand 
the recurrence of religious beliefs, the accomplishments of cognitive scientists introduce 
important new insights for scholars of religion.
The rise of the cognitive science of religion
The cognitive mechanisms of the human mind have recently become a promising starting 
point in the study of religion. Several studies inspired by the work of cognitive scientists and 
psychologists have suggested that we can best understand the supernatural with reference 
to how the mind and brain work (for reviews, see Atran 2002; Boyer 2003; Tremlin 2006). 
In other words, belief in the supernatural can be traced back to the natural functioning of 
the mind instead of religion being a sui generis category, as suggested by earlier scholars 
(e.g., Eliade 1959; van der Leeuw 1963).
The first steps in the cognitive science of religion were taken by Stewart Guthrie, who 
proposed that the belief in supernatural agents arises from an error in inductive reasoning 
caused by the unconscious tendency to attribute humanlike properties to all kinds of 
environmental cues that suggest the presence of agents (Guthrie 1980; see also Guthrie 
1993; 2002). According to Guthrie, the human need for coherence and to reduce ambiguity 
is so great that it drives the cognitive processes to create representations of invisible 
humanlike agents in the absence of real agents (cf. Kruglanski 1989). Thus, supernatural 
anthropomorphic agents were unconsciously created to reduce the feelings of anxiety and 
fear and to make the uncertain world around us feel more predictable, as humanlike agents 
are among the entities of the world humans naturally know the best.
Although Guthrie presented his argument in 1980, it was not until the early 1990s 
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when the cognitive science of religion really started to take off. Many consider the work 
of E. Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley (1990) a starting point for the cognitive study 
of religion. Lawson and McCauley formulated a theory of how cognitive processes shape 
religious rituals. Their main argument was that the acquisition of symbolic-cultural 
systems, such as religious rituals, requires little if any explicit instruction from outside 
(Lawson & McCauley 1990). The foundations of such acquisition must therefore be non-
cultural. Even though the argument itself had been presented by linguists before (e.g., 
Chomsky 1957; 1980), Lawson and McCauley were the first to apply this argument to 
religious rituals to show that unconscious cognitive processes and intuitions affect religious 
behaviour and expectations concerning the efficacy of rituals.
Throughout its short history, the focus of the cognitive science of religion has been in 
the study of supernatural agency and how it is conceptualized, in what has been dubbed 
as theological correctness, and in the differential distribution of religious ideas (Barrett 
2007). Moreover, religious experience (e.g., Pyysiäinen 2001a; 2001b; McCauley 2001; 
Whitehouse 1995), narratives (e.g., Sjöblom 2004; 2008), and modes of religiosity (e.g., 
Whitehouse 1995; 2000; 2002) have been studied from the cognitive standpoint.
In addition to Guthrie, the work of Pascal Boyer in particular has had a major impact 
on the development of the cognitive science of religion. Boyer has shown that religious 
concepts are generally counterintuitive and violate our ontological intuitions (Boyer 1994; 
2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; see also Pyysiäinen & al. 2003). Boyer argues that the violation 
of intuitive folk-biological expectations make representations of supernatural agents more 
memorable and thus more prone to become culturally widespread. In other words, our 
natural cognitive functioning largely shapes our representations of supernatural agents 
(Tremlin 2006: 9), that is, the structural features of the human mind organize and shape 
the repertoire of possible supernatural agent representations.
Boyer’s theoretical insights have been further refined and applied to religious beliefs by 
many authors. It has been shown, for instance, that religions operate on two different levels, 
theological and intuitive, that are, despite many similarities, fundamentally different from 
each other from the standpoint of the functioning of the mind (Barrett 1998; 1999; 2000; 
2004; Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Pyysiäinen 2004a; see also Tremlin 2006: 
172-182). Cognitive structures constrain the cultural spread of religious representations; 
while some representations remain a property of trained religious specialists alone, 
others become widespread (cf. Sperber 1996: 140). For instance, the studies of Justin 
Barrett & al. (Barrett 1998; 1999; 2000; Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett & Nyhof 2001) show 
a clear intuitive tendency to  anthropomorphize and  to remove abstract properties from 
supernatural agents when their properties must be spontaneously pieced together. This, in 
turn, restricts the variety of representations of supernatural agents people can mentally 
hold. Thus, cognitive functioning guides what humans can actually intuitively believe in, 
regardless of what is offered as a theologically correct doctrine.
So far, many of the scholars working in the field of the cognitive science of religion 
have concentrated on the theoretical formulations instead of experimentally testing 
the predictions of their theories (Barrett 2008). The empirical testing of hypotheses is 
only gradually becoming a part of the cognitive science of religion. For instance, Boyer’s 
main arguments about counterintuitiveness have been recently affirmed by several 
experimental studies (Atran & Norenzayan 2004; Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 
2001; Gonce & al. 2006; Pyysiäinen & al. 2003; Slone & al. 2007) indicating that most 
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religious concepts are indeed inconsistent with intuition-based knowledge, though not 
randomly. Moreover, the results show that context-sensitivity affects the memorability of 
religious concepts (Gonce & al. 2006; Slone & al. 2007) indicating that contextual effects 
may have greater importance than mere counterintuitiveness. Thus, while experimental 
studies have succeeded in showing that the theoretical foundations of the cognitive 
science of religion are fair, they have also opened up new issues that further theoretical 
and empirical work should address. Consequently, more work is necessary in the future to 
test the theoretical assumptions of the cognitive science of religion. For example, the role 
of emotions and motivational aspects in religious conversion is one of the open issues yet 
to be experimentally addressed.
Even with such limited, if growing, empirical material available, the major contribution 
of the cognitive science of religion is having managed to show how the belief in the 
supernatural can be understood in terms of the natural mind functioning and that religion 
is natural and part of being human (see Barrett 2004). Additionally, the cognitive science 
of religion has managed to show that not all religious conceptions are made equal which 
is in line with the findings of cognitive science about cultural information in general. 
Instead, representations of a certain kind are more likely to become a part of religious 
beliefs and traditions than some others. Theological abstractions have little chance of 
becoming intuitively accepted and thus a part of the religious doctrine people hold in their 
everyday life. A religious belief can only survive if it fits in with the architecture of the 
mind and manages to utilize the ordinary information processing of the mind. Basically, 
this is what many previous authors such as Freud, Jung, and Lévi-Strauss have already 
proposed, albeit in different terms. However, the cognitive science of religion entails the 
theoretical framework that is both scientifically plausible and testable. The cognitive 
science of religion provides a very promising tool kit for solving what kind of information 
processing actually takes place in the mind and brain, and why it works as it works.
Despite several methodological and conceptual differences compared with more 
traditional approaches, the cognitive science of religion has focused mainly on traditional 
subjects other than myths. However, the theoretical foundations of the cognitive science 
of religion offer a starting point for the study of myths when we keep in mind that myths 
are narratives that consist of representations similar to supernatural agents. The cognitive 
science of religion can be applied to explain aspects of mythology to the extent that myths 
include counterintuitive representations. Understanding religiosity from the viewpoints 
of the architecture and functioning of the mind is essential to the study of belief in the 
supernatural in general. Thus, the question to pose is not what the cognitive science of 
religion has done to explain the invariance of myths but what it can do and how the new 
theories can change our view of this very topic.
Evolutionary approaches in the study of culture and religion
Before proceeding, one more important approach in the study of the human mind must 
be briefly outlined as the standpoint adopted in this work relates to it. This evolutionary 
approach may be the most debated, the most controversial, and emotionally the most 
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difficult of all the approaches used in the study of culture. Scholars who have approached 
culture from this perspective have been accused of supporting racism, or even worse (see 
Hagen 2005). For some reason, applying evolutionary theory to cultural phenomena is 
difficult to accept for many scholars. For many, culture should be treated as a unique 
whole that separates humans from other animals. Likewise, as evolutionary theories are 
designed to explain the behaviour of animals, it cannot be applied to human behaviour in 
any way. This is by no means true. While the evolutionary approach (in true Darwinian 
terms) has traditionally been applied only to the behaviour of non-human species, there 
are no reasons to exclude humans from the potential topics of research.
The motivation to study human culture from an evolutionary perspective stems from 
the functional aspect of an organism, that is, all organisms must function to procure 
energy in order to survive and reproduce (Eldredge 1986). Humans are, among other 
things, organisms with the urge to survive and reproduce and therefore they are a feasible 
subject of evolutionary study. To reveal the underlying naturally selected patterns and 
physically evolved structures of humans, evolutionary perspective must therefore always 
be considered when studying culture.
The first to suggest the use of Darwinian evolutionary theory in the study of human 
culture was in fact Charles Darwin himself (see Darwin 1965 [1872]). However, the scholar 
who started the current debate around the topic was Edward O. Wilson with his book 
Sociobiology (1975). Wilson argued, mostly by drawing from the then very current theories 
of ethology (e.g., Hamilton 1964; Lorenz 1966; Trivers 1971) aimed at explaining animal 
behaviour, that human culture is dependent on the genetically inherited traits and that 
all human behaviour serves evolutionary purposes to advance one’s reproductive success. 
Since then, much of the discussion around evolutionary psychology and neighbouring 
disciplines has concentrated on the extent to which evolutionary history and natural 
selection can explain human behaviour, thinking, and culture. While most scholars today 
admit that Wilson’s deterministic view needs at least a serious revision, it is still unclear 
how many human behavioural traits can be explained in evolutionary terms.
In addition to sociobiology, several types of approaches, such as memetics, gene-culture 
coevolution, and evolutionary psychology (see Laland & Brown 2002) have been developed 
to expose the role of evolution in human behaviour. Behavioural ecology, for example, 
assumes that human behaviour consists of adaptive tradeoffs that occur in behaviour 
but that behaviour is more flexible than sociobiologists suggest. Moreover, the history of 
selection has endowed humans with a tendency to respond to environments by weighing 
up costs and benefits of adopting particular strategies (Laland & Brown 2002: 114-115), 
thus treating human behaviour as analogous to animal behaviour.
While behavioural ecologists criticized the sociobiological approach for its inflexibility, 
it has been, in turn, criticized by evolutionary psychologists, perhaps the most influential 
school of scholars advocating the evolutionary study of culture, for not taking the 
functioning of the mind into account (Laland & Brown 2002). Evolutionary psychologists, 
the most eager spokesmen of domain-specificity and the modular model of cognition, 
developed their models from the viewpoint that the evolved architecture of the mind 
best explains cultural phenomena. They based their theories on the assumption that the 
human mind consists of a number of modules adapted to solve the problems of a past 
environment in which hominids evolved.  Due to the slow pace of evolution, it is likely 
that the same adaptations still shape human cognition and hence culture, meaning that 
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cultural universals and constraints can be explained by studying the functioning of the 
context-specific modules of the mind.
While this assumption is most likely largely true based on what is known about 
evolutionary processes, it is pointed out that the knowledge about the past environments 
is often insufficient. Thus, it becomes very hard to prove that any given mechanism of 
the mind has evolved due to selective pressures of a certain type of environment (cf. 
Buller 2005; Panksepp & Panksepp 2000). In other words, the role of evolution is often 
difficult to pinpoint. Moreover, some critics feel that the role of genes in human evolution 
is overestimated at the expense of other processes, especially cultural evolution, and 
that the role of adaptiveness is overemphasized (see Buller 2005; Laland & Brown 2002; 
Panksepp & Panksepp 2000; for an earlier critique of adaptationism in general, see Gould 
& Lewontin 1979). Moreover, evolutionary psychologists often overlook the evolutionary 
history of pre-human species. Many evolved mechanisms of the mind are probably older 
than the human species. Previous steps in hominid evolution have possibly shaped our 
mental functioning more than any given Pleistocene environment (Buller 2005; Panksepp 
& Panksepp 2000; Panksepp & al. 2002). This does not make the importance of evolutionary 
processes obsolete in any way, however.
When it comes to the scientific plausibility of methods used by evolutionary 
psychologists, a considerable number of the critiques of the evolutionary approach are 
based on emotional opinions and unjustified accusations of genetic determinism rather 
than well-formulated counterarguments (Hagen 2005). However, it is also true that far too 
many propositions concerning how evolutionary history has shaped humans have been 
scientifically dubious, even fallacious (Laland & Brown 2002). The evolutionary studies of 
human behaviour have often been “just-so” stories, in which an evolutionary explanation 
is simply postulated for some cultural phenomenon without testing the hypothesis with 
data or considering to what extent evolutionary theory can provide explanations for the 
subject. For this reason, wider arrays of data, a wider range of methods, and further 
specification and testing of supposed evolved functions must be employed in order to test 
evolutionary hypotheses (Simpson & Campbell 2005). However, when used correctly and 
by following the standards of good research, the evolutionary approach offers insights no 
scholar should bypass simply on account of habit or personal arrogance. It is a fact that 
humans are evolved organisms. Therefore, how evolutionary history still affects humans is 
an issue that should always be considered in the study of culture.
So far, the evolutionary approach has not been widely used in the study of religion, 
although it is becoming an increasingly discussed topic (see Bulbulia & al. 2008; Sjöblom 
2007). However, taking the cognitive standpoint means the evolutionary tone will always 
be present in research due to the importance of evolutionary considerations for the 
background theories: The human mind is understood as an evolved whole which is rooted 
in the evolutionary history of the human species. Consequently, the functional aspect of 
the architecture of the mind needs to be considered as the architecture of the mind is a 
result of natural selection and must therefore have responded to problems of survival more 
effectively in the course of time than alternative architectures.
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A new approach – some conceptual framework
We have now reviewed different theories of the invariance of myths and religious beliefs 
in general. We have also noted how most of the theories locate the origin of myths in the 
human mind and in some cases add environmental factors as determinants of the actual 
content. We have also noted how the cognitive science of religion could offer important 
insights to explain the invariance of myths. It can help us explain the invariance of 
paradises more precisely than before as it links contemporary brain and mind research 
to research problems relevant to comparative religion. This notion will form a basis from 
which the formulations of this work will be developed. With this approach, I believe, it is 
possible to achieve a deeper understanding of the question at hand than has been possible 
with the previous theoretical considerations.
However, before moving on, some of the key concepts need a closer examination. The 
main concepts are summarized in Table 2.1. Nevertheless, some more detailed evaluation 
about the key concepts is also necessary. I will discuss these concepts in the following 
paragraphs.
First of all, we must define what is meant by paradise. Understood from a Western 
point of view, paradise is usually a synonym for the Garden of Eden as described in the 
first chapter of Genesis in the Bible. In this work, paradise covers a much wider range of 
supernatural worlds, however. Paradise should be understood as a place where the dead 
live after their death, or alternatively as the original abode of the human species. Thus, the 
term “paradise” does not refer here to any specific paradise, such as The Garden of Eden or 
Sukhāvatī (the paradise of Pure Land Buddhists), for example. “Paradise” should instead 
be understood as a common name for any representation of a supernatural environment 
which is considered desirable. Thus, paradise can also refer to a nostalgic golden age, in 
which case returning to paradise is usually seen as the ultimate goal of human life (cf. 
Eliade 1971; Partin 2005).
When we talk about paradise representations, we should also be careful what we mean 
by representations. Despite its wide use, representation is not necessarily an unequivocal 
concept. In this work, I follow Dan Sperber’s definition that is both theoretically plausible 
and rigorous. At a general level, a representation, says Sperber, involves a relationship 
between three terms: an object is a representation of something for something (Sperber 
1996: 61). Sperber’s definition does not contain a presupposition of the nature of that 
something or the nature of the object the representation is for. For our purposes here 
it is enough to bear in mind that only representations for humans are considered. Thus, 
paradise representations are representations of environmental circumstances humans 
hold either mentally or, when transmitted to other humans, publically.
The supernatural, for its part, separates paradises from utopias, another type of 
desirable environment. By following Ruth Eaton’s definition, utopian environments 
are ideal environments that are intended to be realized through human effort without 
supernatural assistance (Eaton 2002: 16). Paradises, in turn, are always established by a 
supernatural force. Thus, even though utopias and paradises may closely resemble each 
other, they are fundamentally different concepts when it comes to the emergence of a 
utopian or paradisiacal world.
Naturally, one could ask if paradises are myths in themselves. After all, myth, narrowly 
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defined, describes a story about gods and other superhuman beings. Myths report realities 
and events from the origin of the world that remain the basis and purpose of all there is 
(Bolle 2005; see also Eliade 1963: 1-20). Paradises, in turn, are descriptions of a place in 
wider narratives. However, it should be noted that paradises always represent mythical 
realities and are therefore myths as such, because they represent realities considered 
sacred (see Bolle 2005). Furthermore, many paradise myths, such as that of the Garden of 
Eden, are also comprehensive narratives. Many paradises are also the original abodes of 
men and are essential elements in explanations of how men, among other things, came to 
be. Although paradises are not illustrations of the present, they sketch the ideal of how the 
present world should be and will be in the afterlife.
Table 2.1 – Key concepts defined.
Concept Details
Paradise A common name for any representation of a 
supernatural environment which is considered 
desirable.
Representation A private (mental) or public (culturally transmitted) 
presentation of an object, or set of objects. A 
representation involves a relationship between three 
terms: an object is a representation of something for 
something. (a)
Innate, innateness Refers to a trait or a predisposition that exists in the 
mind of an individual at birth and is therefore gene-
based instead of post-natally learned.
Counterintuitive, counterintuitiveness A property of concepts and representations that 
violates intuitive expectations related to ontological 
categories.
Module An innate cognitive structure specialized in processing 
certain types of information (e.g., that of other agents 
or objects).
Domain-specificity The model of cognition that presents the human mind 
as a set of specialized, presumably evolved, devices 
specialized in processing information of a certain 
kind.
(a) after Sperber 1996: 61.
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Summary
As already noted, paradises have not usually been studied outside the mythical context as 
independent representations. When beliefs about various kinds of afterworlds have been 
studied, the viewpoint has usually been theological, historical, or linguistic (e.g., Auffarth 
1999; Barr 1993; Benjamins 1999; Wallace 1985). In comparative religion, scholars have 
usually approached afterlife beliefs from the phenomenological point of view (e.g., Brandon 
1962; Eliade 1978; 1982; van der Leeuw 1963). Yet the efforts to understand the reasons 
behind the spectrum of paradise beliefs have been quite modest despite the wide interest 
in myths.
As discussed above, several theoretical and methodological openings to solve the 
invariance of myths have been made. Nevertheless, they have not proven to be suitable to 
gain a more profound understanding of the architectural elements of the mind behind the 
invariance of myths and paradises. However, a new theoretical framework, the cognitive 
science of religion, provides insights for studying how religious beliefs have emerged 
and are held in general. Despite the differences in the object of study, the theoretical 
framework of the cognitive science of religion should be highly applicable for the study of 
paradise representations as representations of paradises are cultural information about the 
supernatural and should therefore be created similarly in the mind as the representations 
of supernatural agents. 
That said, by using the general theory of the emergence and persistence of supernatural 
concepts we should be able to study paradise representations from a cognitive viewpoint. 
Even though there are no previous attempts to explain the invariance of paradise 
representations in this way, the insights of the cognitive science of religion and evolutionary 
understanding of cultural phenomena suggest that this approach is the most promising so 
far. The key is to learn which kind of information processing takes place in the mind with 
regard to paradise representations.
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3 Recurrence in paradise representations1
Just as there are recurrent themes in myths in general, there are recurrent themes in 
paradise representations as well. Similarly, even if in theory there are no limitations to 
what paradises are like, in practice this is not the case. Patterns similar to those found 
in myths can be found in paradise representations. In this chapter, I will review paradise 
representations of several major traditions to show how paradises resemble each other. I 
will indicate where there are differences, and why this is an interesting issue that is in need 
of explanation.
Before going any further, a critical distinction needs to be made, however. I will use 
the terms “real world” and “imaginary world” to refer to the two classes of representations 
of environments. “Real world” refers to the world about which we can make empirical 
observations. Thus a real, or empirically observable world refers to the environments that 
can be seen, heard, or sensed in ordinary ways. “Imaginary world”, for its part, refers 
to environments that cannot be directly observed but about which we can hold beliefs 
and have mental representations similar to those of the real world. This is not in itself an 
ontological claim about the non-existence of paradises, however.
As questions concerning the origin of humans and especially their fate after death 
are crucial to religions, it is not surprising that the nature of paradise has caught the 
attention of many theologians. Especially the problem of the afterlife has been addressed 
in many ways. In most cases, however, the desired state of an afterlife has been described 
in rather abstract terms. For instance, Christian theologians have made great efforts to 
explain the ultimate fate of man. The desired afterlife is usually described as living in 
union with God with no references to environmental circumstances. For example, the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) states that the desired afterlife is an everlasting, 
purified communion with Christ and God. At the same time, CCC portrays the emotional 
nature of the afterlife: it is the ultimate end and fulfilment of the deepest human longings, 
the state of supreme and definitive happiness (CCC, Part I, Section 2, Chapter 3, Article 
12, 1023).
Similar explanations that link one’s ultimate fate with ideas of union and fulfilment 
are found in most major religious traditions. The Talmud and Midrash, the holy scriptures 
of Judaism, for instance, declare that at the end we arrive at the world to come, where the 
righteous will sit in glory and enjoy the splendour of the Divine Presence in a world of 
purely spiritual bliss (e.g., Berenbaum & Skolnik 2007). The ultimate goal of Buddhists, 
Nirvāna, is, for its part, described as an escape from the world of suffering, as cessation, or 
as the absence of delusion (e.g., Kasulis 2005). The same is true of Hinduism and various 
schools of Tao (henceforth Taoism), two other major Asian traditions. Both emphasize 
1 This chapter is based on Närhi (2008).
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that the ultimate goal of humans is not a specific place but rather a state in which a person 
unites with the universe (i.e., Bráhman or Tao) and all suffering ceases to exist (e.g., 
Heesterman 2005; Kohn 2005).
While theological viewpoints are usually presented by the theologians of major 
religious traditions, even some newly arisen sects have formulated similar conceptions. 
For example, the Urantia Foundation, that was established in 1950 under the influence of 
the then current UFO phenomenon, has a complex description of paradise. According to 
The Urantia Book, which contains the teachings of the group, paradise is “the eternal center 
of the universe of universes and the abiding place of the Universal Father, the Eternal Son, 
the Infinite Spirit, and their divine co-ordinates and associates. This central Isle is the 
most gigantic organized body of cosmic reality in all the master universe. Paradise is a 
material sphere as well as a spiritual abode” (The Urantia Book, Part I, Paper 11).
Despite the existence of such conceptions, this level of explanation seems generally 
to be restricted to traditions which have developed serious theological explanations, a 
process that has often taken centuries. What is even more notable is that even if such 
conceptions are theologically accepted as orthodox, the very same traditions regularly hold 
concurrent ideas of paradise that are very different from abstract delineations. Moreover, 
these concurrent ideas represent a far more common type of paradise beliefs if we take a 
closer look at a wider range of religious traditions.
If theological conceptions are not satisfactory for the majority of believers, what are 
more intuitive paradises then like? Simply put, they are physical environments with very 
concrete features. Paradises are fruitful valleys, oases, distant islands, and gardens, for 
example. Instead of complex abstractions, representative examples of the constituents of 
paradise representations consist of natural elements, such as water or fruit trees, culturally 
valued elements such as towers and palaces decorated with jewels, gold, and a lack of all 
threats. In short, paradises would be ideal places to live.
Of course, this is not to say that paradises are just idealized mirrors of the real world. 
Many of their properties are modified in such a way that they violate our intuitive 
expectations about natural regularities or are vastly exaggerated. Things such as talking 
animals or people who live forever or can transform themselves into animals are not found 
in the real world. Nor are there rivers of honey and wine or an unlimited supply of the 
finest food.
Nevertheless, the way these paradises resemble this world is quite striking. Paradises are 
not strange randomly generated realms where invisible five-headed myriapods float in the 
air while the bluish quantarees (whatever they may be) dance happily around the singing 
clouds. Nor are they vague in terms of environmental elements. Instead, they are real-world-
like environments populated by familiar objects, such as rivers, trees, buildings, animals, 
and humans. Paradise representations can actually be called simplified representations 
of cultural-ecological systems. They provide the necessary resources for living as well as 
shelter in one form or another (e.g., by removing dangerous beasts, providing safe places to 
rest etc.). In this respect, descriptions of geographically and demographically distributed 
paradise representations from various traditions repeat the same formula: Their elements 
form an environment which provides everything necessary for living.
In Table 3.1 I have summarized the contents of different paradise representations. 
Although some aspects seem to make the representations very different, the differences 
are in fact relatively trivial and can be explained with reference to local differences in the 
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natural and cultural environment.
Table 3.1 – Paradise representations of various traditions.
Tradition (paradise(s) 
known as) Geographical origin Contents of paradise
Christianity, Judaism
(Gan ‘eden, Pairidaeza)
The Near East A fertile oasis or garden which supplies 
everything its inhabitants need for nutrition 
and ease of life. It is also the source of the 
sweet waters of the world. The birds and 
animals of paradise are under the mastery 
of humans, and thus harmless (even to each 
other). Sexual tension does not exist between 
a man and a woman. (a)
Islam
(al-Jannah)
The Near East Paradise is a pure, perfect, and eternally 
fruitful garden that provides eternal shelter 
and a place to rest for its inhabitants. 
Paradise is filled with ease, joy, laughter, and 
amenities. Endless supplies of food and drink 
are available. Four delightful rivers of honey, 
milk, water, and wine flow in paradise. 
Spotless, amorous virgins are reserved for 
men as spouses. Sins, sorrow, and death are 
unknown. (b)
Taoism
(e.g., K’un-lun Shan,   
P’êng-lai Shan)
China On the shore of The Lake of Gems grow the 
trees of Old Age Peach, The Tree of Pearls, 
and the Jadestone Tree. The fruits of these 
trees all ensure immortality. The inhabitants 
enjoy perpetual leisure and happiness and 
they live life filled with ease and pleasure. 
(K’un-lun Shan)
The towers and terraces are made of gold and 
jade, the beasts and birds are white. Trees 
of pearl grow densely, and they flower and 
bear fruits which are always luscious. Those 
who eat the fruits will never grow old or die. 
(P’eng-lai Shan) (c)
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Tradition (paradise(s) 
known as) Geographical origin Contents of paradise
Pure Land Buddhism
(Sukhāvatī)
India, China, Tibet The inhabitants of paradise live happily 
forever and all their wishes come true. 
Paradise is full of ponds with gold-sanded 
bottoms surrounded by trees. Lotus flowers 
rain from the sky and the air is filled with 
beautiful music. Paradise is decorated with 
gold, silver, emerald, and crystal and is 
bounded by banana and palm trees. (d)
Hinduism
(e.g., Vyoman,
Anand-loka, Svar-loka)
Southern Asia, India Said to be located north of the Himalayas, 
paradise is a place of sensual pleasures for 
all the senses. Music enchants the ear, and 
fruits, sweetmeats, and ambrosial dishes 
entice the palate. Delightful perfumes charm 
the sense of smell. Paradise is also populated 
with jewelled palaces, golden pathways, 
green acres, and bowers of fragrant flowers. 
The heavenly companions (nymphs) ensure 
the happiness of those who ascend to the 
heavenly spheres. (e)
Egyptian ancient religion
(Sekhet Aaru)
Egypt In paradise life continues similar to this 
life but is effortless: fields always produce a 
profuse crop, hunting is easy, and hunger or 
thirst are unknown. The dead can live in any 
form they like. (f)
Ancient Scandinavian
 religions
(Valhöll/Valhalla)
Scandinavia The home of Odin, reserved for those died in 
battle. Paradise is a great golden hall with 540 
doors, from which the dead warriors sally 
forth every day to fight against one another. 
After the day they feast on the flesh of the 
mythical boar and drink the mead produced 
by the mythical goat. The inhabitants are 
served by valkyries (nymphs). (g)
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Tradition (paradise(s) 
known as) Geographical origin Contents of paradise
Saami
(Sáiva)
Northern Scandinavia, 
Lapland
A mirror-world that is a parallel but  happier 
realm of the deceased, situated either inside an 
arctic hill or a mountain, or below the lower 
bottom of a double-bottomed lake. The most 
significant differences between paradise and 
the real world are that in paradise well-being 
is guaranteed and working is unnecessary. 
Even the reindeer are bigger than in this 
world.
The lakes that set this world and paradise 
apart are also known to be the abodes of fat 
and large fish (especially lavaret, perch, and 
salmon), which often live between the two 
bottoms of the lakes, hence being difficult to 
catch. (h)
Celts
(Síd)
Ireland Paradise is characterized as a spacious festive 
hall, a distant island, or a burial mound. 
It possesses a never-failing supply of the 
choicest food and drink. Most notably, there 
is an inexhaustible supply of pork, which 
was highly valued among the Celts. Life in 
paradise is a continuous feast. People live 
without toil and in eternal peace without 
strife. Death and diseases are unknown, and 
even the colours are brighter than in this 
world. (i)
North American Indians, 
especially Plains Indians
(Name varies depending 
on tribe)
North America Life continues similar to this life except that 
everything becomes easier: hunting buffalo 
involves no risks and is always successful. The 
souls of the dead live in their tepees, dancing 
and celebrating. (j)
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Tradition (paradise(s) 
known as) Geographical origin Contents of paradise
Aztecs
(Tlalocan, also several
“lesser” paradises)
Central America Paradise is a fortunate land with lakes, rivers, 
cacao trees, and eternal summer. There life is 
a pleasant existence in the middle of flowers 
and trees. An abundance of fruit, corn, and 
beans is notable. The inhabitants of paradise 
feel no sorrow. If they wish, they can also 
transform themselves into a butterfly and fly 
back to the world of the living. (j)
Aboriginal tribal religions
(Name varies depending 
on tribe)
Australia Paradise is a fertile land with abundant 
resources of water and easily hunted game. 
Life in paradise is comparable to this life but 
is without its difficulties. Paradise is usually 
located in the sky or a distant island in the 
west (where the sun sets). (k)
African tribal religions
(Name varies depending 
on tribe)
Africa In paradise life is effortless and without risk. 
Its inhabitants can enjoy without labour all 
the fruits of the trees and the fields and all 
their wishes come true. Misery, suffering, 
and toil, as well as sickness and death are 
unknown. Even hunting involves no risk and 
effort, for the animals do not fear or flee their 
hunters. (l)
Cargo Cults
(Name varies
depending on
the “school”)
Melanesia Paradise is characterized by equality 
between the races, and by lack of poverty 
and hunger. Life is happy and wars and 
violence are unknown. Material welfare and 
the abundance of Western commodities are 
central. (m)
UFO cults
(Name varies
depending on cult)
Western countries, 
especially the United 
States
Paradise is a utopian realm usually located 
in outer space in which all contemporary 
problems are solved. Ecological and 
sociological crises cease to exist and all 
weapons are destroyed or neutralized. The 
inhabitants of paradise either live thousands 
of years or are immortal. Reincarnation is 
possible for nearly all. Earthlings can have 
an eternal soul that survives a physical death. 
War, poverty, and suffering are unknown. 
(n)
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Lettering of names and the descriptions of paradises in Table 3.1 are based on ethnographic and 
encyclopedic sources: (a) Bamberger 1978 [1972]; Partin 2005; (b) Glassé 1989; (c) Werner 1961; 
(d) Gomez 1996; Kōtatsu 1987; (e) Walker 1968; (f) Lewis 1994; (g) Dronke 1997; Lindow 2001; (h) 
Laestadius 1997; Pentikäinen 1995; Pulkkinen 2005; (i) Carey 1982; O’Cathasaigh 1978; O’Rahilly 
1946; (j) Hultkrantz 1980;  (k) Berndt & Berndt 1988; Charlesworth & al. 1984; (l) Baumann 1936; 
Ray 1976; (m) Steinbauer 1979 [1971]; (n) Grünschloß 1998; 2003; 2004; Wojcik 2003.
The main purpose of the descriptions provided in Table 3.1 is not to itemize the smallest 
items of detail (this will be done in study 2 for some of the representations presented 
here, see chapter 6) of different representations but to illustrate the scope of variance and 
invariance among traditions, and to show how geographically and temporally widespread 
is the belief in this type of paradise and afterlife. Except for the last two (Cargo Cults 
and UFO cults), all the representations derive from premodern times, before aeroplanes 
and global real-time cultural exchange of information. Taking into account their wide 
geographical dispersion, it should be clear that cultural interaction cannot explain all of the 
invariance in paradise representations. Undoubtedly, historical contacts between the Near 
Eastern traditions can at least partly explain their mutual similarity. However, cultural 
exchange is hardly an adequate explanation for the fact that the paradise of the Aztecs 
is not very different from that of the Aboriginals of Australia or the Saami of Northern 
Scandinavia. We must therefore look for a different explanation.
In addition to invariance, there is also variation that needs to be explained. Flora and 
fauna differ from paradise to paradise, and so do such cultural elements as the presence or 
absence of palaces and temples. Evidently, cultural variation can explain this to a certain 
extent. For example, the lack of huge buildings in the paradises of tribal religions is explained 
by the fact that these peoples did not build or even know of any such constructions. Thus, 
because there is no real-world parallel, the supernatural version does not exist either.
The same logic holds for the palaces and temples when they are present in a paradise. 
We do not find temples made of jade in the Near East. While jade was known, there were 
many other materials of greater importance. Instead, jade is one of the materials of Chinese 
(Taoist) paradises (see Werner 1961: 234, 372) as it was highly valued in China. Similarly, 
in the biblical imagery of the New Jerusalem, palaces are made of gold and diamonds. It is 
obvious that culturally valued elements tend to find themselves in paradises, but only in 
cases where they have a real-world parallel.
Flora and fauna perhaps offer even more salient examples, since their local variation is 
more unique than that of the cultural elements. By looking at the paradise representations 
in Table 3.1, we see that most of them actually present paradise as a natural environment. 
Animal and plant species and the scenery represented vary from paradise to paradise. For 
example, hummingbirds are as unique to the paradise of the Aztecs as reindeer and specific 
fish to the Saami paradise. American bison are mentioned in the North American Indians’ 
paradise representations, but not in the Near East, where this animal was unknown. Thus, 
typical local fauna is usually found in paradise, especially if it is somehow relevant (such 
as game).
In the case of flora, the presence of plant species seems to depend on their natural 
distribution in a similar manner. For example, the lotus, a typical plant of paradise in East 
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Asia is not found elsewhere. Bananas, cacao trees, and palms serve as further examples of 
local specialities, although they are more widespread. Again, this is because these plants 
have a real-world counterpart in these parts of the world. We do not expect to find them 
in Scandinavian paradise representations, however.
It also seems that the location of paradise can be predicted by examining the general 
attributes of the environment where the belief in a certain paradise is held. The geographical 
location of paradises varies from a distant island or a lake to mountain tops and valleys. 
The connection between these locations is that they all represent the idea of a paradise 
situated beyond an unreachable natural formation or element (e.g., the sea or mountains) 
and that the elements in question play some role in the environment of the culture. The 
location of paradise depends on the kind of geographical elements available in different 
regions. Locating paradise in a distant island is therefore quite logical to people such the 
Celts, who lived by the sea. Similarly, paradise as a fertile oasis in the desert is natural for 
the people of the Near East. For the Saami, the salience of lakes, arctic hills, and mountains 
in their living habitats make them natural locations for paradise. In short, paradises are 
generally located in places that are ultimately unreachable and yet familiar.
Again, paradises do not strictly reflect the actual environments; they are exaggerated 
and stretched in many ways. The ratio between favourable and harmful species is 
unbalanced, for example. While favourable species, like those that are hunted, indeed form 
one of the most important animate natural elements of paradise representations, harmful 
or threatening species are either absent or their dangerous nature has been modified to a 
harmless form. The fruitful properties of nature are greatly emphasized while real-world 
harshness is marginalized. All these things are located in a mysterious place at the edge of 
the world familiar to the creators of the representation.
Therefore, and regardless of certain variation, paradises clearly follow certain pattern. 
While paradises in general represent an ideal place to live, their properties are limited to 
those that are observable in the actual environment of the creators of the representations. 
Therefore, the nature of a paradise can be predicted by observing the natural and cultural 
environment of the creators of the representations.
If the pattern discussed is universal and independent of cultural contacts, a need to 
explain its emergence and durability becomes evident. It seems that there are predictable 
rules linked to our evolutionary needs and evolutionary history which explain how 
paradise representations are so uniform. I argue that this predictability arises because the 
human mind has been optimized by natural selection to favour mental representations 
of a certain kind, and that this makes these representations enduring and widespread. 
Paradise representations seem to emphasize those elements in our environment which are 
considered relevant or desirable.
To learn how and why this is so, we must examine the way our mind processes and 
values information acquired from the environment and whether any universal preference 
patterns can be found. Moreover, we must explore what cognitive predispositions involve 
in the construction process of paradise representations. In the next chapter, I will formulate 
the theory of emergence and durability of paradise representations from the cognitive 
point of view.
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4 The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of      paradise representations2
In order to understand how paradise representations emerge and survive in the 
competition of cultural ideas, we must examine three different but interwoven aspects of 
cognitive information processing. First, we must understand why humans prefer certain 
environments and how this preference is linked to paradise representations. In other 
words, the impact of natural selection and the relative roles of unconscious and conscious 
information processing must be analysed. Coping with threats and possibilities provided 
by the environment requires abilities of a certain kind that, according to my argument, 
have their effect on the content of the representations created in the mind.
Next, we must probe what kind of mental processing and mental capabilities are 
necessary for producing paradise representations and how they shape the repertoire of 
paradise representations. In other words, we must analyse how the architecture of the 
mind makes paradise representations possible. Third, we should learn why this happens, 
that is, what kinds of motivations promote representations of paradises even if they can 
never be reached in the real world. Obviously, there must some other reason to hold a 
belief in representations of this kind.
My argument is based on the distinction between unconscious and conscious 
information processing; their relative roles in human information processing largely 
determine the outcomes that can be communicated to others and thus have the chance 
of becoming a part of culture. I argue that it is the unconscious level that determines 
what is possible to process on the conscious level. In other words, the unconscious shapes 
representations that can be presented consciously.
By unconscious processes, I refer to thought processes that are spontaneous, rapid, and 
intuitive. They form the cognitive system that produces a continuous, unreflective stream 
of consciousness. This automatic system is responsible for perception and inference in 
everyday tasks. Conscious processing, on the other hand, refers to a rule-based, analytical, 
reflective system that makes inferences and rearranges information in the mind. It is 
responsible for tasks such as logical thinking and formal analysis (see Pyysiäinen 2004a).
Paradises and environmental preferences
The unconscious, intuitive system is the default system used to process incoming (via 
sensor systems) information; the reflective system is relatively slow and inefficient (e.g., 
2 This chapter is based on Närhi (2008).
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Lewicki & al. 1992). This is understandable because the amount of stimuli in any normal 
environment is enormous and not all of it can be processed on the conscious level. Instead, 
when most of the information processing happens on the unconscious level, the conscious 
level can be reserved for more demanding and complex tasks (cf. Orians & Heerwagen 
1992). Consequently, conscious processing is dependent on the information filtered by 
unconscious processes. The evaluation of different elements of environmental scenes is a 
typical example of such unconscious processing.
Environmental preferences refer to the outcome of  the  evaluation process of 
environmental scenes. Preference, high or low, is a sum of the evaluation of different 
elements of a scene and it is closely linked to habitat selection which in turn refers to 
a hierarchical process of behavioural responses that may result in the disproportionate 
use of habitats to influence the survival and fitness of individuals (after Jones 2001). 
Environmental preferences affect not only behavioural responses but also the emotional 
reactions that determine the outcome of the evaluation process (see Korpela & al 2002).3
In humans, inferences and the initial affective reactions based on environmental 
cues are primarily unconscious (Zajonc 1980). Due to this, according to several authors, 
human environmental preferences are a result of natural selection, the preference pattern 
having been shaped by the challenges met by our ancestors. Intuitive, rapid processing is 
understood as an adaptation that serves as an effective tool for increasing the probability 
of survival. One who is able to automatically filter and sort out the relevant pieces of 
information from the cacophony of signals always has a selection advantage over those 
lacking that ability (Kaplan 1987; 1992; Orians & Heerwagen 1992; Silverman & Choi 
2005).
Indeed, several studies show that human responses to environments of various kinds 
are highly affective and little or no conscious processing is involved (Korpela & al. 
2002; Ulrich 1983; see also Zajonc 1980). We usually respond to general features of the 
environment, such as the presence of water, buildings, trees, or landscape geometry (for 
reviews, see Ulrich 1983; 1986). Environments are typically so complex that their detailed 
representation would take far more time and resources than is desirable. Acquiring 
general information about potentially valuable resources and dangerous elements is not 
only faster but also leaves the brain free to attend to the aspects that do need attention 
(Orians & Heerwagen 1992). In many cases there is no room for a trial and error type of 
learning. To be effective, information processing must be automatic and rapid, something 
that conscious processing can scarcely do. For example, a cue about a predator should 
trigger the right kind of response not in seconds but in decimals of a second.
Many experimental studies have found that humans have a universal preference 
pattern according to which the preferred environments contain water, large trees, a focal 
point, moderate complexity, a moderate depth of field, the presence of deflected vistas, 
and  lack of threats (for reviews, see Ulrich 1983; 1986; see also Fig. 4.1). This preference 
pattern seems to be cross-cultural (Herzog & al. 2000), indicating a genetically derived 
predisposition as a function of survival (Kaplan 1992; Kaplan & Kaplan 1989: 40-42, see 
3 It should be remembered that environmental preferences are not unique to humans. Organisms with 
environmental preferences are found throughout the animal kingdom and even some of the simplest life forms, 
such as bacteria, show a clear tendency to favour certain type of habitats at the expense of others. Here, only the 
environmental preferences of humans need be considered, however.
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also Balling & Falk 1982).
This is not to say that environmental preferences are all hard-wired and that there is 
no room for learning. Among other factors, a bias towards familiarity in environments 
depends on one’s acquired, that is, learned, experience and is a significant predictor of 
preference. Preferring familiarity really makes sense, because knowing how the current 
environment can be best utilized, or its threats avoided, has natural advantages. A simple 
and yet universal example could be finding one’s way back home. Familiarity also reduces 
the sense of complexity, which, if excessive, exposes one to feelings of anxiety and fear. 
Moreover, familiarity creates a feeling of being in control and thus helps to decrease the 
level of anxiety (Ulrich 1983, see also Kaplan & Kaplan 1982). Yet familiarity does not 
necessarily enhance preference if the familiar elements are harmful or unpleasant. For 
example, cliffs, hostile agents, or other signs of danger usually weaken the preference 
(Herzog & al. 2000; Kaplan & Kaplan 1989; Ulrich 1983). Even then, however, familiarity 
is a predictor of preference, though this time a predictor of negative preference.
Figure 4.1 – The fundamental properties of preferred environmental scenes. Shelter from the eyes 
of others provides a refuge from potential threats. Depth of field (DOF) and partially hidden scene 
enhance preference by offering good visibility and by suggesting the potential for exploration. 
Moderate complexity and semi-open space make the scene coherent and easy to observe.  Water and 
verdancy indicate the presence of vital resources.
In addition to inanimate objects and natural elements of the environment, humans 
have had to cope with other animate agents. Throughout our evolutionary history, we have 
constantly encountered not only other humans but also a vast array of lethal predators. 
Thus, animate agents pose an additional challenge, which complicates the scenario: Even 
if a certain environment provides abundant resources, it may be inaccessible because of 
hostile agents, such as other humans or dangerous animals. Similarly, the presence of 
game does enhance preference as it promises the fulfilment of needs.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the available data suggest that rapidly working, 
automatic cognitive mechanisms involved in predator detection and evasion have been 
selected throughout evolutionary history (Barrett 2005). Humans also detect animal 
activity in their environment automatically without training (New & al. 2007). Moreover, 
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other humans pose similar but socially more complex challenges and the available evidence 
suggest that cognitive adaptations to these challenges have probably evolved due to specific 
selection pressures as well (see Duntley 2005). We should thus add animate agents to the 
list of factors that determine environmental preferences, as their presence might have 
interesting implications for the general preference of the scene.
From an evolutionary perspective, the theoretical viewpoints and empirical evidence 
discussed indicate that humans have a naturally selected preference for favouring 
environments of a certain kind at the cost of others. The prospect-refuge theory formulated 
by Jay Appleton (1975; see also Appleton 1988; Woodcock 1984) suggests that humans, on 
a general level, prefer environments that offer visibility to open spaces and shelter from 
others’ eyes, a standpoint that empirical evidence (Clamp & Powell 1982; Fischer and 
Shrout 2006) has later affirmed. The key findings are that humans prefer environments 
where they have shelter, are able to observe the scene in front of them, have access to 
resources, and are not exposed to threats (cf. Fig. 4.1).
Thus, we should expect a cross-cultural pattern that predicts the general feature set of 
preferred environments irrespective of culture. For example, the differences between the 
preferred scenes of Finns and Bushmen should be modest in magnitude and differences 
should occur only in specific elements uniquely relevant to one region but not to the other. 
Generally speaking, all humans exhibit similar responses to environments; differences are 
mostly best explained by familiarity, or by its lack (cf. Herzog & al. 2000).
Bearing these facts in mind, a comparison between the general elements of paradise 
representations and those present in preferred environments reveals an interesting 
correlation between certain elements of paradise imagery (see Table 4.1 for details). The 
presence of water and shelter, the abundance of resources, and lack of threats repeatedly 
occur. These also repeatedly occur in the preferred real world environments. Moreover, 
the elements correspond to generally preferred real world elements, such as woods, rivers, 
or certain animals, i.e., to elements that provide either nutrition or shelter.
The explanation of this observation is that the basic needs are universal although there 
are always differences in the exact ways they are fulfilled. The Saami, for example, were, 
and still are, dependent on their reindeer or fish in the lakes, whereas ancient Egyptians 
put their hopes in the annual flood of the Nile. In both cases, and in every other case in this 
respect, the goal is the same irrespective of actual circumstances: gaining a satisfactory 
living from the surrounding environment. Thus, while ideas about the ideal world vary, 
we should expect paradises to be look-alike versions of the environments of the creators of 
paradise representations. Paradises are idealized environments characterized by a lack of 
the usual hardships of everyday life.
Paradise representations are thus characterized by the fact that they are shaped by the 
universal human environmental preferences. The existing differences reflect differences 
in environments. Paradises are desirable because they represent a total solution to the 
problem of survival in a hostile environment. Paradises are the ultimate representations 
of the most preferable environment.
However, while the basic properties of paradise representations apparently derive from 
actual environments, there is a need for an explanation of the persistence of paradises, 
as the responses to environmental scenes are tied to momentary situations that may vary 
greatly in the course of time. In other words, we must understand the way the human 
mind processes, creates and holds fast to representations in general and representations 
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about supernatural environments in particular. We have seen that there seems to be a 
strong correlation between certain spontaneously preferred elements of the environment 
and of paradises. The question why paradise representations are so durable must be further 
examined.
Table 4.1 – Correlation between the core properties of environmental preferences and 
paradise representations.
Property In paradises In preferred environments
Shelter Yes Yes
Verdancy Yes Yes
Water Yes Yes
Animals Yes Yes (although not tested 
extensively)
Threats No No
Human presence Yes Yes, degree depends on 
familiarity*
Familiarity Yes Yes
Visibility Semi-open spaces** Semi-open spaces
* see Bixler & Floyd (1997), also cf. Nassauer (1995).
** Or in the “environment of dreams”, see chapter 5 for details.
Cognitive attraction and the relevance of paradises
While supernatural agent representations have been the most discussed topic, the cognitive 
science of religion can also be applied to explain paradise representations, as the central 
issue is why religious concepts of a certain kind are preferred by the human mind, and 
how they are remembered and transmitted.
Here I address the problem of how paradise representations achieve their success 
in the competition between cultural ideas. Representations of counterintuitive agents 
do it by being slightly modified versions of their ontologically intuitive counterparts: 
Counterintuitive agents are also agents and agents are always of crucial importance to 
us. While one violation of intuitive expectations makes such representations salient, their 
intuitive features make them easy to process in the mind.
My argument is that the reasons behind the cultural success of paradise representations 
are parallel with the reasons that make counterintuitive agents attention-grabbing, and 
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we should be able to find similar factors determining cultural success or failure in both 
cases. Thus, my aim here is to show that the rules that regulate the conceptualization of 
supernatural agents apply to paradise representations as well. I will, however, claim that 
relevance and selection play a more important role in the case of paradise representations 
compared to counterintuitiveness, although they are all needed in a successful 
representation of paradise. To understand this, we need to take a look at the way the mind 
works because it will help us understand why the repertoire of paradise representations 
seems so constrained to the “lots of resources and no threats” type of image.
As already noted in the introductory chapter, it is rather widely accepted that the 
human mind consists of several innate, context-sensitive mechanisms that are specialized 
to process certain kinds of information. In other words, the mind of a new-born child 
comes already equipped with a set of predispositions waiting for the right kind of input. 
Consequently, the mind is a very good problem-solver in some contexts while in other 
contexts it is not. For example, while humans outperform computers in face recognition 
tasks (e.g., Hancock & al. 2000), humans perform poorly in tasks where the context is 
abstract or irrelevant, even if the logic of the task is otherwise perfectly understandable in 
another context (see Manktelow 1999; Sperber & al. 1995).
Furthermore, many of the abilities of the mind may be adaptations to the pressures of 
the environment during the evolutionary history and the selective pressures of the ancient 
world of the hominids and the first humans. This means that the mind works best in the 
context of problems related to different aspects of survival and social relationships. In 
abstract tasks, the mind often struggles because it cannot link the problems presented to 
any meaningful context or goal (for discussion, see Sperber & al. 1995; Tooby & Cosmides 
1992; Tremlin 2006: 53-64).
That said, although the specialized mechanisms of the mind are useful in their proper 
context in specific problem-solving situations, they also set limitations for what humans 
can easily adopt, as we tend to prefer certain kinds of information at the cost of some 
other. Information that has relevance from the receiver’s point of view (Sperber 1985; 1996; 
Sperber & Wilson 1995) is likely to be successful. Unimportant or irrelevant information 
is unlikely to be remembered or transmitted. Information that has relevance from the 
receiver’s point of view has most chances to survive and shape cultural ideas. The most 
general factor affecting the distribution of information is its compatibility and fit with 
human cognitive organization (Sperber 1996: 140).
Indeed, religiously relevant representations are constrained by mental functioning. It has 
been amply shown that the human mind does not create intuitive religious representations 
freely, but rather does so within cognitive boundaries that explain the apparent invariance 
of the core elements of such representations (Boyer 1994; 2001). In other words, religious 
representations basically follow the rules of intuitive folk psychology and its basic concepts. 
They differ, however, from ordinary knowledge in that they systematically violate intuitive 
ontological categories. Religious concepts break the intuitive expectations of what 
something should be like (Boyer 1994; 2001; see also Sperber 1994). For example, a talking 
statue violates an intuitive expectation that non-living objects cannot talk (Boyer 2001: 
79).
However, the counterintuitiveness, or the violation of ontological expectations, of 
religious concepts is limited. Merely violating as many ontological expectations as possible 
does not make a salient religious concept (Boyer 1994). In fact, it is very difficult for the 
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human mind to even produce extremely odd concepts or representations (Ward 1994), 
much less remember or transmit them. Thus, a viable religious concept should possess 
only one, or very few, violations of intuitive expectations (Boyer 2001: 85-86). For example, 
a talking pink statue with seventy feet and the ability to spit fire but nothing else is not 
actually a very good candidate for a god which people might worship. Instead, a statue with 
the ability to make fields fertile when prayed to would be a much better candidate, because 
it does not violate too many expectations and it also does something useful. Experimental 
studies (Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; Pyysiäinen & al. 2003) indicate that 
minimally counterintuitive concepts spread and endure better than those without or with 
too many violations. Therefore, it is expected that a salient religious concept has to be 
based on a similar real world counterpart with one or very few properties tweaked.
While paradises seem to reflect real world environments closely, several properties of 
paradises also follow the rule of ontological violation. Reincarnating or eternally living 
inhabitants who can transform themselves into butterflies, talking animals, and fruit 
trees with diamonds as their fruits are typical counterintuitive elements in paradises. 
While they realize an intuitive ontological category in principle, they are still impossible. 
No dead person can reincarnate, nor are there animals with whom humans can have 
meaningful conversations. Likewise, diamond trees are not possible, as living organisms 
cannot produce inanimate material from itself. In this respect, paradises follow the path 
of counterintuitiveness.
The access to paradises represents another counterintuitive aspect of these 
representations. In order to gain access to a paradise, some supernatural event always 
seems to be necessary. In many cases it is one’s physical death in which the soul departs 
from the body and ascends to paradise. Sometimes, gods and spirits create the paradisiacal 
circumstances on Earth. In some cases it might be possible for living persons, such as 
shamans, to visit paradises e.g., via dreams. In every case, however, a supernatural event 
or an act of a supernatural agent is required. To go from here to there is not possible by 
ordinary means. Thus, counterintuitiveness occurs both in the paradise and in getting 
there. Together they separate the paradise from the real world, no matter how similar 
these two might otherwise be.
Despite the counterintuitiveness of some elements, paradises still resemble real world 
environments in many respects. Paradises are described as gardens, fertile valleys, oases 
in the desert, distant islands, and so on. The flora and fauna of paradises (when described 
in specific detail) often have their parallels in the real world. Most importantly, many 
of these properties are described in an intuitive manner. The abundance of resources, 
buffaloes who do not escape, or lions that eat grass are not counterintuitive even if they 
are otherwise desirable. Similarly, lack of threats and beautiful landscapes are completely 
intuitive and within the boundaries of intuitive expectations. Thus, paradises are basically 
ontologically intuitive but they violate ontological expectations in some details thereby 
promoting their impression of uniqueness.
While counterintuitiveness can make paradise representations more salient, the feeling 
of relevance can reinforce them even more. According to Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson 
(1995), relevance sets the value of information. Sperber and Wilson define relevance as a 
contextual effect of information against the amount of effort required to process it. That is, 
the more contextual effect and the less effort is required, the more relevant that information 
is (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 125). Furthermore, they argue that human cognition tends to be 
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geared to the maximization of relevance and that this is a result of biological functioning 
and natural selection. A tendency to maximize relevance and minimize processing costs is 
best realized in a mind that has specialized mechanisms that respond in the most relevant 
context in the quickest and most meaningful way. In the evolutionary context, a tendency 
towards the best balance between the cost and benefits should result in a predictable 
pattern of what is considered relevant in the mind (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 260-266).
This viewpoint is supported by a wide amount of experimental evidence showing that 
humans tend to remember better things that can be connected to some relevant context 
in general (for a review, see Smith & Vela 2001; see also Sperber & al. 1995). Therefore, we 
should expect that culturally successful representations, that is, those that are remembered 
and transmitted, are somehow connected with the surrounding world.
The most relevant information also tends to remain relevant over time. While some 
information is relevant only in particular situations, some information is of such crucial 
importance that it is felt to be relevant independently of time and space (Sperber & Wilson 
1995: 160-161). Representations that contain this kind of information have a stronger 
cognitive effect than other information, and they thus have the best chances to be stored 
in the mind and remain stable.
As natural selection has shaped human psychology, several aspects of human psychology 
are genetically structured, that is, they derive from genetically inherited development, and 
are therefore characteristic of all humans (see Tremlin 2006: 43-72; Sperber 1996: 113-115). 
As a consequence, certain types of information are felt to be relevant by default by all 
humans. Furthermore, the most relevant information should always be processed in the 
most relevant way to achieve the most effective responses to problems of a different kind 
(Sperber & Wilson 1995: 260-263).
 The stimuli that activate the context-sensitive mechanisms of the mind vary depending 
on one’s location in time and space, however. This input variation is caused by the fact 
that natural and cultural environments differ. The challenges met by humans in the 
environments of a different type can vary dramatically; Eskimos and Aztecs lived in very 
dissimilar natural settings, for example. Still, the primary goal of all humans is the same: 
to ensure survival. Thus, while the stimuli differ, the goal remains the same and the mind 
is adapted to process and store information related to this goal. That is why representations 
containing information related to survival are the most likely ones to survive cultural 
competition.
As already noted, the content of paradise representations is very much related to 
questions of survival. The emphasis on the abundance of resources and the lack of threats 
is directly linked to physiological welfare, and information of that kind is effortlessly 
processed by the human mind. Therefore, paradise representations are relevant and require 
minimal cognitive processing because the predisposition to process them exists in every 
individual mind. Furthermore, humans are well adapted to process information related to 
resource-seeking and the avoidance of threats (e.g., Kaplan 1992; Tomasello 1999: 13-55). 
Thus, the human mind can handle paradise representations rather effortlessly as their core 
content is firmly linked with these mechanisms of the mind and is felt to be relevant.
The similarity of paradise representations is therefore an outcome of similarly 
functioning minds. The differences between representations, on the other hand, are input-
specific, while the demands for contextual fit and relevance from the standpoint of survival 
remain the same. Thus, the predispositions of the human mind explain why paradises 
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tend to follow a predetermined formula that emphasizes relevant pieces of information as 
building blocks of paradisiacal circumstances. At the same time, input variation causes 
differences and gives rise to the ostensible diversity of paradise representations.
Thus, there is no reason to expect that the mechanisms for estimating relevance and 
the fulfilment of basic needs have changed, unless the cognitive functions of our species 
have changed radically in the course of time. I do not think that this is the case, for the 
basic needs of our ancestors are still relevant today though the ways to realize them have 
changed. Most people no longer need to hunt their food or run away from lions. But we 
still need to make money to buy meat and we need to lock our doors to prevent hostile 
agents from trespassing in our houses. Uncertainty and the need to stay alive are here to 
stay. In this sense, the paradisiacal realms the mind produces are just as relevant to the 
mind today as they have been for thousands of years (cf. Tremlin 2006: 25-27).
If the dispositions that make paradises salient in one mind make them salient in every 
mind, the distribution of representations about perfectly suitable environments in and 
between minds and cultures is not surprising at all. Thus far, they seem to be not only 
geographically varying realizations of perfect circumstances, but also stickers that glue 
themselves to the mind with their counterintuitiveness and relevance.
Paradises as reflections
While paradise representations are cognitively attractive and mainly consist of preferred 
elements, the way they are constructed in the mind remains unclear. The proximate 
motivation to create such representations is not self-evident, as they have no direct 
counterparts in the real world, which in turn means that they do not have value in decision 
making in real world circumstances. For example, even if there are no threats present in 
paradise representations, there may well be threats in the real world.
To answer the question why paradisiacal circumstances are chosen for cultural 
transmission from a potentially limitless bunch of imaginary representations, it is 
necessary to explore the properties and phases of the information processing that ends 
up as imaginary environments. I have already discussed the innate properties and 
predispositions of the mind that make paradise representations possible and preferable. 
Next, I will try to explain what is needed to mix real-world elements into the ideas of the 
most well-known and widespread supernatural realms.
I will first concentrate on Stewart Guthrie’s argument that supernatural agents are a 
product of the mind seeking maximal coherence (Guthrie 1993: 38), which supports the 
idea that human minds tend to seek relevance. Coherence means here chances to develop 
strategies and behavioural responses to the variably changing demands of the world. The 
consequence of finding coherence in the world is the predictability of the changes and 
agents acting in it. For example, one’s life can depend on the knowledge of when a lion 
is going to attack, or from what kind of cues its presence can be inferred. Despite the 
necessity of knowing what is happening around us, it is seldom possible to obtain complete 
information of everything. Very often much has to be inferred from minimal cues in order 
to build all-inclusive representations of what is going on (see Barrett 2005).
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Imagine, for example, that you are walking in the woods. While the path ahead is 
clear and clearly visible, you cannot detect everything that happens around you because 
you cannot see through the trees and vegetation. Yet, if there was a grizzly bear lurking 
behind the bushes, it would be of crucial importance to recognize the threat and react 
accordingly. However, you cannot see the bear. Instead, you can make inferences based on 
minor cues like the noise of heavy paws, or the nervous calls of birds. Still, you have no 
chance to know what is around unless you go and see, which is not necessarily wise. 
This is where inference comes into play. According to Guthrie, an error in inductive 
reasoning is the main reason for the existence of human-like supernatural agents. The 
need to know instead of using pure guesswork is so great that even a representation of 
a human agent supposed to be out there, that is, an imaginary representation to which 
pieces of information can be anchored, is better than nothing at all. We are intuitively 
able and even willing to imagine these invisible agents around us because they fit into 
at least one ontological and intuitive category in the mind. It is better to have at least an 
assumption of the presence of an agent instead of just having a set of arbitrary cues. Thus, 
the lack of information causes our mind to make inferences that do not have a counterpart 
in the empirically observable world (Guthrie 1993). The inferential character of thought is 
critical here: without the ability to associate and rearrange acquired information we could 
not produce representations about supernatural agents.
The need for coherence shapes the environmental preference as well. A moderate amount 
of complexity, shelter, and good visibility are all properties of preferred environments 
(Ulrich 1983; 1986; see also Kaplan 1992). While observing the environment, humans 
tend to favour scenes that provide both coherence and access to shelter. In other words, 
humans try to reduce the need for guesswork while exploring and estimating the value of 
the environment.
Furthermore, there are several similarities between observing agents and observing 
the environment. As in the case of agents, full information about an environment is 
hardly ever available. Behavioural and representational responses are based on cues, short 
exposures to information, and to some extent making the best guesses. Although the less 
guesswork the better, inductive reasoning still has a role to play in almost any situation due 
to the inadequacy of available information. Thus, the ability to add properties and imagine 
potential scenarios makes room for imaginary representations about the environment. 
For example, if you are looking for food, would you go where you see trees and water 
indicating fertility and potential nutrition, or would you just wander around hoping you 
will come across something edible?
While uncertainty in the real world is evident, paradise representations often describe 
a world without uncertainty. In paradises the need for guesswork is greatly reduced by 
providing permanent and coherent conditions favourable to life. For example, nutrition 
is granted and access to it contains no risks such as becoming the victim of a predator. 
The catch of paradise representations is that the information gaps that characterize 
representations about the real world are closed. The uncertainty and shortcomings we 
must deal with in our everyday life, are absent in paradise. In paradise, we always have 
nutrition and shelter irrespective of other circumstances.
Thus, of the mechanisms of the mind paradise representations are primarily related 
to those concerned with environmental preferences, coherence, resources, and avoiding 
threats. Environmental preferences shape the general picture of the scene, whereas 
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coherence seeking addresses the problem of predictability. Resource seeking and avoiding 
threats are connected with object and agent recognition. All these mechanisms and 
abilities are, in the light of the previously discussed studies, both innate and adaptive. 
Together, they provide better chances to survive than what would be the case without 
them. However, they are both context-sensitive and dependent on available information 
in a similar manner as agent-detection mechanisms and usually they do not get what they 
would need.
Although we do not find paradises in the real world, paradise representations are felt 
to be relevant because their core content is strongly rooted in the cognitive mechanisms 
that regulate primary information processing and deal with the fulfilling of basic needs. 
As supernatural agents, paradise representations also offer several anchoring points for 
the categorization automations of the mind, but instead of finding a potential partner 
for social interactions, paradises represent a complete environment with a complex set 
of interactions between agents and inanimate objects. Still, they are based on innate 
mechanisms working to maximize the chances of survival.
This, however, raises another issue: If there is no direct parallel between paradise 
representations and the empirically observable world, then how exactly do paradises 
form in the mind? If the mechanisms of the mind were only dependent on actual received 
information, paradise representations would not be possible because we cannot have any 
direct information about paradises.
As already suggested, the answer lies in our ability to associate, that is, to rearrange 
acquired information and mix properties of intuitive ontological categories. In other words, 
the capability of associating makes paradises possible. Association, or cognitive fluidity, 
has been an essential tool for our species throughout history (Kaplan & Kaplan 1982: 74-
75; see also Mithen 1996; Sperber 1996). It has made it possible to foresee causations and 
different scenarios and has allowed us to create representations of what something, such as 
an environment, could be if this or that changed. Consequently, our mental representations 
do not need to have direct counterparts in the real world.
Association provides a tool so powerful that by using it the human mind can even 
exceed its original function of combining existing empirically observable elements 
to create representations that provide a basis for accurate decision making. However, 
literally speaking, paradise representations do not satisfy this condition, for there is no 
empirically observable scene that could match them. Even though paradises reflect an 
evolutionarily ideal world, the realms they represent are unreachable and therefore have 
no actual point of reference in the real world. Therefore, from the evolutionary perspective, 
paradise representations are basically useless. Would this weaken the relevance of paradise 
representations, then?
The simple answer is no. While paradise representations are imaginary, the 
modifications of natural entities that occur in paradise representations conform to a 
uniform pattern that follows the rules of relevance from the evolutionary standpoint: 
paradise representations represent modified versions of desirable natural entities within 
the boundaries of the properties of the experienced world and cognitive functioning. 
When a dry desert suddenly provides water, game does not run away any more, or dangers 
and suffering instantaneously disappear, this makes a representation more attractive from 
the point of view of survival, but does not make it irrelevant even if such things never 
happen. Moreover, the lack of harmful things, such as death or war, complements the 
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picture: living in a paradise is effortless, resources are abundant, and struggle for life has 
become unnecessary. 
The theme of idealization is recurrent throughout paradise representations but it is 
constrained by the natural and cultural landscape. As already noted, the natural and 
cultural elements that are present are constantly those that are preferred in the world in 
which the representation in question was formed. Golden and jade palaces are typical in 
cultures where they have been known and valued as symbols of prosperity. On the other 
hand, they are absent in cultures where they have been unknown. Paradises of Plains 
Indians or Aboriginals do not have the notions of high golden towers simply because they 
did not exist in their cultural landscape.
Similarly, the mind selects familiar beneficial species and natural elements that are 
connected to the fulfilling of basic needs. The easily hunted buffalo or antelopes, fruitful 
trees and oases in the desert underline the point of paradise: the crucial features of the 
world are transformed into the perfections of themselves from the standpoint of human 
needs. The human mind seeks general properties regardless of the environment in which 
an individual lives. The invariance of paradise representations, for one, occurs due to the 
invariance of human needs. Variance, on the other hand, occurs mainly due to geographical 
differences and variation between circumstances while the architecture of mind remains 
the same.
Therefore, it is true of paradise representations that they are products of the tendency of 
the human mind to continuously improve the chances for survival. Paradise representations 
are born when this tendency is exaggerated and starts to produce mental representations 
with no counterparts in the empirically observable world. Despite the lack of real world 
counterparts, the representations can survive by themselves because they activate 
many automatic and innate mechanisms of the human mind designed to solve crucial 
problems. Thus, by giving an impression of relevance and being cognitively optimal, 
paradise representations make themselves successful in the competition between mental 
representations in and between minds. Paradise representations are grounded in the 
natural abilities of the mind but they differ enough from ordinary representations to make 
themselves noteworthy (cf. Sperber 1996: 138-150, see also Kelly & Keil 1985).
To sum up, the human mind has a motivation-based predisposition to representations 
about imaginary realms. Paradises are born when the mechanisms of the mind do not 
function accurately4 in terms of survival but rather when they function as a hyperactive 
device that grinds out imaginary realms and scenarios even when they are not needed. 
In this case, environmental preferences aid survival by directing mental reactions and 
behavioural responses along appropriate paths. Cognitive mechanisms, on the other hand, 
are responsible for processing the information that has passed the first filter of relevance 
estimation and it is up to them to rearrange the original information into a more durable 
and desirable form. Paradises exist due to a combination of unconscious desires driven 
by naturally selected tendencies. As humans imagine the most desirable conditions, they 
gradually approach the limit of paradise representations.
It is therefore justified to say that paradise representations reflect the evolutionarily ideal, 
although unreachable world. While the incompatibility between paradise representations 
and the empirically observable world is obvious, paradises still represent the best
4 Or exceed their domain-specific functionality (cf. Sperber 1996: 142-143).
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possible scenario. They do not need to be realized. They exist in our minds as pictures of 
what humans should aspire to. At the same time, they offer an illusionary way out from all 
the difficulties of this world.
Cognitively speaking, it is not a major leap to jump from representations about the 
empirically observable world to purely imaginary ones. Our ability to imagine non-
existent worlds, the ability originally evolved to react to the situations and scenarios of a 
different kind, makes paradises possible. In this respect, paradise-seeking is no different 
from agent-seeking.
Therefore, the emergence and durability of paradise representations are based on 
the need for finding coherence and the desire to survive. Together, they overdrive the 
associating device, our mind, to create imaginary realms that fulfil all our evolutionary 
needs. That is also why paradises are similar from culture to culture, and from continent 
to another: The needs are the same and the architecture of the mind is the same. The 
seemingly extensive library of perfect worlds has in fact quite a limited collection. It is the 
collection of reflections of what the ideal circumstances would be depending on the actual 
habitats of humans.
Part II – Studies
54
Preface to Part II
In the first part of this work, I argued that paradise representations are more similar than 
different. Despite some deep apparent differences, there are obviously underlying patterns 
of paradise representations that suggest that the differences are largely superficial and 
dependent on the divergence of input respective to time and space, that is, on the actual 
circumstances of the creators of the representations.
While this is an interesting finding which also seems to be supported by the data 
presented in chapter 3, it would be rather inappropriate to stop here. By doing so, we 
would come dangerously close to the “just-so” level of explanation of many (absorbing 
but eventually vague) evolutionary studies. Thus, the issues raised in chapter 4 must be 
addressed with additional empirical data. We need to study if people indeed perceive 
their ideal world as suggested. If paradise representations created in the mind evolved to 
prefer certain types of paradise imagery, this tendency should still exist in the minds of 
contemporary people and thus probing the preferences of people of today should provide us 
with noteworthy additional evidence. Moreover, while it seems that the argued importance 
of familiarity is already reflected in the data presented in chapter 3, this dimension of the 
theory needs a more detailed examination as well.
In this part of the work, I will test the assumptions presented in chapter 4 with two 
types of data. First, I will examine how people currently perceive their ideal environment. 
Next, I will put the familiarity argument to the test by analysing it against written 
descriptions of paradises and see if familiarity actually is a significant predictor of the 
content of paradise representations. In this way, I try to cover and strengthen the main 
aspects of the arguments that the repertoire of paradise representations is constrained by 
both the architecture of the mind and by local circumstances.
This part consists of two independent studies. The findings of both studies and their 
relation to the theory in general will then be discussed in Summary and conclusions. 
In that chapter, I will also summarize the results of this work as a whole and consider 
the possible further implications of this study for the study of religion in general and of 
supernatural environments in particular.
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5   Study 1 – Spontaneous responses to the typical    properties of paradise representations
As shown in the first part of this work, the assumption that natural selection plays a 
role in the creation of paradise representations is theoretically justified. Environmental 
preferences and the architecture of the mind seem to support the durability and dispersion 
of cultural ideas of better realms in a uniform way across the world.
The data presented in the theoretical part was strongly rooted in religious history, 
however. Only a few of the presented traditions were contemporary. Therefore, even though 
the paradises of historical traditions show eye-catching uniformity, we do not know how 
humans would respond to the imagery of those representations today. If, as I have argued, 
the response pattern is uniform due to the species-specific architecture of the mind, we 
should find a similar pattern among contemporary humans as well.
The aim of this study is to examine spontaneous responses to the typical properties 
of paradise representations. The study was designed to test the hypothesis proposed in 
the theoretical part of this work. In other words, the aim is to study both environmental 
preferences, the presence and absence of certain environmental elements, and 
characterizations of human life typical of paradises.
The hypothesis suggests that we should look closely for three factors that could affirm 
the plausibility of the hypothesis. First, scenery that provides resources and shelter should 
be preferred. Second, the preference for the certain properties of paradises should reflect 
their presence in paradises. This should also be true with properties absent in paradises. 
Third, the preference pattern should be uniform irrespective of sex and religiosity. If 
the preference pattern depends on sex and especially on religiosity, we should probably 
question, or at least re-examine the hypothesis from the standpoint of cultural bias.
As paradises are exaggerated idealizations of environments, are generally verdant, 
sheltered, and contain abundant supplies of water, these four elements were specifically 
investigated. Moreover, the impact of human presence on preference was examined.
Method
The study was implemented as an Internet-based survey (see Technical discussion for 
details). The technical requirements consisted of a web browser with Macromedia/Adobe 
Flash Player 6 or newer installed.
The participants were mainly university students (42 men and 139 women) from the 
universities of Helsinki, Turku (Finland), Jerusalem, Oxford, and Victoria (New Zealand). 
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The participants were recruited via e-mail lists. Due to the fact that the test was publicly 
available on the Internet, there were some “outsiders” as well. Participation was voluntary 
and anonymous completion of the survey was possible. The prerequisite for completion 
was an e-mail based registration, however. The purpose of the registration was not to 
identify participants but to prevent multiple submissions, as each e-mail address served as 
a valid identification key only once.
Participants were told that the survey was about “the environment of dreams”, that is, 
the best environment they could imagine themselves living in. Participants were asked 
to imagine this environment before answering the questions. References to any religious 
dimensions of such environment were eliminated from the instructions. The purpose of 
this was both to prevent biased answers and to promote heterogeneity, that is, to avoid a 
bias towards the religious-atheist axis among potentially interested participants.
The actual survey consisted of three parts. In the first part, participants were asked to 
rate 18 pictures representing landscapes (see Appendix A for details). The emphasis on the 
scenes was on the properties that affect the intuitive response resulting in differences in 
preference. These properties were verdancy, presence of water, shelter, light, and human 
presence. The pictures also contained an idealized scene to test if emphasizing elements 
typical of literal paradise descriptions would yield enhanced preference (scene 5), and a 
typical Finnish forest landscape (scene 17) to test if typical characteristics of a familiar 
scene enhance preference (comparison was made between Finns and other nationalities).
In the second part, the participants were asked to choose the property they preferred 
from the pair of adjectives describing the atmosphere of the dream environment. The 
pairs of adjectives were chosen to represent oppositions of a varying degree in dynamics, 
population, and visibility. The purpose of this was to test if the general preference was 
towards that of paradises, that is, an environment with low dynamics, moderate human 
presence, and safety. Moreover, some pairs were related to the properties of the pictures of 
part 1 to survey consistency (see Appendix A for details).
In the third part, the participants were asked if they wanted to see the offered property 
(e.g., cars) in their dream environment. The selection criterion for the shown properties 
was their regular presence or absence in paradise representations. In the third part, there 
were also items unrelated or not central to most paradises to mix things up (see Appendix 
A for details).
To make the answers as spontaneous as possible, the participants were instructed to 
answer the questions as quickly as they could. The latencies were recorded along with 
the actual answers and they were used afterwards to monitor whether a participant had 
followed the instruction to be quick.
In addition to the actual test, background information about the participant was 
collected based on his or her own answers. The information consisted of sex, year of birth, 
nationality, properties of childhood habitat, general personality, and religiosity. Religiosity 
was measured using the revised version of Hoge’s intrinsic religiosity test (see Gorsuch 
& McPherson 1989; Appendix A for the questions). The religiosity scale contained 10 
questions with a five-point Likert scale. Therefore, possible scores could range from 10 to 
50.
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Table 5.1 – Participants by sex and nationality (as reported by participants).
 Sex
 Female Male Total
Nationality Finland 125 27 152
Great Britain 0 1 1
 Iceland 0 1 1
India 1 0 1
 Israel 6 2 8
 New Zealand 6 6 12
 Other 0 1 1
 Sweden 0 1 1
 United States 1 3 4
Total, other than Finns 14 15 29
Total 139 42 181
Table 5.2 – Distribution of participants’ membership of religious traditions grouped by 
intrinsic religiosity score.
 Religiosity group (1-5)
 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Member of N/A (not indicated) 8 5 3 0 0 16
 Christianity 11 24 26 13 3 77
 Judaism 0 2 1 4 1 8
 Hinduism 0 0 0 0 1 1
 Buddhism 2 4 1 1 0 8
 New age (any) 1 1 1 0 0 3
 Neopagan (any) 1 1 0 0 0 2
 Other 2 4 2 1 0 9
 None 36 19 2 0 0 57
Total 61 60 36 19 5 181
Results
The total number of accepted participants was 181 out of 195 (see Table 5.1 for details) 
who completed the survey (for rejection criteria, see Technical discussion). Analysis 
concentrated on the general trends and comparative analysis. For comparative analyses, 
participants were divided into groups by sex, nationality, and religiosity score. The impact 
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of childhood habitat and personality type were also analysed.
In part one, the highest average rates were given to pictures that contained verdancy, 
water, and shelter (see Fig. 5.1 and Appendix A for details). The amount of verdancy 
was the strongest predictor of preference. Furthermore, all the most preferred pictures 
offered good but not unlimited visibility to the scene. The results were in line with current 
knowledge about human environmental preferences indicating that the general imagery 
of a dream environment closely follows environmental preferences.
The results revealed two noteworthy phenomena, however. First, the scenes with 
moderate human presence were preferred. Previous studies have shown that human presence 
tends to weaken preference compared with scenes without human touch or elements (but 
see Bixler & Floyd 1997, also Nassauer 1995). On the other hand, when human presence 
dominated the scene, preference was diminished. Scenes 11 (M = 4.66) and 18 (M = 4.57), 
and scenes 4 (M = 4.72) and 13 (M = 3.30) tested this aspect of preference. In the case of 
scenes 11 and 18, the difference was not statistically significant (p = .36) while in the case 
of scenes 4 and 13 it was (p < .001).
Second, scene 5 (M = 5.23) representing an exaggerated environment with several 
waterfalls, a rainbow, symbols of wealth (villa, pool), and brighter colours was the most 
preferred even though it had an impression of steepness, which normally should weaken 
preference. The mean difference between scene 5 and the second best, scene 4 (M = 4.72), 
was .508. The difference was statistically significant (p < .001), indicating that the preference 
pattern can be disturbed and preference enhanced by the presence of extraordinary 
properties in the scene.
Women generally preferred more scenes that provided shelter from other’s eyes. While 
the trend was consistent throughout the scenes with a shelter element, the difference 
was statistically significant in only one case (scene 16, Mw = 3.99, Mm = 3.52, p = .039),5 
however.
In part two, the responses tended towards properties describing general peacefulness. 
The dichotomy was the most explicit in cases of populated/crowded (M = .99), peaceful/
restless (M = .98), green/harsh (M = .97), luminous/dark (M = .96), calm/tense (M = 
.95), and quiet/noisy (M = .94). Again, it is notable that a dominant human presence was 
strongly rejected (populated/crowded, M = .99) while moderate human presence was 
generally accepted (populated/uninhabited, M = .71). Women showed a somewhat more 
definite general trend than men. The differences in the case of individual properties were 
statistically significant in four cases: bright/dusky (Mw = .87, Mm = .74, p = .41), calm/tense 
(Mw = .97, Mm = .88, p = .019), warm/cold (Mw = .96, Mm = .86, p = .023), and peaceful/
restless (Mw = .99, Mm = .93, p = .013).
In part three, the results showed a clear trend that closely reflects the properties 
of paradise representations and the fulfilment of basic needs alike. As expected, the 
properties most closely connected to basic needs showed the most polarized distribution 
of mean scores. Similarly, the properties not directly connected to basic needs clustered 
in the middle of the range. This indicates that the fulfilment of basic needs regulates the 
preferences of humans while in the case of less relevant properties preferences tend to 
divide more.
5 Mann-Whitney test was used to compare the differences between sexes/ two groups.
59
Figure 5.1 – Means of preference of scenes, part 1.
Table 5.3 – Means of desirability of properties, part 2.
 Mean* Std. Deviation
Bright/dusky .84 .368
Cool/hot .65 .479
Populated/uninhabited .71 .456
Quiet/noisy .94 .229
Calm/tense .95 .218
Exciting/dull** .30 .459
Warm/cold .93 .249
Sheltered/open .77 .423
Luminous/dark .96 .206
Predictable/unpredictable .75 .433
Peaceful/restless .98 .147
Green/harsh .97 .180
Populated/crowded .99 .105
Active/idle .84 .368
N = 181, except for Exciting/dull**
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* A higher mean shows the first option was more preferred. To improve readability, the options 
appear here in a different order than in the survey.
** Only Finnish answers (N = 151) are displayed due to the obvious mistranslation of ‘dull’ in the 
English translation. The mean was .87 (N = 30) for English speakers.
Table 5.4 – Means of desirability, part 3.
Mean* Std. Deviation
Cars .31 .466
Shelter .99 .105
Wars .02 .128
Broad-leaved forests .94 .229
Sorrow .23 .420
Animals .96 .193
Shops .73 .443
Partner .99 .105
Hunger .04 .193
Bridges .76 .430
Death .25 .437
Colourful birds .88 .321
Diseases .14 .352
Conifer forests .91 .285
Lakes .97 .164
Flowers .98 .128
Snakes .44 .497
Mountains .67 .472
Campfire .77 .423
Insects .61 .490
Thirst .11 .314
Rivers .94 .229
Fruit trees .93 .259
Light .98 .128
Darkness .58 .495
Water .99 .074
Butterflies .96 .193
Choicest food .81 .392
Palaces .22 .416
Eternal life .28 .451
N = 181
* Higher value indicates higher desirability
General differences between the sexes in part three were again small. However, even 
though the general response pattern followed similar outlines irrespective of sex, there 
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were statistically significant differences in several individual properties. Women preferred 
broad-leaved forests (Mw = .97, Mm = .86, p = .005), conifer forests (Mw = .94, Mm = .83, p = 
.042), butterflies (Mw = .98, Mm = .90, p = .031) and shelter (Mw = 1, Mm = .95, p = .01) more 
than men. At the same time, women were less willing to tolerate hunger (Mw = .02, Mm  = 
.10, p = .031), thirst (Mw = .06, Mm = .26, p < .001), and darkness (Mw = .53, Mm = .74, p = 
.018) in their dream environment. With the exception of thirst, the most central properties 
of paradise representations were equally preferred by men and women. The same was true 
for the most disliked properties.
Participants who described themselves as risk-seeking rather than safety-seeking were 
generally more willing to tolerate higher dynamics, steepness and unpredictability in scenes 
and in part 2. The difference was especially high in part 2 in predictable-unpredictable 
(Nrisk = 48, Mrisk = .44, Nsafe = 133, Msafe = .16, p < .001). There was no difference in religiosity 
between these two groups, however. Childhood habitat was not a significant predictor of 
preference. 
To analyse the correlation between responses and religiosity, participants were divided 
into five groups according to their religiosity scale score. The most religious group was, in 
theory, larger due to a greater range of scores (9 points instead of 8), but as there were no 
participants who scored the full 50 points, it did not affect the analysis in practice.
The variance analysis of religiosity groups did not reveal statistically significant 
differences between the groups (significance level .05). The contrast between the least 
religious (N = 61) and the combination of the two most religious groups (Ntotal = 24, N = 
19 for group 4, and N = 5 for group 5), revealed statistically significant differences in two 
cases, though. Darkness was disliked more by the most religious groups (p = .005). Also, 
eternal life (p = .011) was preferred more by the most religious groups. However, there was 
no increasing trend of means from the least religious group towards the most religious 
groups. Moreover, the difference was not visible in both groups simultaneously. Lack of 
darkness was strongly preferred by group 5, while eternal life was strongly preferred only 
by group 4. Thus, the results imply that religiosity does not affect the general preference 
pattern behind the responses in any predictable way.
However, religiosity may affect responses if the stimulus has references to familiar 
religious descriptions. Lack of darkness and eternal life are typical of biblical descriptions 
of paradise and the vast majority of the participants belonging to the most religious groups 
identified themselves either as Christians (N = 16) or Jews (N = 5) (other groups Hinduism 
N = 1, Buddhism N = 1, and Other, N = 1). Therefore, it is very possible that the knowledge 
of how paradisiacal circumstances are described in the Old Testament and in the New 
Testament affected the preference in these two particular cases.
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Figure 5.2 – Trend of desirability of properties, part 3. Higher mean indicates stronger preference.
Table 5.5 – Differences in preference between groups: darkness and eternal life.
Religiosity group (1-5) Darkness (mean) Eternal life  (mean)
1 .70 .26
2 .52 .18
3 .53 .36
4 .63 .37
5 .00 .80
Total .58 .28
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Discussion
The results provide evidence that people prefer environments with the same elements as in 
descriptions of paradises. The results are also in line with the findings of environmental 
psychology. The most popular properties – water, a partner, shelter, and light – are all 
typical of paradise representations. They are also crucial from the evolutionary standpoint. 
Similarly, the least popular ones were diseases, thirst, hunger, and wars. Thus, the properties 
of paradise representations that were most closely connected to basic needs were the most 
and least popular ones. The dichotomy was generally more defined in women than in men. 
Most notably, women preferred properties which promised shelter more than men. Men 
were more willing to accept small discomforts than women. It seems that men in general 
were more action-oriented.6  Nevertheless, the overall trend was similar irrespective of 
sex.
Interestingly, the concepts typical of paradises, eternal life (M = .28) and palaces 
(M = .22), were also among the least popular concepts. The possible explanation for the 
unpopularity of eternal life is that it is possibly felt to be unnatural (i.e., not intuitive). 
On the other hand, death, which is undoubtedly a natural and intuitive concept, was not 
desirable either (M = .25), indicating a conflicting idea of dying in the dream environment. 
The contradiction becomes even more evident considering that eternal life also implies the 
absence of death (not wanted), and death implies the absence of eternal life (not wanted 
either).
The ontological contradictions related to the conceptions of afterlife  and  dead people 
have been reproduced in several previous studies (Bering 2002a; Bering & Bjorklund 
2004;  see also Bering 2002b). For instance, people intuitively attribute dead persons with 
properties of the living irrespective of religious conviction. At the same time, they are 
generally aware that a dead person has ceased to exist. As Jesse Bering (2006) suggests, 
there seems to be an error in cognitive reasoning with regard to the conceptual grounds of 
dead persons and the afterlife: Even if people know that a deceased person is no longer alive, 
they still tend to describe him or her with properties characteristic of living people, such as 
having intentions and emotions. Thus, it is evident that human intuition struggles to draw 
the line between the living and the dead. The reasons for the ontological contradiction 
observed here may derive from an error of a similar kind. Currently, there is not enough 
evidence to make any further conclusions about this particular issue, however.
Similarly, there was a conflict between insects (M = .61) and butterflies (also insects, but 
M = .96) that is not ontological but rather categorical indicating a misconception in folk-
biological taxonomy (see Medin & Atran 1999). It is possible that while certain concepts 
of more general categories are either preferred or disliked, there can be considerable 
variation within those categories and concepts. Moreover, it seems that at least some folk-
biological categories can be “cheated” if some properties (here the supposed bright colours 
6 Many activities (warfare, hunting) have been typical male activities throughout history. It is an 
intriguing idea, although not verifiable based on the results of this survey alone, that such a tendency may be 
reflected in some paradise representations. It is possible that the distinctive male preferences have been transmit-
ted culturally as the transmission process (theology, narratives) has been shaped and controlled by men in most 
cultures. This could explain, for example, why there is warfare in Valhalla (see Table 3.1 for details) but no 
references to distinctive activities for women.
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of butterflies) are dominant enough. When the attitude towards insects in general was only 
modestly positive, butterflies were strongly preferred, perhaps from the aesthetic point 
of view. Thus, it seems that a manipulation of preferences is possible to a certain extent 
simply by modifying the original concept. To affirm or falsify this and to learn about the 
boundaries of this phenomenon, a more specific study would be necessary, however.
When it comes to palaces, the reasons behind their unpopularity are probably cultural. 
Palaces as manifestations  of  well-being  or high status are often not present in contemporary 
Western cultures. As the vast majority of participants represented some form of Western 
culture, it is unlikely that they would discern palaces in the same way as the people of 
the ancient Near East or China did, for example. Thus, it is possible that if the concept 
of palaces had been replaced with a similar term with more references to contemporary 
Western culture, the preference could be different. This remains speculative, however.
In the dream environment low dynamics were generally preferred. However, properties 
indicating no action at all were also disliked. This suggests that the dream environment is 
neither static nor too eventful. Again, women showed a slightly stronger general preference 
for properties associated with peacefulness. The preferences of men showed a similar trend, 
though.
The results also hint that familiarity might affect the preference in a way predicted by 
previous studies (e.g., Bixler & Floyd 1997; Ulrich 1983; Kaplan 1992; Kaplan & Kaplan 
1982), as the childhood habitat seemed to have a consistent effect on the preference for 
human presence. If this was studied in detail, it could be possible to determine new aspects 
of familiarity that affect the composition of the environment of dreams (cf. Bixler & Floyd 
1997). To verify or falsify these notions, additional research would be necessary, as this 
aspect was not the main subject of this study. Furthermore, the familiarity of natural 
properties should be analysed with a wider material in order to affirm this aspect of the 
hypothesis. This issue will be addressed in study 2 (see chapter 6).
To summarize, according to the results of this study, the environment of dreams is 
spontaneously understood as being green, luminous, stable, calm, quiet, and moderately 
populated. Having a partner is one the crucial requirements for the dream environment. 
The ideal environment is also characterized by abundant water, flowers, butterflies, and 
animals. On the other hand, wars, hunger, thirst, and diseases should be absent. If this 
sounds familiar, it is so for a reason, as this is how most paradises are described across 
the world’s religious traditions. Thus, it is obvious that the content of paradises does not 
require any religious training to be adapted; humans rather prefer paradise-like imagery 
even without cultural guidance.
Technical discussion – Internet-related issues and how they were 
addressed
In the Internet-based experiments, there are several potential issues that might threaten the 
validity of the data. Ulf-Dietrich Reips (2002) and Michael Roth (2006) have summarized 
the possible disadvantages of using the Internet as a platform. Especially identification, 
dependence on technology, and the motivation of participants are issues that need to be 
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addressed. Moreover, the skills of users must be taken into account as it especially affects 
response times (Roth 2006).
Identification issues were addressed in this study by a mandatory registration which 
required a valid e-mail address. The address was then used as the disposable identification 
key when the participant logged in. Of course, this does not ensure that the rest of the user 
input is accurate, but where it was possible to control according to the provided e-mail 
address, at least the sex of the participant was reported truthfully in every case. According 
to Reips (2002), “gender-swapping” occurs in less than 3 per cent of cases. In this study, 
the rate was seemingly even lower.
Multiple submissions were checked by examining the registration times and IP-
addresses. Only one presumable multiple submission (in which the first attempt was 
aborted by the user) was found and both submissions were rejected.
In this study where spontaneity is important the latencies of single answers and total 
completion time were also analysed. 13 out of 195 completed tests were rejected on this 
basis as being too slow (total time over 30 minutes or average latency of responses over 5 
seconds). It is evident that the instructions were not followed in these cases.
Motivation problems can easily lead to dropouts. This can be a problem especially 
in Internet-based experiments for the face-to-face contact between a participant and a 
researcher is absent (Reips 2002). In this study, the dropout rate was low, reaching just 8.9 
per cent. However, the registration process eliminated more potential participants. 86.6 per 
cent of those who registered started the test, and only 78.9 per cent of those who registered 
actually completed it. Thus, while registration helps to prevent multiple submissions and 
to identify submissions better, it may also mean losing potential data.
On the positive side, the Internet allows participants to freely choose where and when 
to complete the survey. This should help in making a participant feel relaxed and avoid the 
stress often present in experiment situations, where the conditions are usually artificial 
due to certain required arrangements (e.g., laboratory settings). Indeed, 64.1 per cent of 
participants reported that they completed the survey at home.
Dependence on technology was kept as low as possible. The technology used in this 
survey is widely available: according to Adobe, the current developer of the Flash Player, 
Flash Player 6 or newer was installed on over 98 per cent of Internet-enabled computers at 
the time of collecting the data (April 2007 – June 2007, see references).
The client-server traffic during the test was designed in a way that the speed of the 
Internet connection could not affect the results. It could, of course, slow things down 
during the transfer of data, but these phases took place between the parts of the actual 
tests, not during them. Therefore, data collection and users were not disturbed by the data 
transfer unless there were severe problems in networks. Unfortunately, network problems 
are usually beyond the control of a researcher and it is quite well possible that some 
participants failed to complete the survey due to network issues. Due to the nature of the 
Internet, this would have been practically impossible to monitor, however, so monitoring 
of actual network traffic was intentionally omitted from the survey design.
One could also object that the respondent group was too homogeneous to represent 
an all-embracing sample of how people think about ideal environments. University 
students with Internet access and computer skills are hardly a representative sample of 
the world population. Indeed, the Internet can be a limiting factor. It is also true that 
university students do not generally represent the average person. However, even if this 
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kind of criticism is understandable, such limitations in methods and samples are generally 
unavoidable for practical reasons. One cannot expect to study all the people of the world 
to make further conclusions about the universality of certain mental or behavioural 
traits. One must always rely on relatively small samples. Furthermore, this test is not 
Internet dependent. It is designed in a way that it can be implemented without an Internet 
connection and computer skills if needed. The recruiting method can also be modified if 
necessary.
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6  Study 2 – Context-specific features of paradises in    biblical imagery and UFO religions
An important part of the hypothesis of this work is the claim that by examining the real 
world circumstances in which paradise representations have emerged, it is possible to predict 
the content of paradises. Despite the promising looking list of paradise representations 
around the world presented in chapter 3, this part of the hypothesis has so far remained 
largely untested.
In what follows, I will address this issue. I will probe the extent to which the content 
of culture-specific everyday knowledge can explain and predict the content of paradise 
representations. As suggested in the theoretical part, the apparent concreteness of paradises 
hints at the fact that everyday circumstances by and large shape the content of paradise 
representations.
It is necessary to examine the details of paradise representations in order to see if 
context-specificity actually shapes their content. To test the assumptions, I have chosen 
two apparently very different representations of paradises, namely those of the ancient7 
Israelites and of the millennarian UFO religions of the 20th century which worship 
extraterrestrials. This means two distinctive geographical locations and two distinctive 
eras, and, in theory, very different conceptions of paradisiacal circumstances. Yet, if my 
hypothesis is correct, these paradise representations should be more similar than different 
and they should closely reflect the environment, both natural and cultural, in which they 
were formed. In other words, while differences should occur in both the natural and 
cultural settings, the general frames of the idealization of an environment should be close 
to identical.
In analysis, it is necessary to itemize the references of the paradise representations 
that refer to the properties of the surrounding environment. Furthermore, the actual 
circumstances must be reconstructed as precisely as possible. The actual correlation 
between the real and the imaginary world can then be found by comparing the properties 
of these two.
While the focus is on the relationship between the real world and imaginary world 
environments, I will also analyse the similarities between paradise representations and 
the characteristics of human life in paradise. It could, for example, be the case that the 
strongest links between the paradises of the ancient Near East and the 20th century are, 
after all, the references to the nature of human existence.
7 Ancient should be understood here as the period from roughly 10000 BCE to 100 CE, i.e., as the 
period from the end of the most recent glacial period to the emergence of Christianity in the Near East.
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Method and data
In this study, two data sets are used. The first set consists of the paradise representations that 
appear in the texts of the Old and New Testament. The second one consists of the paradise 
representations of three 20th century UFO religions. The method here is a comparative 
analysis which will be applied to both data sets separately. I will first outline the actual 
circumstances of the world in which the respective paradise representations were created. 
Next, I will catalogue all the references to the paradisiacal circumstances with regard to 
environment. I will then explore if and how the properties of paradises are connected with 
the real world environment known to the creators of the paradise representations. Each 
reference will be analysed as an independent entity.
I will also perform a comparison between the data sets. I will look for mutual similarities 
and differences between the two data sets. In this phase, I will also examine the references 
to the nature of human existence in paradise. The purpose of this is to test the hypothesis 
that only the external settings change while the ideal nature of human existence remains 
stable.
I will first focus on the ancient Near East, then on the UFO religions. Last, I will 
compare the representations to see if there are similarities and how the differences reflect 
changes in the real world environment. Before doing so, however, the issues concerning 
the reliability of data should be discussed.
How to reconstruct lost and contemporary worlds?
This study is neither archaeological nor philological, though the data presented here has 
been collected and analysed by various experts. Thus, it is safe to assume that the data has 
already undergone critical review processes and is reliable. Nevertheless, it is appropriate 
to say a few words about the methods used before proceeding with the research problem. 
This will help us understand the uncertainties that are unavoidable in archaeological 
research.
Archaeological data is based on human, animal, and plant remains revealed either 
in excavations or in the surface ruins of ancient sites. In the case of humans, written 
documents can also serve as indirect evidence of life in the past. Several subdisciplines, 
such as archaeozoology and paleoethnobotany, have specialized in natural remains and 
they are proving increasingly important in the study of past circumstances. These fields 
are based on other disciplines related to microbiology and geology, for example (for a 
concise review of methods, see Rosen 1997).
The use of archaeological evidence for the reconstruction and verification of the 
connections between the environment and certain texts of the past is always a difficult 
task. The evidence is often scarce and imperfect. Some aspects of the past cannot be 
reconstructed at all as the evidence has decomposed or has only existed in an immaterial 
form. Moreover, dating the remains is often very difficult. The widely used carbon-14 
method has turned out to be not accurate enough in many cases, for example. Furthermore, 
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while scholars prefer to classify cultures and epochs into categories, such categorization 
always remains more or less arbitrary. Thus, we must be cautious in our inferences (see 
e.g., Cryer 1995; Rosen 1997).
Animals are often even more difficult to study than the life of humans as the material 
remains are usually more scarce. Again, the indirect evidence of the presence of animals or 
plants, such as carvings and art, can be used as additional sources of information if direct 
evidence such as bones are not available. On the other hand, by relying on archaeological 
sites alone the picture easily becomes distorted as the remains found at archaeological 
sites often contain animals that had some special value for humans. Thus, domesticated 
animals become overrepresented in the data. Moreover, small animals or those with fragile 
bones, such as birds, do not preserve well. Recovered bones often reveal more about the 
cultural preferences and the durability of bones than about the original nature of the 
animal world (Gilbert 2002). The same is usually true of flora although the remains are 
often more scarce and more difficult to uncover. The structure and diversity of flora is 
mainly reconstructed by using pollen records preserved in the soil (see Pollock 1999; van 
Zeist & Bottema 1982).
The extinction, domestication, and introduction of species can also change the balance 
of nature rather quickly (Gilbert 2002, see also Tchernov 1982). Perhaps the most extreme 
impact of the introduction of a new species into the native fauna is found in Australia, 
where feral cats (Felis catus) have caused major damage affecting both the distribution 
and balance of the native fauna (Dickman 1996). While no such extreme consequences 
associated with the introduction of a new species are known from the ancient Near East, 
it is still a potential factor that should be kept in mind when reconstructing the picture of 
ancient flora and fauna.
Humans interact with the environment in many other ways than by simply killing 
or introducing new species. Agriculture, the use of wood, mining, and the growth of 
populations all have a profound impact on the environment. This again makes things 
more complex as the change of natural settings cannot be analysed solely on the basis of 
natural processes (Butzer 1995; Gilbert 2002).
Despite certain unavoidable degree of uncertainties, I am still optimistic. The history 
of the Near East is perhaps the best known history of any part of the world. Over a century 
of intensive archaeological research in the region (for a review, see Moorey 1991) has 
revealed us many aspects of the past important for this study. Moreover, the Near East is 
the origin of three major world religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It has ensured 
the continuous interest of not only archaeologists, but theologians and philologists as well, 
and has promoted the collation and analysis of all-important research material. Thus, the 
part of this study which discusses biblical paradise representations is based on a wide 
range of studies on the environment and ways of life in the ancient Near East. Therefore, 
the frames should be well-defined and eligible enough to allow the analysis and inferences 
that follow.
Reconstructing the world around the UFO believers seems like a somewhat easier task. 
While the problem with reconstructing ancient conditions is usually the lack of data, the 
reverse is the case with modern religions. The sources are often available in English and 
some influential UFO groups, especially outside the United States, offer several translations 
of their teachings. Yet the actual circumstances in which the various UFO religions were 
born must be carefully studied as the boundaries of local and global variables that affect 
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knowledge about the real world are unlikely to be as clear as they were in ancient times. 
Thus, the context and context-specificity of UFO religions may be more difficult to define 
reliably.
Data set 1 – Paradise representations of the Bible
The paradise representations that appear in the Bible are products of separate but 
interwoven traditions of the Israelites and of Christianity that further interacted closely 
with their surrounding traditions and cultures. Thus, even if we talk about Judaism and 
Christianity here, it should be borne in mind that the cultural boundaries of the ancient 
Near East were often loose and cultural knowledge of any particular region was far from 
exclusive. The time span of our interest reaches from the third millennium BCE to the first 
century CE. However, it should be noted that the culture of the Near East was much older. 
Thus, some portions and themes of biblical texts may have been derived from even further 
back than the third millennium BCE. This issue, among other things, will be discussed in 
what follows.
Sources
The Christian Bible is a collection of texts of the ancient Israelites and early Christians 
written by multiple, often anonymous authors. It is divided into two parts, the Old 
Testament (or “old covenant”) and the New Testament (or “new covenant”).
The texts of the Old Testament – or The Hebrew Bible – are the holy scriptures of 
Judaism embracing virtually every aspect of the social, political, and religious life of 
ancient Israel and post-exilic Judaism. The Old Testament also describes the foundations 
of the cosmos and world order. The texts of the Old Testament represent multiple literary 
genres varying from narratives to prophecies and they were originally written in Hebrew 
and Aramaic. While there is no clear date for the canonization of the Old Testament texts, 
it is apparent that its texts were acknowledged as orthodox by the Jews by the first century 
CE (Sanders 1992). However, it is notable that its texts were generally acknowledged as 
authoritative long before that (Barton 2001; Sanders 1992).
In addition to the Hebrew Bible, the early Christian Bible – The Greek Bible (The 
Septuaginta) – includes additional, so-called deuterocanonical and apocryphal books 
within it. Unlike the texts of the Hebrew Bible, some of these texts were originally written 
in Hebrew and Greek and they were not a part of the original Hebrew corpus (Goodman 
2001). However, the status of these texts has varied depending on the church; Orthodox, 
Catholic, and Protestant views differ significantly on whether these texts should be 
regarded as authoritative as the texts which belong to the Hebrew Bible (Barton 2001).
The New Testament, in turn, is a collection of texts written during the first and second 
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centuries CE. They were written to record early Christian history, to guide the members of 
the newborn sect, and to describe the life and deeds of the Messiah and the future kingdom 
of God. Only a portion of the early texts were finally included in the New Testament 
canon at the councils of Laodicea in 363 CE, Hippo in 393 CE, and Carthage in 397 CE 
(Gamble 1992), where 27 texts were officially accepted as orthodox. As a result, many 
early influential texts, such as the gospels of Thomas, Jacob, and Nicodemus, and Gnostic 
literature discussing the hidden nature of Christ were left out from the New Testament 
even though they had been widely recognized by early Christians (Houlden 2001; Gamble 
1992). The important selection criteria for the canonized texts were that they were already 
widespread, apostolic, widely accepted, and supposedly written by a disciple of Jesus 
(Gamble 1992). Thus, the New Testament is rather the result of political and theological 
decisions than a single book. The texts of the New Testament were originally written 
mostly in Greek (Houlden 2001).
Biblical texts basically contain three texts where paradise, as defined in this study, is 
described in detail. Genesis 1-3, portions of the collection of texts known as the Book of 
Isaiah, and Revelation 21-22 provide the most detailed descriptions of the paradisiacal 
realms. In Genesis, paradise is a garden isolated from the real world by the cherubim and 
a flaming sword, who guard the way to the tree of life (Gen. 3:24). In Isaiah and Revelation, 
paradise will be established on Earth by God. While these three texts provide the most 
detailed descriptions of paradise, they are not the only ones. Especially other prophets 
follow similar outlines. Paradisiacal visions in Ezekiel (e.g., Ezek. 28, 31, 36), Hosea (Hos. 
14), Joel (Joel 4), Amos (Amos 9), and Zechariah (Zech. 8-14) are similar to those of Isaiah. 
Nevertheless, they basically repeat the content of Isaiah with fewer details. Therefore, they 
are not included in this analysis as they are chronologically rooted in the same epoch and 
in the same environment as the texts of Isaiah and they are content-wise very similar.
The dating of texts is a complicated issue. The most difficult of the texts analysed here 
is Genesis, the first part of the Pentateuch. The task becomes even more complex because 
of the widely accepted fact that Genesis 1-3 is compiled from two different sources and 
the rest of Genesis from additional sources (Whybray 2001). By comparing the content 
with archaeological data, it is possible to say that both sources of Genesis 1-3 existed by 
the beginning of the first millennium but their final versions were not written down until 
probably the 6th century BCE (Whybray 2001). However, the contents of Genesis 1-3 also 
suggests that some portions of the narratives behind it are derived from Mesopotamian 
and Babylonian traditions indicating that the themes of Genesis 1-3 could be of even 
earlier origin. On the other hand, some other portions suggest that at least Genesis 4-11 
must be younger, possibly from 6th century BCE indicating again the use of different 
sources. Genesis is therefore a compilation from different sources rather than a single text. 
Nevertheless, although it is not possible to reliably date the individual texts of Genesis, 
it is relatively safe to assume that the original narratives partially derive from earlier 
neighbouring cultures and traditions even if they were revised by later authors (Wenham 
1987; Whybray 2001).
Isaiah is somewhat easier to date by using other biblical texts as a point of comparison. 
The activity of the prophet took place during the last third of the 8th century BCE. However, 
this dating is applicable only to the first 39 chapters. It is very likely that the following 
chapters 40-55 date from the Babylonian exile and thus from the 6th century BCE (the so-
called Deutero-Isaiah). Chapters 56-66 were possibly written later still, perhaps after the 
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Israelites returned from exile in the 5th century BCE (Coggins 2001; Watts 1987).
We know much more about the author and dating of the Revelation. The author was a 
Christian prophet named John who was familiar with early Christian communities. The 
majority of scholars date the Revelation around 90 CE (e.g., Bauckham 2001).
In addition to dating, biblical texts are often problematic content-wise. The nature 
and style of ancient writing challenges scholars and it is often very difficult to translate 
the texts reliably. Moreover, in many cases, several different interpretations are possible. 
This should be kept in mind when reading the ancient texts. For this reason, I will use 
three translations, of which ESV (English Standard Version) is the main source as it is the 
most widely used. NIV (New International Version), and NLV (New Living Translation) 
provide points of comparison. Since the purpose of this study is to examine whether the 
biblical paradises correspond with the real world circumstances of the past, a comparative 
approach should ensure that we decipher the original meaning of the concept with sufficient 
certainty. Naturally, in some cases even a reliable translation cannot ensure success as 
the meaning of certain terms and passages is sometimes difficult to determine. Should 
this be the case, definite answers cannot usually be found and some issues will remain 
unanswered.
The world of biblical traditions
The actual territory occupied by the ancient Israelites varied at different periods in history 
but principally it can be located in the area covered by Israel and Palestine today. The 
territory familiar to the Israelites was much larger, however, extending from northeastern 
Africa to today’s Iran and Armenia. Furthermore, the Mediterranean and coastal states 
are often mentioned in the Bible indicating that they too were part of the known world of 
the biblical writers (Curtis 2007).
The dominant biotope of the ancient Near East was desert. Deserts covered most parts 
of the Arabian peninsula, the Sinai peninsula and Egypt, excluding the river valleys and 
plains. Where deserts did not dominate, they were usually replaced by steppe. The northern 
parts of the area were mountainous and forested, however. The forests were especially 
characteristics of the so-called Fertile Crescent, a crescent-shaped territory that covered 
roughly the area from the Nile to Mesopotamia, including the eastern Mediterranean 
coastal strip (Butzer 1995; Curtis 2007; Zohary 1973). 
Hills and mountains characterized the area. Several mountain chains, such as the 
Taurus Mountains in today’s Turkey and the Zagros Mountains between Mesopotamia 
and Persia formed natural boundaries within the Near East. In the Levant area, hills 
dominated the territory on the western and the eastern coasts of the Jordan river, the 
Sea of Galilee, and the Dead Sea. The plains were mainly coastal in the Levant. Other 
significant plains were located in Mesopotamia and Egypt (Curtis 2007).
Rivers were the main water supply although oases and lakes, both permanent and 
episodic, provided additional sources of water. The most important rivers of the ancient 
Near East were the Nile, the Jordan, the Euphrates, and the Tigris around which the most 
significant cultural centres were developed and concentrated.
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Nature: climate
After the most recent glacial period, the climate of the Near East has undergone several 
changes affecting the natural settings and biodiversity. However, there are no records of 
rapid climate changes during biblical times. The transition into a climate similar to the 
Near East of today took place by the Early Bronze Age (Goldberg & Bar-Yosef 1982). The 
annual climatic cycles, moisture levels and temperatures were relatively stable from 2000 
BCE to 100 CE, the time within which the biblical narratives are recorded. There were no 
clearly definable climatic trends during that time (see Butzer 1995).
Figure 6.1 – The main regions of the ancient Near East and the approximate boundaries of the 
Fertile Crescent and the Levant. (Figure by the author, see Curtis 2007 for details)
The climate of the Near East in biblical times was dominated by annual climatic cycles 
that are similar today. Generally speaking, a year was divided into two seasons, a cooler 
and rainy winter, and a hot and practically rainless summer (Butzer 1995; Pollock 1999). 
The annual rainfall varied regionally but it was approximately 200 mm although the 
sequence was not generally predictable (see Pollock 1999: 30-31). In the lowlands of the 
Levant, the rainfall varied between 100 and 700 mm. The 200 mm is generally considered 
as the lower limit necessary for dry farming. In mountainous areas, rainfall was higher 
and in deserts there was not necessarily annual rainfall at all (Butzer 1995; Curtis 2007; 
Hopkins 1997; van Zeist and Bottema 1982).
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Nature: fauna and flora
The Near East is a bridge between Africa and Eurasia, and a bottleneck of Ethiopian 
and the temperate Palearctic terrestrial fauna of Eurasia (Gilbert 2002) and African and 
Eurasian subalpine flora (Zohary 1973). Thus, despite the generally arid circumstances, 
the biodiversity of the Near East has been rather high after the Pleistocene period.
The mammalian fauna is the best studied and the best known. Domesticated animals 
are, naturally, best known because of the high number of remains around archaeological 
sites. However, most tamed species had wild ancestors that existed alongside them (e.g., 
wolves and dogs) and were thus known to humans. The diversity of mammalian fauna is 
much larger, however. Forty-three families of mammals ranging from mice (subfamily 
Murinae) to bats (eight families) and wild cats (family Felidae) populated the Near East. 
However, some species are now locally extinct due to human activity. For example, the 
Asiatic lion (Panthera leo persica) has disappeared from the Near East and is found as 
a rarity only in India. Furthermore, several other species are now endangered and their 
distribution is much reduced (Gilbert 2002).
There were probably over 1000 indigenous species of birds (class Aves) in the ancient 
Near East, some of which are now extinct mostly due to human activities, either locally 
or globally (Gilbert 2002). Not all of these species were breeders, however. Most of them 
were simply flew over the region during the annual migrations. While the avifauna was 
probably generally similar to today, the distribution of species presumably deviates from 
that of ancient times. Habitat losses and restoration as well as human activities, especially 
hunting, have affected the distribution of species in various ways (Gilbert 2002). However, 
the current abundance of species was not known in the ancient Near East due to the lack of 
identification methods available today. Thus, it is expected that the nomenclature used was 
much more limited and lacked the precision of the taxonomy of today. In fact, according 
to Bible (Lev. 11:19), even bats were identified as birds sometimes.
There is far less evidence available of other groups of animals and usually only 
the remains of those with significant cultural or economic importance are found in 
archaeological sites. Among those are the Nile crocodile (Crocodylus niloticus), honeybees, 
of which Apis mellifera is indigenous, several species of arthropods (family Acrididae), 
and scorpions (family Arachnoida). Fish are generally poorly known but some remains 
have been found from Egyptian sites (Gilbert 1995; 2002). Among the most common and 
important species were Nile perch (Lates niloticus), tilapia (family Cichlidae), and catfish 
(Clarias sp.) (Brewer & Friedman 1989; Gilbert 2002). According to the evidence, it is 
obvious that underwater life was generally much better known in Egypt than elsewhere in 
the ancient Near East (Gilbert 2002). The distribution of fauna other than mammalian or 
avian is difficult to determine, but it is likely that human activities have crucially reduced 
the living space of many species.
The flora of the Near East is surprisingly rich considering that most of the region suffers 
from a lack of regular rainfall and is consequently deserted and harsh. Yet several types of 
vegetation zones existed in the ancient Near East (Curtis 2007, van Zeist & Bottema 1982, 
see also Zohary 1973). Outside the Fertile Crescent, steppe and desert were the dominant 
biotopes. The typical plants of these biotopes were low and with a grass stalk, including 
several types of thorns (Ziziphus sp.) and thistles (Cirsium spp.). Forests were concentrated 
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around alluvial plains, river valleys, and mountainous regions where  the level of rainfall 
was higher. While the forests concentrated on the northern regions and the recolonization 
of forests was rather slow after the last Ice Age, the Levant and the Fertile Crescent were 
reforested by biblical times (see Butzer 1995 for details).
The most typical plants with nutritional importance were cereals (especially barley and 
wheat) and fruit trees (e.g., mulberry (Morus sp.), olea (Olea sp.), vines (Vitis sp.), and fig 
(Ficus carica)), which provided the main ingredients for everyday nutrition (e.g., Curtis 
2007). While these were indigenous to the ancient Near East, they were domesticated and 
further refined by humans. The most typical plants used for other purposes were often 
trees, such as acacia (Acacia sp.), poplar (Populus sp.), pine (Pinus sp.), cedar (Cedrus sp.), 
fir (Picea sp. or Abies sp.), oak (Quercus sp.), and cypress (Cupressus sempervirens) which 
were used as the raw material of houses, furniture, ships, and boats (Kuniholm 1997). In 
the Levant, the mountainous forested regions of Syria and Lebanon represented the most 
important sources of wood.
Culture
Evidence of human impact on the land has been dated back to the beginning of the early 
Holocene period. The first signs of agriculture and semipermanent dwellings become 
evident after 6000 BCE. The settlements and farming were not necessarily localized around 
the rivers as was later the case (Butzer 1995). Early stages of urbanization took place several 
millennia later, in the Chalcolithic era c. 4500-3300 BCE, during which the alluvial plains 
become the central locations of human populations (Curtis 2007: 199; Pollock 1999: 45-
46).
In Palestine, several city-states were formed by 2700 BCE during the Early Bronze Age. 
This eventually led to more specialized societies and especially to a specialized military, 
which in turn denoted more lethal weapons and, on the other hand, more developed 
defence systems including fortified and walled cities typical of later times in the ancient 
Near East (Coogan 1998; Giddens 1997: 470; Mazar 1995).
The states of the ancient Near East were usually monarchies, small kingdoms or city-
states. Even the largest cities of ancient times were small, extending over an area rarely 
larger than a few square kilometres. Furthermore, the population of even the largest cities 
probably did not exceed fifteen or twenty thousand people. The communities were strictly 
local and travel was the business of a few specialists such as merchants and the military. 
However, trading routes ensured the spread of cultural knowledge even if the process was 
slow by the standards of today (Curtis 2007; Giddens 1997: 470-471). As most of the cities 
and states were connected with the trading routes, knowledge accumulated in cities which 
became cultural, political, and scientific centres of the time.
While cities brought permanent settlements and cultural unity, and urbanization 
made the first “true” civilizations possible (Coogan 1998), pastoral nomadism and rural 
communities still represented the most typical ways of life in the ancient Near East with 
their respective social systems often not controlled by the leaders and officials of the cities 
(Giddens 1997: 470-471). Pastoral nomadism refers to the way of life which is based on the 
care and use of herd animals (LaBianca 1997). In the Near East, this meant the herding 
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of camels, cattle, sheep, and goats. Where possible, nomads utilized flexibly the resources 
of the environment according to the seasonal changes. Thus, in contrast to farmers, they 
were not as dependent on local and annual variations of the climate. Still, the evidence 
suggests that nomads traded their herds for the cultivated products of farmers indicating 
interdependence on each other. Furthermore, pastoral nomadism provided supplies for 
the growing urban populations and by the Early Bronze Age it was already specialized 
in several kind of animals products, such as wool, meat, milk, and fibre (Hopkins 1997; 
LaBianca 1997, see also Pollock 1999; Potts 1997). 
Agriculture was a key factor in the genesis of ancient civilizations (Diamond 1998). 
The best known forms of ancient agriculture were organized around the floods of rivers 
in Egypt and Mesopotamia, but traces of early forms of agriculture have appeared in 
southern Levant as early as about 9000 BCE (Hopkins 1997). Well established agricultural 
villages appeared after 6000 BCE. Hunting wild animals continued alongside farming but 
became gradually less important. Furthermore, hunting was largely replaced by herding 
of domesticated cattle by 6000 BCE. The cultivation of fruit trees was developed by 3500 
BCE (Diamond 1998; Hesse 1995; Hopkins 1997).
Cultivation techniques varied. In Palestine, irrigation systems were not largely used. 
While this meant that less human effort was required to cultivate crops, the lack of rains 
could result in disaster and lead to famine as the well-organized large-scale irrigation 
systems typical of Egypt and Mesopotamia had not been adopted (Butzer 1995; Curtis 
2007: 31-32; see also Renfrew 1995). However, both methods were highly dependent on 
regular rainfall and predictable climatic conditions. Especially in Mesopotamia, this was 
not often the case: uncontrollable floods were much more common than in Egypt and they 
could cause severe problems for people and irrigation systems.
The most important of the field crops were the various types of cereals. Moreover, 
fruits, of which grapes (fruits of Vitis sp.) and olives (fruits of Olea sp.) were the most 
important, provided important sources of nutrition (Curtis 2007, Hopkins 1997, Renfrew 
1995).
As the human population grew, its impact on the environment also grew. There is 
evidence of large-scale clearance of forests as early as c. 4000 years ago (van Zeist and 
Bottema 1982). At the same time, the pollen of cultivated species, such as Olea (Olea 
sp.), Juglans (Juglans sp.), or Vitis (Vitis sp.) become more common in pollen remains in 
Syria, which suggests large-scale use of wood (van Zeist & Bottema 1982). Cultivation 
techniques had already changed the alluvial plains of Egypt and Mesopotamia and the 
concentrations of humans caused substantial pressures on surrounding natural resources. 
Despite this, human impact was generally local and limited to the regions which were the 
most populated and accessible (see Butzer 1995).
Politically, the ancient Near East was anything but stable. Conflicts between kingdoms 
and city-states throughout the Near East were common and long periods of peace rare 
(e.g., Campbell 1998; Cogan 1998; Hamblin 2006). The contacts with neighbouring regions 
were not only dependent on occupations and conflicts, however. Trading between states 
and regions was common as several active trading routes indicate (see Curtis 2007 for 
trading routes). Trade did not only provide resources from neighbouring regions but also 
helped cultural ideas to spread. Thus, no part of the ancient Near East was isolated from 
other parts and from the cultural perspective it is far more difficult to draw borders than 
the geography might suggest.
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To sum up, there were basically three interdependent cultural systems in the ancient 
Near East: pastoral nomadism, agriculturalism, and urbanism. The first two were 
interdependent of each other and provided supplies for the urban centres which in turn 
were cultural centres in which most of the scientific and technological innovations, such 
as metallurgy, largely took place. The societies were highly dependent on annual seasonal 
cycles and resources of nature, however. Moreover, nature posed several types of threats 
in the form of wild animals and harsh physical conditions. Most of the ancient Near East 
remained a wilderness despite the sometimes heavy local human impact.
Paradise representations and the actual environment
The geographical setting is described rather accurately in many books of the Bible and it 
seems that the connections between the biblical geography and the archaeological records 
are relatively strong. Even mythical places, such as the Garden of Eden or New Jerusalem, 
clearly reflect geographical interest and provide a comparative view of the mythical realms 
and the real world (Curtis 2007: 3-4). Several passages in the Bible describe the natural 
environment in detail. Indeed, many inferences regarding the world of the ancient Near 
East have been made based on descriptions in the Bible (Curtis 2007).
In theory, this should not necessarily affect the paradise representations of the Bible 
in any way, as they are representations of imaginary worlds. This is not the case, however. 
The paradise representations reflect the real world almost as accurately as the passages 
describing the real world. Paradisiacal realms actually have only a few references to 
elements that did not exist or were unknown in the real world. Instead, there is almost 
always a reference to the current circumstances and everyday knowledge. For example, 
Genesis provides such detailed cues of the location of the Garden of Eden that it was long 
believed Eden was a real geographical location:
“A river flowed out of Eden to water the garden, and there it divided and became four 
rivers. The name of the first is the Pishon. It is the one that flowed around the whole land 
of Havilah, where there is gold. And the gold of that land is good; bdellium and onyx 
stone are there. The name of the second river is the Gihon. It is the one that flowed around 
the whole land of Cush. And the name of the third river is the Tigris, which flows east of 
Assyria. And the fourth river is the Euphrates.” [Gen. 2:10-14]
Most notable, however, is the detailed description of general natural settings. Especially 
the Book of Isaiah is, in addition to the paradise representations, full of references to 
the real world that make the visions of Isaiah even more specific and tied to real-world 
environments. Cedars (Cedrus sp.) and oaks (Quercus sp.), thorn (Ziziphus sp.), and nettle 
(Urtica sp.) provide examples of vegetation used to describe the characteristics of the world, 
either the paradisiacal or real (e.g., Isa. 2, 7, 34). Similarly, references to animals seem to 
be limited to those with a real world counterpart such as ostrich (Struthio camelus), hyena 
(Crocuta crocuta or Hyaena hyaena), wild goat (Capra hircus), owl (families Tytonidae and 
Strigidae), and hawks (families Accipitridae and Falconidae) (e.g., Isa. 34). According to 
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current knowledge, all the species mentioned in the Book of Isaiah were or are known in 
the Near East (see Gilbert 1995; 2002; Zohary 1973). Moreover, geographical formations 
such as mountains and hills as well as precious minerals such as gold, and silver (e.g., Isa. 
2) all had their meaningful counterparts in the real world.
In Isaiah, paradise representations reflect the actual environment closely in many 
respects. The following excerpts show a clear tendency to locate future paradises in the 
familiar abodes:
“The wilderness and the dry land shall be glad; the desert shall rejoice and blossom like 
the crocus; it shall blossom abundantly” [Isa. 35:1-2]
“The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the young goat, 
and the calf and the lion and the fattened calf together; and a little child shall lead them. 
The cow and the bear shall graze; their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat 
straw like the ox. The nursing child shall play over the hole of the cobra, and the weaned 
child shall put his hand on the adder’s den. They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy 
mountain” [Isa. 11:6-9]
“A multitude of camels shall cover you, the young camels of Midian and Ephah; all those 
from Sheba shall come. They shall bring gold and frankincense, and shall bring good 
news, the praises of the Lord. All the flocks of Kedar shall be gathered to you; the rams of 
Nebaioth shall minister to you;” [Isa. 60:6-7]
In Revelation, the salience of nature is diminished at the cost of descriptions of the city 
of New Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the descriptions of New Jerusalem and God’s kingdom 
still reflect the characteristics of the environment, albeit with obvious interest in the actual 
dwelling place:
“And he [an angel] carried me away in the Spirit to a great, high mountain, and showed 
me the holy city Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God, having the glory of 
God, its radiance like a most rare jewel, like a jasper, clear as crystal. It had a great, high 
wall, with twelve gates, and at the gates twelve angels, and on the gates the names of the 
twelve tribes of the sons of Israel were inscribed – on the east three gates, on the north 
three gates, on the south three gates, and on the west three gates. And the wall of the city 
had twelve foundations” [Rev. 21:10-14]
 “Then the angel showed me the river of the water of life, bright as crystal, flowing from 
the throne of God and of the Lamb through the middle of the street of the city; also, on 
either side of the river, the tree of life with its twelve kinds of fruit, yielding its fruit each 
month. The leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. [...] And night will be no 
more. They will need no light of lamp or sun, for the Lord God will be their light ” [Rev. 
22: 1-4]
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The nature of human existence, on the other hand, remains similar throughout the 
texts. Physical welfare, access to vital resources, lack of threats whatsoever, and control 
over nature are consistently used to portray the nature of human life in paradise:
“’Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish 
of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves on the 
earth.’ And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is on the 
face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit. You shall have them for food.’” 
[Gen. 1:28-30]
“Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped; then shall 
the lame man leap like a deer, and the tongue of the mute sing for joy.” [Isa. 35:5-6]
“Then justice will dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness abide in the fruitful field. 
And the effect of righteousness will be peace, and the result of righteousness, quietness 
and trust forever. My people will abide in a peaceful habitation, in secure dwellings, and 
in quiet resting places.” [Isa. 32:16-18]
“You will see no more the insolent people, the people of an obscure speech that you 
cannot comprehend, stammering in a tongue that you cannot understand. Behold Zion, 
the city of our appointed feasts! Your eyes will see Jerusalem, an untroubled habitation, 
an immovable tent, whose stakes will never be plucked up, nor will any of its cords be 
broken.” [Isa. 33:19-20]
“Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they will be 
his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. He will wipe away every tear 
from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, 
nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away.” [Rev. 21: 3-4]
In Table 6.1, I have listed the terms used to describe paradise. Should there be a real 
world counterpart, it is marked. Additional details and notes are provided when needed. 
The characteristics of human existence have been summarized in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.1 – The presence of the properties of biblical paradises in the real world.
Bible In the Bible*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Gen. 1-3 Garden x In addition to being a mythical abode of 
God or the status symbols of kings, gardens 
played a role in growing vegetables in the 
ancient Near East. The so-called shade-
tree gardening technique, first used by the 
Sumerians, in which tall trees provided 
shelter and shade for other species, was 
widely used in the Near East and Egypt. 
Most of the trees in these gardens were 
fruit trees such as the date palm (Phoenix 
dactylifera), mulberry (Morus alba), fig 
(Ficus carica), and pomegranate (Punica 
granatum). The shade gardens were usually 
situated near water and were subject of well-
controlled irrigation. (a, k, w)
A river that flows 
out of the garden
– At least for the Tigris and the Euphrates, 
there are no common springs today. (n)
Pishon (x) One of the rivers flowing out of Eden. 
Location unknown. Possibly one of the two 
major branches of the Nile. (h)
Gihon (x) One of the rivers flowing out of Eden. 
Location unknown. Possibly one of the two 
major branches of Nile. Also a perennial 
spring in Jerusalem. (h, p, u)
Tigris x The more eastern of the two rivers that 
define Mesopotamia.
Euphrates x The more western of the two rivers that 
define Mesopotamia.
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Bible In the Bible*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Havilah (x) A land known for its abundance and riches. 
Usually associated with southern Ethiopia 
and Egypt (Nubia, i.e., Cush), which were 
major sources of gold. See also “Cush” below. 
(h, t)
Cush (x) A region covering large parts of Eastern 
Africa, mainly the southern parts of today’s 
Egypt and Ethiopia. See also “Havilah” 
above. (h)
Assyria x A mountainous region extending along 
the Tigris. Also a kingdom that controlled 
the Fertile Crescent and parts of northeast 
Africa. (h)
Cattle x The livestock mainly consisted of sheep 
(Ovis aries) and goats (Capra hircus), also 
known as small cattle. Additional domestic 
livestock consisted of cattle (Bos taurus and 
B. indicus), water buffaloes (Bubalus bubalis 
or B. arnee), pigs (Sus scrofa),  equids (Equus 
sp.), bactarian camels (Camelus bactrianus), 
and dromedary (C. dromedarius). (b)
Living creatures 
(including livestock, 
creeping things, 
sea creatures, and 
beasts)
x For livestock, see “Cattle” above.
Serpent x Over 30 species are found in the Near East, 
twenty of which are poisonous. (l, m, w)
Birds x Or “flying things”, which may include bats 
(Chiroptera) as well.
Fish x
Fruit trees x See “Garden” above.
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Bible In the Bible*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Fig x Together with the vine and the olive tree, 
constituted the most important and useful 
fruit tree. See also “Garden” above. (w)
Green plants x Present especially in gardens where tall trees 
provided shelter from harsh conditions. (a)
Bushes x Typical vegetation of the steppe and deserts 
in the Near East. (k)
Grass x Typical vegetation of the steppe and deserts 
in the Near East. (k)
(Good/pure) gold x Gold was a widely employed precious metal 
used for personal ornaments and amulets 
as well as for the ornaments of temples and 
palaces. Furthermore, there is some evidence 
from Mesopotamia that gold was used for 
weapons, tools, seals, and vessels, such as 
strainers and goblets.
Gold was valued in the Near East at 
least from the Akkadian period onwards 
According to Ur III texts, gold was classified 
by purity, or silver-gold ratio: “almost pure”, 
“mixed”, and “normal”. “Almost pure” was the 
best available form of gold. Sources of gold 
were mainly Egypt, Nubia (see “Cush” and 
“Havilah” above), and, at least in antiquity, 
Arabia. In Genesis, the relevant passage 
obviously refers to Nubian gold. (d, t)
Bdellium x Aromatic gum exuded from Commiphora 
wightii (or possibly C. africana), indigenous 
to the Near East. (c, k, w)
Onyx stone x A microcrystalline quartz. Coloured milky-
white alternating with black. Important 
sources Egypt and Arabia. (d, t)
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Bible In the Bible*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Thorn x It is not possible to identify species here. 
Thorns probably refer to Ziziphus sp., or 
any species with thorns, of which there are 
numerous examples in the Near East. Not 
present in paradise, only outside it. (f, k, w)
Thistle x Cirsium spp., thrives in arid environments in 
the Near East. Some species are also used as 
food. Not present in paradise, only outside it. 
(k, w)
Garments of skin x Skins of game and herded animals were used 
as garments. Not present in paradise, only 
outside it. (aa)
Isaiah 2 The house of the 
Lord
–
Mountains x There are several mountain ranges in the 
Near East, including the Levant area. (j)
Hills x Hills are typical of the lowlands of the 
mountain ranges in the Near East. (j)
Swords x Typical weapons of infantry. (å)
Plowshares 
(Ploughshares)
x Used as an agricultural tool. (ä)
Spears x There is evidence of the use of spear both for 
hunting and warfare. (å)
Pruning hooks x Widely used in viticulture around the world.
Isaiah 11 Fruit x See “Garden” above for examples of sources 
of fruit.
Wolf x Canis lupus ssp. pallipes/arabs, native to the 
Near East. (e)
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Bible In the Bible*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Lamb x (Young) sheep (Ovis aries). See “Cattle” 
above.
Leopard x Panthera pardus ssp. nimr is native to Arabia 
and southern Levant, ssp. tulliana in Turkey, 
and ssp. saxicolor in Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia. Was known as one of the most 
fearful beasts. (b, e, w)
Goat x See “Cattle” above.
(Fattened) calf x See “Cattle” above.
Lion x Panthera leo persica, native to the Near East. 
Was known as one of the most fearful beasts. 
(b, e, w)
Cow x See “Cattle” above.
Bear x Ursus arctos syriacus, native to the mountains 
and forests of Lebanon. (b, e, w)
Straw x It is not possible to specify species or even 
family here. Refers here to the general 
nutriment of cattle.
Ox x Male of a species of cattle. See “Cattle” above.
Cobra x Naja sp., a group of dangerous and lethally 
poisonous snakes. Probably refers to 
Egyptian cobra (Naja haje), native to the 
Near East. (w)
 
Adder x Or viper, Vipera berus (or Vipera sp.), several 
poisonous species are native to the Near 
East. (w) 
Sea x The sea is not specified here but probably 
refers to the Mediterranean.
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Assyria, Egypt, 
Pathros, Cush, Elam, 
Shinar, Hamath, 
coastlands of the sea
x All are regions in the Near East. This passage 
describes how Israelites are gathered to 
the promised land from the surrounding 
regions. (q)
Judah x A region west from the Dead Sea, south of 
Ephraim. (q)
Efraim x Or Ephraim, a region between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean. (q)
Philistines (in the 
west)
x A region west of Judah. (q)
Edom x A region south of the Dead Sea. (q)
Moab x A region east of the Dead Sea. (q)
Ammonites x A tribe that lived east of the Jordan River and 
Gad. Israelites believed that the Ammonites 
were related to them, since Lot was a nephew 
of Abraham. (x)
Sea of Egypt (x) Obviously refers to the Red Sea, as the 
passage compares the highway from Assyria 
to the highway across the Red Sea from 
Egypt to Israel. NIV names this the gulf of 
Egypt and NLV the gulf of the Red Sea.
River x According to NIV and NLV, Refers to the 
Euphrates (see also “Euphrates” above).
(Seven) channels x Or, streams. The passage refers here to the 
road which is made easy to walk by God.
Sandals x As well as closed shoes, several types of 
sandals were used in the ancient Near East. 
Usually made of leather or fibre. (ö)
Assyria x See “Assyria” above.
Israel x A territory of the Israelites located between 
the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. (h)
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Egypt x A region in the northeastern corner of 
Africa. (q)
Isaiah 32 Wilderness becomes 
a ->
x Most of the ancient Near East was 
uninhabited desert, steppe, and grassland.
-> fruitful field x Probably refers to fields that provide good 
crops.
Forest x Forests of the ancient Near East were 
concentrated in mountainous regions of 
the Fertile Crescent and in river valleys and 
plains. (q)
City x In Palestine, several city-states were formed 
by 2700 BCE during the Early Bronze Age. 
See also “Great, high wall” below. (q, u)
Ox x See “Ox” and ”Cattle” above.
Donkey x See “Cattle” above.
Dwellings x Probably tents or houses.
Isaiah 33 An untroubled 
habitation
– Described in many ways in the Book of 
Isaiah, most of which represent the opposite 
of real-world circumstances.
(An immovable) 
tent
x A dwelling widely used in the Near East, 
used especially by nomads and the military. 
Traditionally tents were made of goat hair. 
(s)
Cord x Ropes were used to support the tents and 
small shelters. Usually the tent had two sets 
of ropes, one to pitch the tent and one to 
control the panels of the tent. Traditionally 
made of spun and plied sheep’s wool. (s)
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Stakes x Used to support tents and ropes. Generally 
made of wood. Very little evidence of this 
material remains, however. (s)
Broad rivers and 
streams
x No direct reference to any particular river. 
Rivers were of crucial importance in the 
ancient Near East, however.
Galleys with oars x Different types of vessels from cargo ships 
to warships that were propelled by human 
oarsmen. Evidence of such ships has been 
traced back to 3000 BCE. (o)
Majestic ship x Probably refers to larger vessels.
Sails, masts x Parts of many types of larger vessels used in 
the Near East. (o)
Prey x Faunal remains indicate the importance of 
wild animals as a source of meat. Generally, 
however, domesticated animals were a more 
important source of meat. (b, m)
Spoil (x) Difficult to identify, probably refers to the 
stolen treasures of other nations.
Isaiah 35 Desert x Deserts dominate the landscapes of the Near 
East.
Dry land x Dry land may refer to any type of arid 
environment in the Near East. Due to the 
climate, large areas of the Near East were dry 
and unsuitable for cultivation most of the 
year.
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Abundant blossom x In the biological sense, this refers to the 
reproductive stage of plants. The active 
reproductive stage in deserts is closely 
connected to rainfall. Thus, abundant 
blossoms can only occur when water 
is abundant. Interestingly, blossom is 
associated with paradisiacal circumstances in 
many cultures. (y)
Crocus x Crocus spp. Several native species in the 
Near East, some of which are also used as 
food or ornamental plants. (k)
Lebanon x A territory north of Israel. (h)
Carmel x A mountain top north of Sharon (see 
“Sharon” below). Also a city in Judah. (h, q)
Sharon x Or plain of Sharon, a coastal region of  the 
Mediterranean. (h, q)
Deer x The Book of Isaiah refers to the typical 
movement of deer (Cervidae spp.). Deer 
provided an important supplementary 
source of meat and raw material for carving. 
(b)
Wilderness x The ancient Near East was mostly wilderness 
or desert. (h, j, q)
Water breaks forth x Episodic lakes are often generated after heavy 
rains in arid environments if sand covers 
have absorbed and retained groundwater 
well. Even single rains can from sheets of 
water on a rocky surface. (j)
Burning sand shall 
become ->
x The high temperatures of sand are typical of  
the desert during the daytime.
-> a pool x See “Water breaks forth” above.
Springs of water x See “Water breaks forth” above.
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Jackals x Two subspecies of Golden jackals (Canis 
aureus), Syrian (ssp. syriacus), and Egyptian 
(ssp. lupaster), are native to the Near East. (b, 
e)
Reeds x Scirpus spp., many different types of grasses. 
Mainly present in marshes and alluvial lands. 
(k, w)
Rushes x Juncus sp. Present in wetlands and around 
the edges of pools. (k)
Highway (x) Highway refers here to the safe way to God’s 
kingdom. It is uncertain if the modern use 
of this term is applicable to the routes of the 
Near East.
Lion x This passage denies the presence of lions in 
paradise. See “Lion” above.
Ravenous beast x Probably refers to all large carnivores found 
in the ancient Near East.
Isaiah 54 Foundations of 
sapphires
x A blue form of corundum. Not used as a 
gemstone before the final quarter of the 
first millennium BCE. Impure forms of 
corundum, known as emery, were used for 
beads and seals from at least the early second 
millennium BCE, however.
The Bible may also refer here to lapis 
lazuli, an opaque semi-precious, usually 
blue gemstone, which was the most widely 
utilized material for beads, ornaments, and
amulets in the ancient Near East. Especially 
for the Sumerians, and in combination with 
gold, it was a valued status symbol. (d)
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Pinnacles of agate x The Bible may refer here to jasper or ruby as 
well.  For agate and jasper, see details below.
Ruby is a red form of corundum. Not used 
as a gemstone before the final quarter of 
the first millennium BCE. Impure forms of 
corundum, known as emery, were used for 
beads and seals from at least the early second 
millennium BCE, however. (d)
Gates of carbuncle x Carbuncle, or crystal, was an important and 
precious mineral. See also “crystal” below. 
(d)
Wall of precious 
stones
(x) Both walls of the cities or houses and several 
precious stones were familiar in the Near 
East. There is no direct counterpart for the 
wall described here, however.
Weapon x
Isaiah 60 Abundance of the 
sea
(x) Refers possibly to the nourishment such as 
fish and crustacean.
(The young) camels 
(of Midian and 
Ephah)
x The Bactrian camel (Camelus bactrianus) 
was probably domesticated by the beginning 
of the second millennium and was a source 
of milk and meat. It was also used for 
transport. The status of the dromedary 
(Camelus dromedarius) is less clear as it is 
difficult to infer from the available material 
whether the dromedary was primarily 
herded or hunted. (b)
Midian x A territory east of the Sinai peninsula. It may 
also refer to the people of Midianites. The 
camels of the Midianites are also described 
in Judg. 6-8. (h)
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Ephah x Refers probably either to the people of 
Ephah; also considered to be the people 
known as the Midianites, or the city of 
Ephah located south of Kedar. (q)
Sheba x A territory on the south-western corner of 
the Arabian peninsula. (h, q)
Gold x See “(Good/pure) gold” above.
Frankincense x A highly valued balsamic gum exuded from 
the trees of genus Boswellia, more specifically 
Boswellia sacra flückiger and B. frereana 
birdwood. Native to Arabia, Ephah, Sheba, 
and Somalia, but probably not to Palestine. 
Burnt with the sacrifice of meal offerings. (w, 
z)
Kedar x An area east of the Dead Sea. Also a son of 
Ishmael (see Gen. 25:13). (h)
Ram x A common name for male sheep (Ovis aries) 
or goats (Capra hircus).
Nebaioth x Probably refers to the tribe of Nabataeans 
who lived in a region east of the Dead Sea. 
Also a son of Ishmael (see Gen. 25:13). (q, h)
Doves x Family Columbidae. Eighteen species are 
native to the Near East, nine of them in the 
Levant area. (e)
Ships of Tarsish x Refers either to the vessel’s place of origin or 
a type of vessel intended for long voyages on 
the high seas. Tarsish was also a geographical 
location, probably a synonym for Sardinia 
(in the Mediterranean) or Tartessos (Tarsish) 
in Spain. (h, o)
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Silver x In its native form, a rare metal and usually 
obtained from ores containing silver in small 
amounts. Possible sources included Midian 
(east of the Gulf of  ‘Aqaba), Greece, and 
Taurus Mountains as well as the Keban and 
Upper Euphrates regions. Silver was used 
for many purposes including vessels, statues, 
and personal ornaments. It was also used as 
money. (d, t)
Israel x See “Israel” above.
Walls x It is unclear whether this refers to walls of 
houses or cities.
Gates x Gates were usually passages to fortified cities. 
(i)
Lebanon x A mountainous region north of Israel. (h)
Cypress x Cupressus sempervirens, native to the 
Near East, employed for a wide variety of 
purposes. (b, f, g)
Plane x Platanus sp., native to the forests of the 
Near East, employed for a wide variety of 
purposes. (g)
Pine x Pinus sp., native in the forests of Near East, 
employed for a wide variety of purposes. (b, 
f, g)
Iron x Pure iron was not known in the ancient Near 
East. An alloy consisting of iron and small 
amounts of carbon was widely used and 
employed, however. Sources are difficult to 
identify, but iron was possibly a by-product 
of copper smelting. There is also evidence 
that the first sources of iron were meteorites. 
Used for tools, vessels, weapons, and armour. 
(d, t)
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This passage of Isaiah emphasizes that iron 
is a less valuable option to silver, which will 
replace iron in the promised land.
Bronze x A common name for a range of binary 
alloys consisting of copper and tin. Several 
sources, of which eastern Anatolia, the 
Mediterranean coastal region, and the Upper 
Euphrates were the most significant during 
the Neo-Assyrian period. Used for tools, 
weapons, and ornamental purposes. (d, t)
This passage of Isaiah emphasizes that 
bronze is a less valuable option to gold, 
which will replace bronze in the promised 
land.
Wood x Several species of wood were widely used for 
a wide variety of purposes. (g)
Sun x
Everlasting light – The midnight sun characteristic of the polar 
regions was most likely unknown in the 
ancient Near East. Moreover, the duration of 
the midnight sun is from a few days to a few 
weeks a year.
Moon x
Isaiah 65 Houses x Houses as permanent dwellings became 
more common after urbanization took place 
during the Early Bronze Age. (i, u, q)
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Vineyards x Wine and viticulture were important 
throughout the ancient Near East. Vines 
(Vitis sp.) require regular rainfall and 
sunlight. Thus, vineyards could only be 
successful if general circumstances were 
favourable and water resources were plentiful 
enough. Viticulture was generally risky due 
to unpredictability of climatic factors. See 
also Isa 32. (a, w)
Fruit x The Book of Isaiah refers here to grapes, 
widely cultivated in the Near East. See also 
Isa. 32. (a).
Wolf x See “wolf ” above.
Lamb x Sheep (Ovis aries). See “Cattle” above.
Lion x See “Lion” above.
Ox x Male of a species of the cattle. See “Cattle” 
above.
Serpent x See “Serpent” above.
(Holy) mountain x Mountain tops were typical locations 
for cities, including Jerusalem. See also 
“Mountains” above.
Revelation 21-
22
Throne x Seats of kings and gods. Usually decorated 
with jewels, gold, and silver. (ab)
Mountain x See “Mountains” and “(Holy) mountain” 
above.
The most rare jewel x Possibly jasper or crystal, or lapis lazuli.
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Jasper x A relatively frequent quartz used for working 
tools and for ornamental purposes. Several 
forms of a different colour are known. 
The main sources were the Irano-Arabian 
and Arabian mountains. Appeared in 
Mesopotamia from the Akkadian period 
onwards. (d)
Great, high wall x Fortification systems characterized the cities 
of the Near East, especially those of  Syria 
and Palestine. Most cities were surrounded  
by ramparts by the second millennium 
BCE. The walls of Jerusalem were built in 
the 8th century BCE to resist the attacks of 
conquerors. (i)
Gates x Typical passages to cities. (i)
New Jerusalem (x) The paradise described in Revelation. While 
the reference to Jerusalem is clear, there is no 
direct counterpart, however.
Gold (clear/
transparent as glass)
x Clear/transparent refers here to the glaring 
appearance of gold rather than actual 
transparency.  See also “(Good/pure) gold” 
above. (ac)
Sapphire x See “Foundations of sapphires” above.
Agate x A microcrystalline quartz coloured white 
and brown, sometimes with a little blue. 
Widely used for ornamental purposes. (d)
Emerald x A deeper-coloured, green, and transparent 
variant of beryl found especially in the 
Sikait/Zabara region of the desert of eastern 
Egypt. Used for beads and decorational 
purposes. See also “Beryl” below. (t)
Onyx x See “Onyx stone” above.
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Carnelian x Or cornelian, a transparent microcrystalline 
quartz used for beads, amulets, and 
ornaments. It was generally rare and highly 
appreciated. (d)
Chrysolite x Or olivine, an olive-green and obviously rare 
mineral in the ancient Near East. Occurs in 
small pebbles and was therefore suitable only 
for small items. Used at least for ornamental 
purposes and in necklaces. (d)
Beryl x A stone of which several colour variants, 
of which green is the most common, are 
known. Beryl refers to the light-coloured, 
transparent variant of this stone. Has yet 
to be reliably reported in Mesopotamia or 
Egypt (or elsewhere in the Near East) before 
the 4th century BCE. (d, t)
Topaz x Topaz known in biblical times was the 
peridot (a variant of olivine, see “Chrysolite” 
above) found on the Isle of St. John in the 
Red Sea. Usually associated with any yellow 
variety of quartz but topazes were also pink, 
blue, or colourless.  (t)
Chrysoprase x A pale apple-green variety of chalcedony. It 
was obviously was not available in the Near 
East before the beginning of the Seleucid 
period (c. 310 BCE). Chalcedony in general 
was well known and widely used during the 
first millennium BCE, however. (d, v)
Jacinth x Or zircon, belongs to the family of mineral 
called garnets. Can take various forms and 
colours. Often confused with hessonite. 
Known at least in Roman times, but earlier 
evidence is scarce and unconfirmed. (t)
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Amethyst x A transparent quartz coloured deep purple 
or violet. Occurs naturally in Egypt but was 
probably only sporadically available. More 
plentiful during the first millennium BCE. 
Used in beads and pendants as well as for 
ornamental purposes. (d)
Temple x A house of god or gods. Remains of different 
types of temples are found throughout the 
Near East and Egypt. (p, q, r)
Lack of darkness – The midnight sun characteristic of the polar 
regions was most likely unknown in the 
ancient Near East. Moreover, the duration of  
the midnight sun is from a few days to a few 
weeks a year. Revelation refers here to eternal 
light.
River of the water 
of life
(x) No direct reference to any particular river.
Crystal x Or rock crystal, a colourless macrocrystalline 
variety of quartz. Used especially for 
beads. Considered as a luxury material 
in the first millennium and, according to 
Mesopotamian grave finds, was obviously 
only available for richer people. (d)
Twelve kinds of fruit (x) Species not specified.
x = present, (x) = possibly present, see Details/Notes for further information,  –  = not present
* The main source is ESV. NIV and NLV are used as supplementary sources where necessary.
(a) Renfrew 1995, (b) Hesse 1995, (c) Miller 1969, (d) Moorey 1994, (e) Gilbert 2002, (f) Potts 
1997, (g) Kuniholm 1997, (h) Aharoni & Avi-Yonah 1977, (i) Mazar 1995, (j) Butzer 1995, (k) 
Zohary 1973, (l) Caubet 2002, (m) Breniquet 2002; Root 2002; Hesse & Wapnish 2002, (n) Kolars 
& Mitchell 1991, (o) Bass & Wachsmann 1997; Casson 1995 [1971], (p) Bahat 1997, (q) Curtis 2007, 
(r) Arnold 1997, (s) Irvin 1997, (t) Ogden 1982, (u) Coogan 1998, (v) Gafni 2007, (w) Fauna and 
flora of the Bible 1972, (x) Oded & Rabinowitz 2007, (y) Frese 2005, (z) Feliks 2007, (å) Brown 
1971; Chapman 1997, (ä) Hopkins 1997, (ö) Irvin 1997, (aa) LaBianca 1997, (ab) Enclyclopaedia 
Britannica 2008d, (ac) Liddell 1996.
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It must be noted that in many cases in Table 6.1, several interpretations of the meaning 
of individual properties are possible and sometimes reliable identification cannot be 
achieved. This is particularly true of many geographical locations. I have made an 
assumption that there is a real world counterpart if such a location was known within the 
territory familiar to the Israelites of the time. Still, it is sometimes uncertain how much 
familiarity derives from antecedent versions of the representations. This applies especially 
to the Eden narrative in Genesis 1-3, which borrows elements from Sumerian and Egyptian 
mythology and has developed in Mesopotamia rather than in the Levant (e.g., Partin 
2005; Moynihan 1979: 3-5). For example, the nuances of Mesopotamian origin such the 
sacredness of trees and water are still apparent in the biblical version (Moynihan 1979: 6). 
Thus, while examining whether a property has been familiar or not, we must also keep in 
mind that the knowledge to which biblical writers had access was not limited to the Levant 
area (for a more detailed analysis, see Results below).
Table 6.2 – The nature of human existence in paradises in the Bible.
Bible Terms used to describe human actions and existence
Genesis Present Dominion over the other life forms of Earth.
Fruits for food
Nakedness (without being ashamed)
Fear (after eating a fruit of the tree in the midst of the 
garden, the tree of life)
Not present Loneliness
Names (humans are given names after God had decided 
to expel them from the Garden of Eden)
Isaiah Present A little child leads lions, calf, and cattle
A nursing child shall play over the hole of cobra
A weaned child shall put his hand on the adder’s den
The banished are assembled
Kings reign in righteousness
Princes rule in justice
(People) will abide in peaceful habitation, in secure 
dwellings, and in quiet resting places
Eternal righteousness, quietness, and trust (or security)
Prey and spoil in abundance will be divided
The lame will take the prey
Peace for one’s children
The eyes of the blind open
The ears of the deaf unstop
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The lame man leaps like the deer
The tongue of mute sing for joy
The redeemed shall walk there
(Everlasting) gladness and joy
Land is possessed forever
(Chosen people) shall long enjoy (or: shall wear out) the 
work of their hands
Plant vineyards and eat their fruit
Young man shall die a hundred years old
Sinner a hundred years old shall be accursed
The days of the people are like a days of a tree
(They and their descendants shall) be the offspring of the 
blessed of God
God knows all the intentions of humans
Not present Nations lifting up sword against nations
Learning war
Hurt or destruction
Sickness
Iniquity
Sorrow
Sighing
Unclean (people)
Disgrace or shame
Weapons (against the chosen people)
Violence
Devastation
Mourning
Labour in vain
Bear children for calamity (or: for sudden terror)
Build (and another inhabit)
Plant (and another eat)
Infant who lives but a few days
Old man who does not fill out his days
Weeping
Revelation Present The water of life will be given without payment
Only those whose names are written in the Lamb’s book 
of life
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Not present Anything unclean, detestable, or false
Tears
Death
Mourning
Crying
Pain
Cowards
Insolence
The faithless
The detestable
Murderers
The sexually immoral
Sorcerers
Idolaters
Liars
Everyone who loves or practices falsehood
Results
The comparisons in Table 6.1 show a strong relationship between actual and paradisiacal 
circumstances. Generally speaking, biblical paradises are very much like the real world 
with only a few exceptions such as a lack of darkness or beasts, for example. Even in these 
cases, the properties derive from the real world and the difference is achieved through 
polarization. The paradisiacal worlds were without doubt very familiar and intuitive to 
the Israelites. The general forms of the landscape, flora and fauna, and cultural aspects are 
directly borrowed from the real world.
Furthermore, geographical and cultural transitions are notable. The time frame within 
which the paradises in this data fit is at least about 11 centuries. The narrative about the 
Garden of Eden in Genesis shares elements with narratives of the Sumerian and thus 
of Mesopotamian origin. Compared with the real world, it seems to borrow its main 
ingredients from Mesopotamian geography and Sumerian shade-tree gardening technique 
(see Renfrew 1995; Moynihan 1979: 2-12). However, while the core content of the narrative 
itself has remained largely intact, the clear references to African geographical locations 
are absent in the Gilgamesh epic and Babylonian accounts (see Heidel 1951; 1954; Wyatt 
2005) indicating that the biblical writers have “localized” the narrative to make it fit their 
world better.
The visions of Isaiah (and other prophets alike) follow the same outline. Again, 
geographical context reflects the changes of the world of the biblical writers. The 
geographical settings had become concentrated around the Palestine region as Jerusalem 
had become a political and religious capital of the Israelites c. 1000 BCE (Firestone 2005; 
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Sass 1997). In Isaiah, the place-names are clearly of Levantian origin indicating again the 
salience of surrounding real world circumstances. In Isaiah, natural settings are still very 
important, however. Most of the references to paradisiacal circumstances are derived from 
nature rather than culture.
By the first century CE, Romans had brought the Levant into the realms of the Greco-
Roman civilization which meant that Romans controlled political, social, and religious 
realities in Israel (Levine 1998; Schowalter 1998). The archaeological evidence from the 
first century BCE to the first century CE shows that the transition was rapid and prominent 
(Gray 1962: 216-229; Levine 1998; Schowalter 1998). At the same time, the Temple of 
Jerusalem had become the political, economic, and religious centre of the Jews (Firestone 
2005; Levine 1998).
The references to natural settings are scarce in Revelation although water, fruits, and 
lamb are mentioned. Considering that Jerusalem had fallen to the Romans and the Temple 
had been burned down in 70 CE (Levine 1998) it seems logical, by following the argument 
that familiarity and desire for stable and predictable circumstances define paradises, that 
the visions of New Jerusalem in Revelation concentrate on the majesty of the established 
paradisiacal city instead of natural settings. The re-establishment of Jerusalem and the 
Temple were, even only as an idea, of crucial importance considering their status among 
Jews and among the new Christian movement alike. Despite the minor role of natural 
entities, New Jerusalem is still constructed of familiar elements, especially of jewels.
Albeit different from each other, all the surveyed texts contain several similarities. In 
each physical welfare is granted and humans have control over the environment. While 
the real world is a harsh place, paradises are ideal for living. Only the most favourable 
elements of the real world are present. Ease of life and the abundance of resources are 
strongly emphasized. Moreover, human existence is not characterized by uncertainty 
and harshness and the living is earned without exhaustive work. From the emotional 
perspective, positive emotions dominate life while negative emotions are often explicitly 
absent (see Table 6.2 for details).
To sum up, irrespective of time and space, biblical paradises are described almost 
exclusively in concrete terms instead of abstractions or concepts reserved for “divine” use 
typical of theological concepts. The three major representations of paradise in the Bible 
strictly rely on the surrounding reality of their inventors.
Data set 2 – Paradise imagery of UFO religions
The era of modern UFO phenomena began in June 24, 1947 in the United States, when 
Kenneth Arnold sighted nine flying objects near Mount Rainier in the state of Washington. 
In a religious sense, contacts with extraterrestrials had been familiar to occultists and 
theosophists much earlier, however (Bartholomew 2003; Rothstein 2003a). Nevertheless, 
it was just after Arnold’s sighting and especially the claimed UFO crash-landing on July 
1947, near Roswell, New Mexico, United States, when belief systems around the claimed 
UFO contacts and contactees began to emerge.
Although UFOs  soon entered the consciousness of the public, before 1950 “flying 
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saucers” were regarded as secret weapons of a domestic or foreign army rather than 
spacecrafts of alien civilizations (Bartholomew 2003, Lewis 2003a, Partridge 2003). Their 
extraterrestrial genesis did not become a paradigm until 1950, however. The gradual 
change in meaning of the terms used for the UFO sightings was paralleled by the growth 
of a UFO community in general (Saler & al. 1997: 13). 
The rise of religious UFO movements took place from the early 1950s onwards. These 
movements managed to grab attention and gained supporters probably because of their 
ability to synthesize existing elements from esoteric and spiritualistic as well as theosophical 
and Christian traditions with modern science, technology, and scientific cosmology 
(Grünschloß 2003; Rothstein 2003b; Saliba 1997). Especially science has been one of 
the cornerstones of UFO religions since the 1950s, which is not surprising considering 
the supposed technological and scientific superiority of extraterrestrials compared with 
humans.
Despite their ostensible heterogeneity, UFO religions are generally millennarian, that 
is, they are movements that await an imminent liberation from this world, which in turn 
implies the founding of a “perfect” age or kingdom free from all the suffering of this world 
(Grünshloß 2003; see also Landes 2006). Prophecies of such a kingdom have been a recurrent 
theme characteristic of most UFO religions (Wojcik 2003). Furthermore, UFO religions 
are often cargoistic. They borrow the idea of the preternatural arrival of commodities 
from the Melanesian cargo cults but replace Europeans with extraterrestrials and superior 
technology while maintaining other characteristics (Grünschloß 2003; Trompf 2003; see 
also Steinbauer 1979 [1971]). UFO religions also share the leadership-support group type 
of hierarchy with cargo cults. Nevertheless, UFO religions do not descend from cargo 
cults but have developed their conceptions independently (Trompf 2003).
Although UFO religions are essentially an American phenomenon, UFO religions and 
believers are found throughout the Western industrial societies. The phenomenon as a whole 
is difficult to locate in any specific geographical regions, however. Modern technology, 
media, and recently the Internet make the messages of UFO religions accessible around 
the globe in a radically different manner compared with, for example, the societies of the 
ancient Near East. Thus, it will be more difficult to examine if the context and settings 
of the paradise representations of UFO religions match the real world. In fact, it may be 
the globalization of knowledge of the 20th century that may be visible in the paradisiacal 
visions of UFO religions rather than local peculiarities.
Sources
As UFO religions do not have any canonized texts in a traditional theological sense, it 
might be difficult to identify the sources that contain the “accepted” visions of paradisiacal 
circumstances. However, the hierarchical nature of UFO religions offers a solution to this 
problem. The accepted views are those approved, and usually written down, by the leader 
of the movement. By using these texts as sources, it is possible to analyse the more or less 
official ideas of the paradises of UFO religions.
The religious groups around UFOs are numerous and diverse and thus they have 
various conceptions of paradises. Still, the re-established-paradise-on-Earth type of image 
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and belief is shared by most UFO religions (Grünschloß 2003; Wojcik 2003). The examples 
in this study are representative examples of UFO religions and provide rather detailed 
pictures of their paradise beliefs. The groups selected for this study are the The Ground 
Crew, the Raelian movement (or Raelian Church), and the IFO-Sananda group studied by 
Leon Festinger & al. (1956). These three are representative examples of UFO religions and 
they are spatially and temporally evenly distributed within the epoch of UFO religions.
The Ground Crew is an American group in California and Hawaii. It was originally 
known as The Ground Crew Project, or Planetary Activation Group. However, it split in 
1997 into the new Ground Crew and the Planetary Activation Organization, apparently 
because of internal conflicts (Grünschloß 2003). Due to this, two similar conceptions of 
the establishment of paradise exist.
The Ground Crew has published its views in books and on websites. The general view 
is that the Earth will be saved by extraterrestrials who will turn it into an incomparable 
paradise where people are raised to “full consciousness”. Moreover, the world government 
will be taken over by The Spiritual Hierarchy. With its help, the atmosphere of the Earth 
will be transformed and purified and all communication systems will be replaced with 
“advanced technologies”. As a consequence, there will be ecological and sociological 
equilibrium and an immediate awareness of God (see Grünschloß 2003).
The Raelian movement was founded in France in 1973 by Claude Vorilhon (known 
as Rael), who claims he has received his revelations from humanoid space aliens. The 
group perceives itself to be a scientific religion and one of its major goals is to establish an 
extraterrestrial embassy in Israel at which to receive Elohim (or The eternals) when they 
land in 2035 (Lewis 2003b). The movement emphasizes the role of science and modern 
technology as solutions to the problems of today and denies the existence of god. However, 
Rael vividly describes the paradisiacal landscapes in Intelligent Design, a book published in 
2005 (see sources for details). This book collects the teachings of Rael originally published 
in French into several separate volumes. The claim of Raelians, according to this book, is 
that paradise will be established by extraterrestrial scientists who have achieved the higher 
spiritual, scientific, and technological level that humankind needs to rise to this next level 
to ensure its immortality.
The third group represents the so-called first wave of UFO contactees (for details, see 
e.g., Melton 1995; Rothstein 2003a). Officially, the group had no name but it was called 
IFO-Sananda Religion by J. G. Platvoet (1982) because the extraterrestrial who sent the 
channeled messages to Mrs. Keech (name given by Festinger & al. (1956)), the founder of 
the group, was known as Sananda. The group was active from late 1953 to late 1954 or early 
1955, depending on one’s perspective. The group was private by nature. Only after receiving 
the prophecies predicting imminent cataclysm and the rise of a perfect new world did its 
leaders step forward and attempt to tell the world what was waiting for it.
The IFO-Sananda group predicted that a great flood would drown most of humankind 
in December 21, 1954, and only the true believers would be saved (Festinger & al 1956; 
Platvoet 1982). The chosen ones would then repopulate the purified Earth. The prophecies 
of IFO-Sananda concentrated on the geological cataclysms that would cause the flood but 
they also described how paradise on Earth would be established.
The data concerning IFO-Sananda used in this study comes from scholarly sources 
rather than IFO-Sananda itself. Due to the nature of the group, access to primary data was 
not generally possible as it was reserved for the leaders of the group only. Thus, the views 
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analysed in this study are drawn from the works of Leon Festinger & al. (1956) and J. G. 
Platvoet (1982). They are based on the original messages, however.
The world of UFO believers
The world of UFO believers is a post Second World War world. In many ways, the 
time from the late 1940s until the new millennium has been antagonistic and radically 
different from the former history of humankind. Rapid urbanization, and technological, 
and scientific progress are characteristic of the later 20th century along with economic 
growth, globalization, and an improved standard of living, at least in Western countries. 
However, the development of even more lethal weapons, poverty, overpopulation, and the 
environment degradation due to human action have cast their shadow over the optimistic 
views.
The possibility of the imminent destruction of humankind became evident after the 
Second World War. For the first time, humans had armaments that could exterminate 
practically all life on Earth within a few minutes. What made things even worse was the 
Cold War, the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies 
that lasted from the late 1940s until the late 1980s. This led to the rapid increase in 
conventional and nuclear weapons in the world. Moreover, the arms trade to third party 
countries became a profitable business for these countries. The arms trade also served 
political purposes: parties involved in conflicts were funded on the basis of ideological 
orientations (Giddens 1997: 357-362).
Along with the political tensions there has been a trend towards rapid technological 
development and a shift from rural societies to urban societies. Until the nineteenth 
century, Europe and the United States were mostly agricultural and rural. Within a 
century, they had become industrialized and urban (Flora & al. 1987: 10-12; Martin & 
Olds 2006). The increase in the rate of urbanization is a global phenomenon: the amount 
of urban population has increased from 14 per cent in 1900 to 37 per cent in 1970 (see Platt 
1994). In Europe and the United States, the rates in 1970 were about 63 per cent and 73 per 
cent respectively (United Nations 1971) and the rates have continued to increase.
Access to information has undergone radical changes during the last few decades. 
While daily newspapers became common from the end of the 19th century onwards, it 
was the radio and especially television that truly revolutionized communication during 
the mid 20th century. The impact of the information revolution on general knowledge has 
been enormous as access to practically any type of knowledge has become possible due 
to the globalization of communication. Previously inaccessible information can now be 
transmitted around the world via several channels (Giddens 1997). Thus, knowledge is no 
longer limited to local circumstances as it was in traditional societies.
The Western society of the late 20th century is typically urbanized, dependent on 
technology, and its members work in a specialized profession not directly related to primary 
production. The everyday environment of the majority of inhabitants is markedly urban 
and the connections to nature are dependent on artificial establishments such as parks 
and zoos. Consequently, knowledge about nature has weakened and has been replaced 
by cultural information acquired mostly through media and literature, but it also stems 
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from everyday experience. Trade and transportation have undergone radical development 
meaning that most merchandise and regions are accessible to members of Western societies 
today. In general, people in Western countries have become more and more dependent on 
technology. Traffic, food supplies to cities, and the amenities all require technology that is 
in turn dependent on external sources of energy.
Nature: climate
From the point of view of climate, the environment of UFO believers is diverse. Large 
areas of lowlands with a temperate climate are broken by mountainous ranges with a 
colder climate. The majority of Western countries belong, according to Köppen’s climate 
classification, to the climate zones B, C, and D, which are characterized by temperate 
climates and seasonal changes. Variation may be ample, however. For example, the coldest 
variation of type D is typical of Nordic countries with four seasons and cold winters, 
whereas the type B climate around the Mediterranean is characterized by hot, arid summer 
s and cool, rainy winters. Thus, it is not possible to determine a single type of climatological 
conditions that UFO believers have encountered. In fact, the variation is about the only 
applicable constant (see Martin & Olds 2006; Peel & al. 2007).
Nature: fauna and flora
The diversity of climatological conditions applies to fauna and flora of Western countries, 
as well. It is neither possible nor relevant to review the whole diverse fauna and flora here. 
Nevertheless, outlines will be briefly discussed to provide a general picture of the wildlife 
of Western countries.
In North America, there are in the United States over 340 native mammalian species 
ranging from small rodents to wolves (Canis sp.) and grizzly bears (Ursus sp.) (see Corbet 
& Hill 1980). In Europe, the respective number of species varies from eleven of Iceland to 
almost 100 in Greece and former Yugoslavia (see WCMC 1992).
There are about 520 indigenous bird species in Europe ranging from quails and 
pheasants (family Phasianidae) to raptors (families Acciptridae and Falconidae) and several 
types of passerines (order Passerine). In North America, the respective figures are over 
800 species with many similarities to European avifauna. Only very few wild species are 
companions to humans, however, and even fewer find themselves comfortable in urban 
environments. Species with any economic importance are usually domesticated or held in 
captivity (for details, see Hagemeijer & Blair 1997; Sibley 2000).
In addition to the more familiar birds and mammals, reptiles, amphibians, fish, and 
insects are numerous. While most of these species are not familiar to laypersons, some of 
them are economically important. This applies especially to the fauna of the seas which is 
widely used as food.
Like the fauna, also the flora of Western countries is very diverse. Hence, only basic 
vegetation zones will be covered here to give an idea of what kind of vegetation should be 
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familiar to UFO believers on the grounds of their everyday experience.
The vegetation zones of Western countries in the North America and Europe vary 
from boreal coniferous forests to deciduous forests and woodlands with winter rains. 
Additionally, some regions are best described as desert, steppe, or grassland (Walter 
1985).
The variation in species richness is notable. Generally, the closer to the equator a region 
is located, the greater the species richness. In North America, there are over 18,000 species 
of flowering plants in the United States but only about 2,500 in Canada, for example. In 
Europe, the corresponding species richness varies from about 1,000 in Finland to over 
5,000 in Italy. The total number of higher plant species (i.e., excluding lower plants such as 
algae and lichen) is about 17,000 in North America and 12,500 in Europe (WCMC 1992).
Typical examples of native trees of Western countries are pines (Pinus sp.), spruces 
(Picea sp.), birches (Betula sp.), oak (Quercus sp.), lime trees (Tilia), maples (Acer sp.), and 
laurels (Laurus), meaning that there are both conifers and deciduous trees. Deciduous 
trees shed their leaves in autumn except in the southern regions, where there are also 
some evergreen species (Walter 1985). The diversity of flowering plants is even higher than 
that of trees. Examples of typical flowering plants are different types of roses (Rosaceae), 
sunflowers (Helianthus annuus), dandelions (Taraxacum), and marigolds (Calendula sp.) 
(WCMC 1992; Junikka 2008). 
In addition to native fauna and flora, many species are held in captivity in zoos and 
in botanical gardens. This complicates things further. Considering that most urbanized 
people generally have a poor knowledge of the native fauna and flora (Wolff & al. 1999) it 
may be that they are more aware of captive animals and plants than the native ones.
Culture
All modern Western societies are heavily urbanized. Rapid urbanization is mainly a result 
of population increase and immigration from rural areas. The effects of urbanization on 
society are much deeper than a simple concentration of people, however. The growing 
cities have become centres of financial and industrial activity that provide all the services 
and goods needed by the residents. As a consequence, sources of livelihood have become 
more varied than in rural societies (Giddens 1997: 471-474).
As an environment, cities differ radically from traditional rural areas, towns, and 
villages. The environment is completely created by humans and mostly consists of built 
structures. Sources of vital resources such as food are artificial, such as grocery stores. 
Moreover, life is concentrated on the monitoring and maintenance of social relationships 
rather than coping with environmental threats. Most threats are likely to be of human 
origin.
In urban areas, culture has many connotations. Culture is a loose term to describe all 
possible human activities of the late 20th century in the Western world. As class inequalities 
are typical of Western societies, several subcultures exist and it is rather difficult to identify 
any universal traits of culture applicable to all members of society (Giddens 1997). Yet 
some traits can be said to be at least typical properties of Western cultures. A desire for 
personal affluence, popular culture (including e.g., fashion, popular music, and movies), 
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and a membership of a certain social class direct behaviour to a certain extent.
Politically, most contemporary Western countries are democracies even though kingship 
is still formally maintained in many countries. Nation-states, political communities 
divided by clearly delimited borders, are typical of the Western world. Unlike the ancient 
rulers, the governments of Western countries have extensive power over many aspects of 
citizen’s lives (Giddens 1997: 55-57). On the other hand, or as a consequence, this political 
system has managed to guarantee a relatively stable society. There have not been large-
scale wars in or between the Western countries after the Second World War. Despite this, 
political tensions created an atmosphere of uncertainty due to confrontations between the 
United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies that extended over decades. 
While the Cold War is now over, it represented a significant potential threat during the 
times most UFO religions were born and it is probably one of the reasons why apocalyptic 
cults in general became a widespread phenomenon.
Paradise representations and the actual environment
Paradises of UFO believers are established through the action of supernatural agents. 
While it is not regarded as necessary for humans to die in order to gain access to the new 
world, believers are considered somehow to ascend to a new spiritual level. It is, however, 
assumed that the location of the new paradisiacal world is on Earth.
With regard to general natural settings, not many details are provided by UFO religions. 
Nature is described in vague terms. However, this is not to say there is no interest in the 
surrounding environment at all. On the contrary, the relationship between humans and 
nature is characterized despite the relative lack of details. For instance, The Ground Crew 
states that after paradisiacal circumstances are established:
“Our beloved animals and plants will also ascend and accelerate their consciousness. You 
will be able to communicate telepathically with them. You will be able to tell your plants 
to grow and they will grow. We will also be having new forms of animal life coming to 
the planet. Some old forms may leave if they are particularly viscous or and outlived their 
need here.” [The Ground Crew website]
IFO-Sananda, in  turn, provides quite  specific geography with regard to the 
establishment of the paradisiacal world, while the circumstances themselves are described 
only briefly:
“The great tilting of the land of the U.S. to the East will throw up mountains along the 
Central States, along the Great New Sea, along North and South – to the South. The new 
mountain range shall be called The Argone Range, which will signify the ones who have 
been there are gone – the old has gone past – the new is. This will be as a monument to 
the old races; to the new will be the Altar of the Rockies and the Alleghenies.” [after 
Festinger & al. 1956: 56-57]
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and
“Egypt would be remade and the desert would become a fertile valley; Mu would rise 
from the Pacific; the “uprising of the Atlantic bottom” would “submerge the land of the 
Atlantic seaboard”; France would sink to the bottom of the Atlantic, as would England; 
and Russia would become one great sea”  [after Festinger & al. 1956, 56-57]
The most detailed, if still rather general, descriptions of natural environment are 
provided by Raelians. The text refers to Rael’s visit to a paradisiacal, perfect world where 
“The Elohims” live:
“Before me a paradisacal landscape unfolded, and in fact I cannot find any words to 
describe my enchantment at seeing huge flowers, each more beautiful than the last, and 
animals of unimaginable appearance were walking among them. There were birds with 
multicolored plumage, and pink and blue squirrels with the heads of bear cubs climbing 
in the branches of trees that bore both enormous fruits and gigantic flowers.” [Intelligent 
Design: 160]
and
“[...] behind the trees I was able to make out a group of buildings that resembled brightly 
colored shells harmonizing perfectly with the vegetation. The temperature was very mild, 
and the air was perfumed with countless scents of exotic flowers. We [Rael and a small 
group of Elohims] walked towards the top of a hill, and a marvelous panorama began to 
appear. Innumerable small streams wound through the lush vegetation, and far off an 
azure sea sparkled in the sun.” [Intelligent Design: 160]
Human existence, however, is a different matter. It is generally described in more 
specific detail than the natural environment. The Ground Crew states that:
“The end times are simply the end of life on the planet, as we know it. In the new times 
we will have many wonderful events occurring on the planet and within ourselves. For 
instance, we will be able to manifest whatever we want, we will be telepathic, live for 
thousands of years, not have any illness, know our life purpose at birth, have only wanted 
children, no longer need money or work for someone else. We will be god-like as we were 
originally created in this image. We will have extraterrestrial brothers and sisters visit 
here, we will see Angels, devas, fairies, talk with the plants and animals. You will meet 
up with lost loved ones from the other side. You will see there is no death, just a shifting 
from one physical form to another. End times are truly the beginning times -- the times of 
love, peace, joy and harmony.” [The Ground Crew website]
IFO-Sananda uses similar, if not such detailed terminology to describe the future 
existence in paradise. It should be noted, however, that IFO-Sananda describes the 
circumstances as current but available for the chosen ones only after the cataclysm. 
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Thus, they do not directly state what the life will be like but what it is already like for the 
extraterrestrials:
“What we [the extraterrestrials] enjoy as natural everyday enjoyments, you of the world 
cannot yet imagine. [...] It is a beautiful place to live. We have weather – snow and rain. 
We adjust our bodies to the temperature.” [after Festinger & al. 1956: 44]
Again, the most detailed descriptions are provided by Raelians. Life in paradise seems 
to be a continuous feast surrounded by perfect men or women. For instance:
“The eternals who live here, both people from Earth and Elohim, can fulfill themselves as 
they wish, without having to do anything but that which pleases them – scientific research, 
meditation, music, painting, and so on. Or they can do nothing at all if they feel like it.” 
[Intelligent Design: 162]
and
“the Eternals from Earth are not allowed to have children. They agree to have a small 
operation, which makes them sterile, but that sterility can easily be reversed. The purpose 
of  this measure is to prevent undeserving beings from joining us in this marvelous world. 
However, male and female eternals can unite freely just as they wish, and all jealousy is 
eliminated.” [Intelligent Design: 163]
Raelians go even further in describing access to sexual pleasures. In addition to  the 
citations above, they also state that:
“In addition, men who wish to have one or more companions outside the relationships 
of equality that exist between eternal men and women, or who do not want to live with 
a woman on an equal basis, may have one or more totally submissive biological robot 
women with the exact appearance that is desired. The same goes with women, who can 
have one or several totally submissive biological robot men.” [Intelligent Design: 163]
The descriptions contain constant references to real world elements that must have 
been known to the authors of these descriptions. I have summarized and explained 
the correspondences between paradisiacal worlds and the real world in Table 6.3. The 
characteristics of human existence have been summarized in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.3 – The presence of the properties of the paradises of UFO religions in the real 
world.
Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
The Ground Crew Planet x Earth.
Angels – Probably refers to angels as 
described in the Bible. According 
to the Ground Crew, angels will be 
in charge of paradise.
Devas – Probably refers to a class of 
celestial male gods in Hindu 
mythology. Devas can either be 
with or without form. (e)
Fairies – German, Scandinavian, and Celtic 
mythical creatures. First appeared 
in medieval manuscripts but are 
probably much older. “Fairy” 
is not a well-defined category. 
It consists of several kinds of 
mythical creatures such as spirits 
and goblins of different sizes. (g)
Extraterrestrial brothers 
and sisters
(x) According to the other references 
to extraterrestrials, this probably 
refers to humans who, according 
to the Ground Crew, live outside 
Earth. 
New forms of animal life (x) By following the principles of 
evolution this could also be said of 
the real world.
(Humans as) god-like 
images
– Possibly borrowed from Gen. 
1-3. On the other hand, in most 
religions gods are considered 
anthropomorphic.
Plants x Species not specified.
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
No pollution, nuclear 
weapons or power, no 
overpopulation.
All crucial problems of today that 
are said to cease to exist after the 
establishment of paradise.
(Altered) DNA x Or deoxyribonucleic acid. 
Contains genetic instructions 
used in the development 
and functioning of all living 
organisms. The first evidence 
of DNA was discovered in 1928 
but its structure was not fully 
determined until 1953. 
The determination of the structure 
made possible the conscious 
manipulation of genetic material. 
(f)
Five dimensions (x) The idea of three dimensions 
of space and the fourth as time 
is widely known. The existence 
of further dimensions has been 
discussed mainly by physicists 
during the 20th century. (h)
Earth back in original 
condition, “Heaven on 
Earth”
– This is not specified in detail. 
However, the idea of the 
restoration of the original abode 
is clear.
The Raelian 
movement
Flowers x Species not specified.
Animals (of 
unimaginable 
appearance)
(x) Refers to the presence of animals. 
No further details are provided, 
however (but see “Pink and blue 
squirrels with the head of bear 
cubs” below).
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Birds (with 
multicoloured plumage)
x Species not specified. It is not 
possible to infer if this refers 
to bright colours or colours in 
general. Within the Western 
Palearctic region, at least the males 
of most species are multicoloured.
Pink and blue squirrels 
with the head of bear 
cubs
– This kind of animal is not known 
in the real world. However, 
squirrels (family Sciuridae) and 
bears (family Ursidae.) are found 
native to as well as captive in 
Western countries. (x)
Fruits x Species not specified.
Trees x Species not specified.
Buildings (that resembled 
brightly coloured shells)
x May refer to the Sydney Opera 
House or a similar construction. 
Scallops (family Pectinidae) are 
molluscs that are worldwide in 
distribution and widely used 
as food. Their shells range in 
colour. At least the shell design 
of the Pilgrim’s scallop (Pecten 
jacobaeus) has been used a 
religious emblem. This use of 
shells took place during the 
Middle Ages in Europe (the badge 
of St. James). (u)
Mild temperatures x Probably refers to the lack of 
extreme temperatures typical 
of most regions of Earth during 
winter and summer. See also 
“Climate” below.
Air perfumed with scents 
of (exotic) flowers
x
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Hill x Terrain characterized by small 
hills is typical of many regions in 
Western countries. (r)
Small streams x Small streams and rivers are 
typical of many regions in Western 
countries. (r)
Lush vegetation x Species not specified.
Azure sea x Refers to the bright colour of 
water.
Sun x Probably the sun of our solar 
system.
People (resembling those 
who live on Earth)
(x) Obviously human inhabitants of 
paradise. Later they are described 
as “Biological robots”, however.
Robes x Several types of robes have been 
used across the world throughout 
history. (o)
(Multicoloured) silk x Silk is the fabric produced by 
silkworms. Originally used in 
China as clothing for the rich. 
Known in Europe from c. 2nd 
century BCE onwards. Has 
always been considered a luxury 
product with more symbolic and 
emotional value than utility value. 
(n)
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Cave x A natural opening in the Earth 
that is large enough for a human 
to enter. Many of the largest caves 
in the world are found in Europe. 
(w)
Furs x Here, furs are either carpets or 
covers for armchairs. Furs as 
luxury clothing and status symbols 
have been known in Europe from 
at least the 11th century onwards. 
(q)
Grilled meat x
Armchair x Very common. However, at 
the old royal courts armchairs 
were reserved for those with the 
highest social status.  Even today, 
the type of chair may indicate 
social distinction. The CEO of 
a company often has a more 
majestic chair than the rest of the 
personnel, for example. (t)
Trays x
Sauces and drinks (of 
unforgettable flavours)
x
(Marvellous) music x
Cities (with multiple 
architectural styles)
x While this is true of the cities in 
the real world, this may also refer 
to the existing designs of ideal 
utopian cities. (p)
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
(Innumerable) fountains x Fountains are typical decorations 
of parks, gardens, shopping malls, 
hotels, houses etc. Evidence of the 
early use of fountains comes from 
Persian and Roman times. They 
were also widely used elements 
of the gardens of Mughal India 
and Persia from the 16th century 
onwards. Fountains also appear in 
allegories as sources of positive or 
supernatural powers. (l)
No winter x True only around the Earth’s 
equator (see “Climate” below). 
Even there, several factors such as 
elevation or proximity to the sea 
affect climate. (r)
Climate (comparable to 
the Earth’s equator)
x Not true of Western countries that 
are located in the northern and 
southern hemispheres. Moreover, 
climate at the equator is not 
uniform around the world. See 
also “No winter” above. (r)
Rainfall only during the 
night
– Generally not true near the 
equator. Either rainfall occurs 
around midday (diurnal climate) 
or during monsoon seasons. (y)
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Robots x This obviously refers to cyborgs, 
biological organisms whose 
physiology has been augmented 
technologically by chemical or 
mechanical means. The concept 
was developed in the early 1960s 
and it quickly spread in popular 
culture. Genetic engineering 
related to cyborgs and human 
evolution has been discussed from 
the 1960s onwards and should 
have been already familiar to Rael 
by 1973, when the movement was 
founded. (m)
Scallop shell (as a house) x See “Buildings” above.
Shaggy furs x See “Furs” above.
Bed x
Bathtub (as huge as ->) x Bathtubs became common in the 
19th century. (t)
-> Swimming pool x The first swimming pools were 
built by the Romans. However, 
swimming pools did not become 
popular until the 19th century. (s)
Vegetation x Species not specified.
Female companion x Depends on one’s sexuality if this 
is desirable in the sexual sense. 
On the other hand, it is indicated 
elsewhere that male companions 
are also available.
117
Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Helmet x Helmets are protectors widely 
used by the military, fire fighters, 
racing drivers etc. The use of a 
helmet here is obviously related to 
the “Ideal women” (see below).
Ideal man/men/ woman/
women (really robots)
(x) Anthropomorphic figures that 
are exactly like humans from the 
outside but are really “biological 
robots”. See also “Robots” above.
Machines (that generate 
worker/companion 
robots)
(x) Obviously a sort of factory. 
Parallels with the real world can 
be found.
700 Elohim members 
of the Council of the 
Eternals
– The beings in charge in paradise. 
Among the members of the 
council is Yahweh, which refers to 
the god of the Jews but also to the 
claimed father of Rael (see also 
“Yahweh” below).
Transportation belt x A belt that makes travelling in 
the air possible. The idea of the 
“jet pack” has been popular in 
science fiction literature from the 
early 20th century onwards. Some 
prototypes have been developed 
in Germany and the United States. 
(v)
Jews x Ethnic, cultural, and religious 
group that has its origins in the 
ancient Near East. There are 
about thirteen million Jews today 
around the globe. Most of them 
live in Israel, and the United 
States. (c)
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Jesus x Or Jesus of Nazareth, c. 4-30 CE. 
A Jewish preacher and a religious 
leader. Christianity sees him as its 
founder and object of faith. (b)
Moses (x) Traditionally regarded as the 
founder of Israel’s religion. 
Historicity debatable. (j)
Elijah x An Israelite prophet active in 
Israel c. the 9th century BCE. (k)
Koran x The holy book of Muslims.
Mohammed x Or Muhammed, c. 570-632 CE, 
the author of the Koran and 
the prophet of Allah, the god of 
Muslims. (a)
Yahweh – Usually refers to the god of the 
Jews (see “Jews” above) but is 
used here in a different meaning. 
Yahweh is claimed to be an 
“Eloha” one of the extraterrestrial 
scientists who engineered the first 
humans. Also the claimed father 
of Rael. Also called “Elohim”. (d)
Buddha x Or Siddhartha Gautama, c. 563-
483 BCE, Indian philosopher and 
the founder of Buddhism. (i)
Allah – The god of Muslims.
Grass x Species not specified. Obviously 
grass is a common name for any 
green plant with grass stalk.
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Computers x Computers have become a vital 
component of Western society 
from the late 20th century 
onwards.
Large vessel (x) Depending on interpretation, 
several kinds of aerial vessels are 
known today, including several 
types of spacecraft.
IFO-Sananda Mu (rises from the 
Pacific)
– Refers to a continent that rises 
from the Pacific. The myth of Mu 
is parallel to the myth of Atlantis. 
(ä)
Sahara -> x
-> will be green again (x) The last desertification of the 
Sahara that is still continuing 
occurred by 3000 BCE. There are 
several wet periods before that, 
however. The most recent wet 
period took place between 10000 
BCE and 5000 BCE. (å)
Egypt -> x
-> becomes a fertile 
valley
(x) Only small regions around the 
Nile are fertile today.
-> is remade – Possibly refers to ancient Egypt 
and the time of the pharaohs.
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Religion Property*
Present 
in the real 
world
Details/Notes
Atlantis (re-emerges) – The myth of Atlantis was 
originally formulated by Plato in 
his dialogues Timaeus and Critias. 
According to him, Atlantis was 
an ideal, paradisiacal city. In the 
course of time, its inhabitants 
degenerated, however. As a 
punishment, the gods decided to 
drown the city and its inhabitants.
The formulation of Plato borrows 
elements of several flood 
narratives known in the ancient 
Near East and the Mediterranean 
region. Several attempts to localize 
Atlantis have failed and it is 
unclear if there is any historical 
truth in Plato’s account. Today, 
Atlantis remains a rather popular 
topic in popular culture. (ä)
Atlantic seaboard 
countries and Russia will 
become a great sea.
(x) Geographical interest and 
knowledge are clear here. Again, 
this seems to refer to flood 
mythology and the future great 
flood.
Earth x
Argone range (in the 
United States)
(x) A mountain range that symbolizes 
the birth of the new world. 
Situated in the United States.
Altar of the Rockies (x) Probably refers to the Rocky 
mountains that range from 
southern Canada to the 
northwestern United States. (z)
Altar of the Alleghenies (x) Probably refers to the Allegheny 
mountains that range from 
Pennsylvania to southwestern 
Virginia in the United States. (z)
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x = present, (x) = possibly present, see Details/Notes for further information,  –  = not present
* If several translations exist, the English version has been used.
(a) Lecker 2007, (b) Flusser 2007, (c) Jones 2005, (d) Lewis 2003b, (e) Williams 2003, (f) Campbell 
& al. 1999, (g) Briggs 1967, (h) Hawking 1996, (i) Reynolds & Hallisey 2005, (j) van Seters 2005, 
(k) Gutmann & al. 2007, (l) Moynihan 1979; Thurn 2005, (m) Asaro 2001, (n) Anquetil 1995, 
(o) see Racinet 1988, (p) see Eaton 2002, (q) Black & Garland 1975, (r) Martin & Olds 2006, 
(s) Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008a, (t) Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008b, (u) Enclyclopaedia 
Britannica 2008c, (v) Hambling 2005, (w) see Courbon & al. 1989, (x)  Enclyclopaedia Britannica 
2008e; 2008f, (y) Walter 1985, (z) see Penny & Olds 2006, (å) Allan 1981, (ä) Ramage 1978.
Again, in many cases in Table 6.3, several interpretations of the meaning of individual 
properties exist and sometimes reliable identification is not possible. This is particularly 
true of natural settings. It is not possible to identify trees or birds, for example. Furthermore, 
most of the specific entities seem to be derived from the cultural environment, especially 
from literature, either religious or secular. I have made the assumption that there is a real 
world counterpart if information about the actual parallel has most likely been accessible 
through some widely used channel such as popular literature or the mass media.
Table 6.4 – The nature of human existence in paradises of UFO religions.
Religion Terms used to describe human actions and existence
The Ground Crew Present Ability to manifest whatever they want or make the reality 
whatever one wants it to be
Have only wanted children
Ability to communicate telepathically
Ability to live thousands of years
Ability to know our life purpose at birth
Ability to talk with plants and animals
Humans are god-like
Ability to meet the lost loved ones
Love
Peace
Joy
Harmony
Not present Illness
Death
Money
Work (for someone else)
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Religion Terms used to describe human actions and existence
Raelian 
movement
Present Happy life
Eternal life
Ability to fulfil him/herself with anything one wishes 
without having to do anything but that which pleases them 
(e.g., scientific research, painting, meditation, music, or 
nothing)
Several (sexual) relationships with men/women (who 
actually seem to be biological robots)
Open-mindedness
Enjoying all the pleasures
(Doing nothing other than) making love
Safety
Liberty
Nudity
Ability to use the full potential of the brain
A cosmic mind that is connected to infinity
Universal love and harmony
In paradise on Earth:
Fulfilment
Freedom
Universal fraternity
Not present Dirty jobs
Aggression
Jealousy
Problems between the inhabitants
Surprises
Soul
IFO-Sananda Present Those who are open and receptive to “Light”
Joy
Enlightenment
Unparalleled new experiences
(Unimaginable) natural everyday enjoyments
Not present Scientists (or, people who follow Lucifer)
Death
Wars
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Results
The shift from knowledge about nature to knowledge about culture, both current and 
ancient, is clear in the paradise representations of UFO religions. Most of the paradisiacal 
elements of UFO religions are cultural and not directly related to nature. Imaginary entities 
such as fairies and angels have their parallels in tradition and literature, however, meaning 
that totally new imaginary entities do not appear in the paradises of UFO religions. When 
nature is described, details are generally scarce with very few specific references.
What is described in detail is the nature of human existence (see Table 6.4). Much 
attention is paid to emotions and the availability of modern amenities. Furthermore, 
humans are said to be able to ascend to a new superhuman level which makes it possible 
to fulfil every wish and to live forever without any problems, indicating that humans have 
control over the environment. Thus, the environment is no longer a source of fatal threats; 
whatever threats there are can be met relying on the power of advanced technologies.
The time span here is too short to analyse possible demographic transitions. Despite 
this, there is one apparent example of such a transition: the rapid development of genetics 
is completely omitted by IFO-Sananda. Considering that the activity of IFO-Sananda dates 
back to the early 1950s when genetics was still not established, this factor clearly separates 
it from the other two groups that have been able to derive the content of their paradise 
representations from the world of the last decades of the 20th century.
Paradises of the Bible and UFO religions – comparisons
At first sight, the paradise representations of the Bible and UFO religions do not have much 
in common. Utopian realms created by extraterrestrials where robots do all the work do 
not resemble very much the biblical paradises in which nature flourishes and wine flows. 
The apparent dissimilarity is more apparent than real, however.
While tools for mapping natural settings were modest during biblical times compared 
with the 20th century, a profound knowledge of nature is reflected in biblical paradises 
much more than in the paradises of UFO religions. UFO religions generally stick to a 
very generic characterization of nature with simple references to wonderful animals and 
plants. Biblical paradises, however, contain detailed descriptions of local natural settings, 
including flora and fauna, and seem as accurate as possible considering the knowledge 
of the time. Moreover, Genesis and Isaiah provide rather little information about human 
settlements; the importance of nature receives far more attention. The believers of UFO 
religions are not generally as aware of the importance of nature, as industrialization and 
urbanization have made nature a somewhat alien environment.
What remains similar is the nature of human existence in paradise. Both biblical 
narratives and the visions of UFO believers describe life in paradise in very similar terms 
and they are similarly connected with the fulfilment of needs. At the same time, context-
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specific threats cease to exist and humans gain the power to master the world around them. 
Moreover, both argue that work becomes unnecessary, people can live forever, aggression is 
suppressed, and eternal peace reigns over the world. In this respect, the different paradises 
resemble each other closely.
Again, some differences in how this state is achieved indicate change in real-world 
circumstances: UFO religions advocate the role of science, new technologies, and 
extraterrestrials, whereas the Bible only talks about God. Thus, a belief in scientific 
progress is only typical of UFO religions and it affects the picture of how the paradisiacal 
circumstances are gained. This contrast is not surprising. Science in its contemporary 
form was generally unknown in the biblical world and modern technological achievements 
were certainly not familiar to biblical writers.
We must keep in mind, however, that UFO religions partially derive from Christianity 
and thus use biblical imagery as a reference. Thus, some likenesses derive from the use 
of the Bible as a source in UFO religions. Indeed, many features, such as the Jews as the 
chosen people, or the importance of Jesus as a prophet (or as an influential extraterrestrial) 
have found their way into the paradises of UFO religions. The tendency to provide a 
detailed picture of natural settings is not passed down, however; it is replaced with a 
general level illustration. At the same time, the paradises of UFO religions remain more 
anthropocentric than their biblical counterparts emphasizing the importance of cultural 
settings at the expense of natural environment.
Discussion
The results of this study indicate that in constructing an imaginary paradisiacal world 
people tend to stick to the factual content directly derived from the surrounding nature 
and culture. The analyses show that paradise representations depend in fundamental ways 
on the circumstances and knowledge of the physical world. The idealized environment and 
the no-threats type of image are similar in both studied data sets, however. The differences 
reflect the changes in the real world. At the same time, the nature of human existence has 
remained essentially the same.
The cultural environment plays a far more extensive role in UFO religions. It is notable 
that most specific references to the nature of paradise are actually references to how the 
inhabitants of paradise live and what kinds of resources are available. Specific references 
to natural settings without their direct significance to humans are almost absent. This 
is explained by the alienation from the natural environment typically experienced by 
urbanized people (Wolff & al. 1999). Cultural knowledge has become a more important 
building material of paradises as it has become the most significant type of lore. What can 
be inferred from the rather generic descriptions of the natural settings of UFO religions, is 
that they probably still follow the general outlines set by innate environmental preferences.8 
Bright colours, flowers, water, animals, and trees still seem to be constituents of paradisiacal 
environments. Obviously, the lack of knowledge of nature that restrains the creators of the 
8 See the results of study 1 for details and further indications of what kind of environment is spontane-
ously perceived as “ideal” by contemporary Western people.
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paradises of UFO religions from describing the natural settings in detail, does not prevent 
them following intuitive expectations of how the paradisiacal environment would look in 
general.
UFO believers seem to borrow supernatural entities from existing folklore and religious 
traditions. According to Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge (1987) this seems to be a 
recurrent trend among religious traditions in general. The adoption of the symbols of 
previously established religions helps new traditions to establish their own credibility 
(Stark & Bainbridge 1987). Following this argument, the paradise imagery along with other 
symbolism should be based on existing imagery and symbolism. Indeed, the paradise 
imagery of UFO religions owes much not only to the actual environment but to (religious) 
literature as well. The supernatural agents that appear in the paradises of UFO believers, 
appear in literature and folklore well before UFOs. That said, the establishment of a modern 
paradise seems to be dependent on previous establishments. This is characteristic not only 
of UFO religions, however. Biblical paradises were also, partially at least, adoptions of the 
mythological themes of neighbouring peoples (cf. e.g., Heidel 1951; 1954; Penglase 1994; 
Wyatt 2005).
In a cognitive sense, the paradise representations in my data are ontologically intuitive 
in most respects, just as my hypothesis predicts. They also follow the outlines set by the 
surrounding environment and therefore seem to depend on knowledge about the actual 
world. Counterintuitiveness, as already noted in chapter 4, does not seem to play any 
major role in paradisiacal environments. Nevertheless, paradise is always established by a 
supernatural counterintuitive agent, or agents, thus separating paradises from the real world. 
Interestingly, there seems to be no major contradiction between this data and the preferences 
analysed in study 1. Thus, it is apparent that the dichotomy between theological and intuitive 
conceptions there is not as sharp as with supernatural agents. Paradise representations 
seem to be both theologically correct and intuitive although they remain concrete 
rather than abstract in both cases, which is   usually not case with supernatural  agents.
In evolutionary terms, the paradisiacal environments in my data are adapted to human 
needs rather than vice versa. This theme is in view in both data sets and, as already suggested 
in chapter 4, it is dominant throughout the paradise representations. The struggle for 
survival ceases to exist as circumstances become evolutionarily ideal in paradise.
From the viewpoint of environmental psychology, the results indicate that familiarity 
is a dominant property of a paradise irrespective of time and space. The studies discussed 
in chapter 4 have shown that familiarity usually enhances preference. The results of this 
study suggest that this applies to imaginary worlds as well. This aspect was more visible 
in biblical paradises due to more detailed descriptions. However, as already argued, the 
alienation from nature that has occurred during the 20th century in the west as a result 
of heavy urbanization has had a profound impact on the nature of everyday knowledge 
(Wolff & al. 1999). As nature has lost its significance as a direct source of supply, nature no 
longer represents the most considerable element in the surroundings but is replaced by a 
more relevant and immediate cultural environment. Thus, when the significance is lost in 
the real world, it is also lost in the imaginary world.
While these results indeed look promising, we should keep in mind that this study is by 
no means exhaustive. I have analysed only two sets of ideas of paradisiacal circumstances 
here. The primary purpose was to address the argument of the hypothesis that paradise 
representations are shaped by the actual circumstances and that the paradise imagery 
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varies depending on changes in circumstances. Still, I hope I have managed to make the 
argument clearer here. By looking at Table 3.1 in chapter 3 and the detailed analyses of 
this study together, it is evident that real world circumstances indeed play a major role in 
shaping paradise representations.
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7 Summary and conclusions
The starting point and the principal argument of this work was that the possible repertoire 
of paradise representations is cognitively constrained and the mechanisms responsible for 
the constraints are originally evolved for tasks related to coping with the environment 
rather than with supernatural worlds. After theorizing and testing the hypothesis, the 
picture has hopefully become sharper and we are now able to observe it from different 
perspectives.
Key findings
Generally, the hypothesis appears to be supported by the data. In study 1, environmental 
preferences seemed to affect how idealized landscape is perceived: the idea of an ideal 
environment followed the general outlines of environmental preferences. As paradises go, 
there is always a companion present, which has not been a consistent finding of previous 
studies in environmental psychology. Unbuilt environments have been preferred more 
than their built counterparts. However, recent evidence suggests that slightly modified 
environments with cues to care (e.g., parks) may be preferred most by contemporary 
people (e.g., Nassauer 1995; Williams & Cary 2002), which is in line with the findings of 
study 1 as well with paradises, which always contain traces of human modification despite 
the emphasis on natural elements.
When it comes to theological correctness, it is evident that theologically correct and 
intuitive conceptions of paradise do not differ much. The biblical paradises analysed in 
study 2 and those catalogued in chapter 3 are still basically intuitive. Thus, the contrast 
that appears between the theological and intuitive ideas of supernatural agents is not 
present in paradise representations. While religious traditions include abstract ideas 
concerning the final destiny of man, it seems that traditions recurrently hold belief in 
paradise representations that are generally both intuitive and theologically correct.
The journey has also revealed some surprises. Although the data derived from past 
cultures and religious traditions suggest that paradises are primarily natural environments, 
their modern counterparts refer to technological and urban ideals rather than wildlife, 
indicating that the details do depend on the location of the actual environment in time and 
space. This suggests that environmental preferences are content-wise slightly more flexible 
than some previous studies indicate and the importance of familiarity is greater than the 
environmental preferences alone would suggest. Even so, the typical preferred properties 
of a scene, such as visibility and shelter, still shape the preference for urban environments 
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in a similar manner to natural environments (e.g., Nasar 1992; Talbot 1992). Thus, it is 
evident that environmental preferences primarily serve as the frames of reference within 
which the human mind tries to optimize its responses to those circumstances.
In the data presented in study 2, this was indeed shown. Familiarity is among the 
significant predictors of the content of paradise representations. Moreover, the transition 
from nature-oriented to culture-oriented paradises was visible even BCE, and more so in 
the 20th century. It also follows the urbanization process that took place during the 19th 
and 20th century. Thus, the everyday environment of believers seems to have a major impact 
on paradise imagery, again indicating the important impact of familiarity. Alienation 
from nature reduces descriptions of natural conditions. This seems to happen under the 
constraints of folk-taxonomical knowledge, however, meaning that intuitive general-level 
classifications such as separation of mammals and birds still directs the construction of 
the individual natural elements of paradise representations (cf. Medin & Atran 1999).
In addition to the natural elements, many of the cultural elements present in 
paradises were constantly highly valued by the cultures in which the respective paradise 
representations were born. Again, only familiar elements tend to be found in paradises. 
Thus, the contrast between the paradisiacal abundance and actual harshness was indeed 
marked. Similarly, the emphasis on the positive quality of human life without any dangers 
and difficulties was contradictory with real-world life and conditions. Paradises were and 
are constructed within the boundaries defined by environmental preferences, familiarity, 
and contrast.
The results of the study 1 then raise another issue, that is, the role of the brain in 
the process of making up paradise representations. Paradises, like supernatural agents, 
are unreachable, and elusive at best being therefore outside the everyday experience and 
information our brain is adapted to process. But the results of the cognitive science of 
religion and neuroscience strongly suggest that supernatural conceptions are not built by 
some special structure in our mind. Instead, they are the result of the coordinated activity 
of many automatic mental modules (for reviews, see Boyer 2003; Tremlin 2006). Thus, the 
question is primarily about which mental modules are triggered.
While supernatural agents are primarily products of the mental network consisting of 
agency-detection, contagion-avoidance, and social exchange (Boyer 2003), supernatural 
environments require more processing in the mind. The environment is a whole that 
consists of multiple agents and objects. Agents can be further divided into human and 
non-human agents. Similarly, objects can be divided into animate and inanimate objects 
that roughly represent either resources or threats. An environment is also a landscape that 
looks different depending on the location of an observer. Thus, an environment is a great 
deal more complex than a single agent and the perception of an environment is cognitively 
more complicated.
Despite the complexity, agency-detection is still applicable to most individual elements 
of an environment as the agents are a crucial part of that environment. The same is true of 
contagion-avoidance which is used for judging optimal behavioural responses.  Thus, there 
is a need for just one more evaluation mechanism to make the observation of an environment 
possible, that is, the environmental preference mechanism discussed in the theoretical 
part of this work. This mechanism works automatically and it continuously evaluates the 
environment around us. No awareness of its actions is needed and it is only visible to 
outsiders in the form of possible spontaneous emotional and behavioural responses. As the 
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mental mechanisms processing information related to agents, environmental preferences 
are adapted to respond to problems primarily related to one’s survival from the point of 
view of external resources and threats.
The results of study 1 indicate that the preference pattern of the properties typical 
of paradises follows the pattern found in previous studies of environmental psychology. 
There were no signs that religiosity would affect the preference pattern in any predictable 
or significant way. Therefore, it appears that the preference pattern behind the paradise 
representations is of secular origin and works in a similar manner irrespective of a possible 
religious dimension. Thus, it seems that there are no dedicated mental modules that would 
be needed to produce mental representations of paradises. In addition to the supernatural 
agents, supernatural environments can also be produced in the mind by using mechanisms 
and modules originally adapted to tasks of a different kind.
The evidence in study 1 is not conclusive, however. There are still insufficiently examined 
details, such as the potential limits of manipulative elements that can enhance a preference 
for otherwise mediocre scenes. Some hints of this are found in the results of study 1. Bright 
colours can by themselves enhance preference, for example. Thus, future studies should 
concentrate on these issues instead of the general-level preferences which were the object 
of my interest here.
According to the previous studies in the cognitive science of religion, the hallmark 
of supernatural (agents) is counterintuitiveness. Supernatural agents constantly violate 
one or very few intuitive ontological expectations, which separates them from ordinary 
agents and thus makes them special. Unexpectedly, this does not seem to apply to paradise 
representations. Many paradises are natural, albeit ideal, environments without specific, 
recurrent counterintuitive elements. While many elements of paradises are stretched to near 
non-naturalness (such as eternal light or pasturing predators), they are not counterintuitive. 
If this was systematically true of paradise representations, their supernatural nature would 
become questionable. The data analysed in the study 2 suggests that this indeed may be 
the case.
The catch is that paradises are never accessible without an intervention of a supernatural 
event or agent. Paradises are always separated from this world by a supernatural force. 
Access to paradise is invariably preceded by an act of a supernatural agent even if the 
paradise is established on Earth and in this life. A counterintuitive element is therefore 
always present in paradise representations although the final environment itself may be 
ontologically intuitive. On the other hand, in most paradises some of the elements are 
counterintuitive. Humans who can transform themselves into butterflies, live forever, or 
can reincarnate, are good examples. Yet the violation of ontological expectations seems 
to be restricted to agents; violations occur far more rarely in other elements of paradises. 
Why?
This question is an extremely interesting one, but also raises so many issues that I 
will not be able to answer it comprehensively here as it would require another extensive 
study. However, I would like to speculate within the limits and knowledge provided by this 
work. My suggestion is that the answer may lie low within the nature of agents compared 
with other elements of an environment. Not only are other agents important actors in 
an environment, they are also the most dynamic ones. They go here and there; they are 
sometimes dangerous and sometimes not. Interacting with agents is more complex and 
reciprocal than any other type of environmental interaction. Thus, they must be constantly 
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observed and identified in order to maintain the sufficient level of knowledge of their 
state as a part of an environment. As they are dynamic by nature, it is more difficult to 
gather reliable information about them, however. Usually information about agents must 
be assembled and compiled from minimal cues. This, in turn, has led to the inductive 
inferential processes that eventually start to produce false positives, some of which we 
know as supernatural agents (Guthrie 1980; 1993; 2002).
This is not generally true of more static elements such as trees and rivers, however. The 
fundamental difference is that the static elements are not capable of moving. Consequently, 
there is no need to infer their presence based on minimal cues. Static elements can often be 
observed better, and acquiring information about them is rather easy. Thus, the pressure 
to acquire information about them however unreliable is not generally necessary, at least 
to a similar extent compared with agents.
As the mind has evolved to respond better to the challenges of the environment, in 
the case of static objects induction has not necessarily provided evolutionary advantages. 
Selective pressures have not directed the evolving mind to trigger inductive inferences for 
every object. Only in those cases where imagining false positives and reacting to them has 
actually helped one to survive have such inferences been promoted by natural selection. 
Thus, as the natural elements other than agents are not as likely to be objects of inductive 
inference, the mind has probably not evolved to handle this type of information in a similar 
manner than information related to agents. While some paradise representations show 
that humans are perfectly capable of creating ideas of ontologically odd trees and other 
plants, for example, these violations are not a general trend in paradise representations. 
The weaker evolution-based induction tendency could explain this difference rather well.
Speculations aside, let me now summarize the findings of this work. According to the 
hypotheses and results presented, the following notions apply to paradise representations 
(see also Fig. 7.1):
Paradise representations are imaginary realizations of an idealized environment that •	
reflect the environments in which they are born. Their creation process is primarily 
guided by innate, species-specific environmental preferences that at the same time 
regulate and constrain the possible repertoire of paradisiacal realms.
Paradise representations are exaggerated by-products of mental mechanisms rather •	
than real solutions to the problems of survival. Their attraction is based on the promise 
of solving all the problems and this triggers positive emotional responses. Moreover, 
their success over competitors is due to their ability to implant themselves in the 
evolved architecture of the human mind.
Access to paradises always  requires an  interference of a  supernatural agent or a •	
supernatural event, which also distinguishes them from other utopian worlds and 
other imaginary representations. This further enhances the memorability of paradise 
representations. The presence of counterintuitive elements in the paradisiacal 
environment is not axiomatic, however, and it is generally restricted to agents.
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No special mental modules are needed to create paradise representations. Mental •	
modules evolved to solve the problems of actual circumstances are fully capable of 
creating paradise representations by rearranging and combining information.
Theologically correct and intuitive paradise representations are not generally different •	
from each other. While there are some abstract, theologically correct ideas of paradises 
in some traditions that are markedly different from intuitive paradises, belief in the 
intuitive type of paradise is usually held in spite of the existence of a theological 
counterpart.
Figure 7.1 – The making of paradise representations. The “normal” cycle indicated by solid lines 
is the ordinary process of acquisition and processing of information from the environment. Dotted 
lines indicate the process of rearranging acquired and previously stored information into new 
representations with no direct parallel in the environment at hand. The template also serves as a 
point of reference for the normal evaluation of a scene.
Anyone who is familiar with paradise imagery has noticed that paradises are by and 
large quite natural environments. What has been less notable, however, is that evolution 
plays an indirect but major role in the development of paradise representations. While 
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evolution offers the tools, or the mechanisms of the mind, necessary for creating such 
representations, it is also the limiting factor. The study of the conceptions of supernatural 
agents has already shown us that it is not easy to exceed the limits of our own mind. The 
same seems to apply to supernatural environments. As powerful as the human mind can 
be, it is, in a way, a prisoner of its original functioning evolved in the course of time
Suggestions for further study
The purpose of this study was not only to try to find new results but also to serve as an 
opening. The issues of different aspects of the afterlife and, in a wider sense, supernatural 
environments have been largely omitted in the study of religion. So far, this has applied to 
the cognitive science of religion as well.
If we learn to understand how and why the representations of supernatural 
environments are developed in the mind, interesting research possibilities open up. For 
example, the question of how to gain access to a paradise has been a central theme in 
religions across the millennia. This has had secular consequences. Paradises have been used 
as instruments of power in the medieval Catholic Church, for example. Indulgences were 
collected from people who the church said could not go to heaven unless they had purified 
themselves from sin. It is difficult to see other reasons for this questionable business other 
than the exercise of power and money. Thus, belief in paradise may be utilized as a tool of 
manipulation.
Much more serious uses of paradises for manipulation purposes also exist. The access 
to paradise is often at least one of the motives connected with martyrdom. Furthermore, 
several cults and extremist wings of world religions use paradisiacal realms as promised 
prizes for certain actions. In extreme cases, this has led to mass suicides and other tragedies. 
While there are certainly other factors affecting the manifestation of such behaviour, the 
role of paradise beliefs in these cases could possibly be analysed along the lines proposed 
here. It would be possible to study, for example, if the uncertainty of real-world conditions 
promotes martyrdom as a way out of surrounding difficulties. It may turn out that the 
idea of gaining access to paradise is a more important factor in the psychology of an 
individual than has hitherto been thought. At this point, this is naturally mere speculation, 
however.
We should also remember that not all supernatural environments are pleasant 
ones. Many representations of supernatural environments are not comfortable at all. 
Representations of hells and netherworlds are, if not as common as paradises, widespread. 
At least the roles of environmental preferences and familiarity should be testable along 
the lines proposed in this work. It would certainly be interesting to know how much 
the architecture of the mind shapes representations of other types of supernatural 
environments.
Evolutionary considerations cannot take place without examining the adaptive values 
of behavioural traits. Although I have largely omitted these considerations here, the 
possibility of adaptiveness of belief in paradises should be studied in the future. While, 
according to my results, it seems that pursuing unreachable worlds is a by-product of 
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the adaptive functioning of the mind and therefore, from the adaptive standpoint, just 
vanity and a striving after wind, the answer may not be that simple. For example, belief 
in paradise may have a function that is a signal of one’s commitment to his or her society 
and thus maintaining paradise beliefs indirectly would promote one’s welfare (cf. Bulbulia 
2004; Sosis & Alcorta 2003). Thus, belief in paradise may serve as a signal of commitment. 
As a solution for adaptive problems related to an individual’s survival, it is difficult to see 
any adaptive advantage of spending one’s resources on holding such beliefs, however. For 
the fact that paradise representations offer apparent solutions to other types of problems 
than social cohesion, I cannot see them as directly adaptive. Further study may change 
this opinion, of course, as currently there is not enough evidence to affirm or disclaim the 
adaptiveness of a belief in paradise.
At the beginning of this work, I found the current knowledge about paradise 
representations and supernatural environments in general insufficient. At the same time, 
major leaps have been taken elsewhere in the cognitive study of religion; the progress, 
however, has not been reflected in the study of the afterlife. Thankfully, the situation is 
changing. In addition to this study, there are current interesting projects concerning the 
afterlife and paradise beliefs in progress9 and I hope my work will further enhance the 
interest in this fascinating dimension of religious beliefs.
9 e.g., http://evolution.binghamton.edu/religion/afterlife.html
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Appendix A – Structure and questions of the survey of 
Study I
Part Q no. Question/Details
Registration General information, instructions, privacy policy, and 
passwords. Provided via an email message.
Log in and language selection
Background information B.1. Sex
B.2. Year of birth
B.3. Nationality
B.4. Level of computer skills (three-point scale, used only to 
survey possible user interface issues)
Part 1 task You will see a series of pictures representing landscapes. 
The pictures are shown on the screen for a short time*. 
After the picture has disappeared, you will be asked to rate 
the pleasantness of the scene in the picture on the scale 
of 1-7. Use the top row keys [of participant’s keyboard] 
1-7 to answer. If you experience that the scene was 
similar or very close to the environment of your dreams 
[that a participant just imagined according to previous 
instructions], give 7 points. Otherwise, use the scale from 
1 to 6.
Part 1 questions* 1.1.
1.2.
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Part Q no. Question/Details
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
1.7.
1.8.
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Part Q no. Question/Details
1.9.
1.10.
1.11.
1.12.
1.13.
1.14.
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Part Q no. Question/Details
1.15.
1.16.
1.17.
1.18
Part 2 task Which one of the following describes the environment of 
your dreams better?
Part 2 questions* Finnish English
Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 Option 2
2.1. Hämärä Kirkas Dusky Bright
2.2. Kuuma Viileä Hot Cool
2.3. Lämmin Kylmä Warm Cold
Related to part 1 2.4. Suojaisa Avoin Sheltered Open
Related to part 1 2.5. Autio Asuttu Uninhabited Populated
2.6. Äänekäs Hiljainen Noisy Quiet
Related to part 1 2.7. Valoisa Pimeä Luminous Dark
2.8. Ennustettava Arvaamaton Predictable Unpredictable
Related to part 1 2.9. Vehreä Karu Green Harsh
2.10. Rauhallinen Levoton Peaceful Restless
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Part Q no. Question/Details
2.11. Jännittynyt Tyyni Tense Calm
Related to part 1 2.12. Asuttu Ruuhkainen Populated Crowded
2.13 Verkkainen Jännittävä Dull Exciting
2.14 Aktiivinen Toimeton Active Idle
Part 3 task You will be asked if the word you see on the screen fits in 
your idea of the environment of dreams. That is, would 
you like to see X in the environment of your dreams. 
Answer yes or no.
Part 3 questions* Finnish English
Unrelated to paradise repres. 3.1. Autoja Cars
3.2. Suojaa Shelter
3.3. Sotia Wars
3.4. Lehtimetsiä Broad-leaved forests
3.5. Surua Sorrow
3.6. Eläimiä Animals
Unrelated to paradise repres. 3.7. Kauppoja Shops
3.8. Kumppania Partner
3.9. Nälkää Hunger
Unrelated to paradise repres. 3.10. Siltoja Bridges
3.11. Kuolemaa Death
3.12. Värikkäitä lintuja Colourful birds
3.13. Sairauksia Diseases
3.14. Havumetsiä Conifer forests
3.15. Järviä Lakes
3.16. Kukkia Flowers
3.17. Käärmeitä Snakes
(Unrelated to paradise repres.) 3.18. Vuoristoa Mountains
(Unrelated to paradise repres.) 3.19. Leirinuotiota Campfire
3.20. Hyönteisiä Insects
3.21. Janoa Thirst
3.22. Jokia Rivers
3.23. Hedelmäpuita Fruit trees
3.24. Valoa Light
3.25. Pimeyttä Darkness
3.26. Vettä Water
3.27. Perhosia Butterflies
3.28. Hienoja ruokia Choicest food
3.29. Palatseja Palaces
3.30. Ikuista elämää Eternal life
Background information B.5. Childhood habitat (city, suburb dominated by terrace 
houses, suburb dominated by blocks/ apartment houses, 
town on the countryside, village on the countryside, 
sparsely populated area)
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Part Q no. Question/Details
B.6. Completion habitat (e.g., home, work, public place, other) 
B.7. Personality type (risk-seeking, safety-seeking)
Religiosity measurement
(score from 1 to 5, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree) Finnish English
R.1. Nautin lukiessani 
uskonnostani.
I enjoy reading about my 
religion.
R.2. Sillä mihin uskon ei ole 
merkitystä, jos vain elän 
oikein.
It doesn’t matter what I 
believe so long as I am good.
R.3. Rukous ja hiljentyminen 
ovat minulle tärkeitä.
It is important to me to 
spend time in private 
thought and prayer.
R.4. Minulla on usein ollut vahva 
tunne Jumalan läsnäolosta.
I have often had a strong 
sense of God’s presence.
R.5. Rukoilen etenkin saadakseni 
lohtua ja suojelusta.
I pray mainly to gain relief 
and protection.
R.6. Yritän parhaani mukaan elää 
kuten uskontoni edellyttää.
I try hard to live all my life 
according to my religious 
beliefs.
R.7. Uskonnossani minulle on 
tärkeintä sen suoma lohtu 
vaikeina aikoina.
What religion offers me 
most is comfort in times of 
trouble and sorrow.
R.8. Rukous tuo rauhaa ja onnea. Prayer is for peace and 
happiness.
R.9. En anna uskontoni vaikuttaa 
arkielämääni.
I don’t let my religion affect 
my daily life.
R.10. Koko elämänasenteeni 
perustuu uskontooni.
My whole approach to life is 
based on my religion.
Feedback information and 
ending
* The exposure time was 1.5 seconds. The length of exposure was not told to participants.
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